SUBJECT: CHAIRED BY: SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI) WITNESSES: MARC GROSSMAN, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; DOUGLAS FEITH,UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY; GENERAL JOSEPH RALSTON, USAF, COMMAND IN CHIEF,EUROPEAN COMMAND BODY: SEN. LEVIN: (Strikes gavel.) Good morning, everybody. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. In just nine months, NATO heads of state and government will meet in Prague to make a decision on enlargement of the alliance and to focus on a number of other crucial areas. In our invitation letters to the witnesses, Senator Warner and I asked them to comment on NATO enlargement issues; on the role of NATO in the global fight against terrorism; the organizational and transformational changes, if any, that NATO needs to make; the technological and capabilities gap that has developed between the United States and the other members, and how that gap should be addressed; the NATO-Russia relationship and how the "NATO at 20" concept should be implemented; how an enlarged NATO could function effectively as a military organization; and any other issues that our witnesses consider relevant to the future of NATO. Depending on whom you talk to, NATO's glass is either half full or half empty. Some on both sides of the Atlantic have raised concerns about the future roles and missions of NATO and NATO's relevance in the post-September 11th world. Some have even cited NATO's invocation of Article 5 for the first time in its history and the numerous offers by NATO members of participate in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a factor demonstrating NATO's weakness, because the United States has not seen fit to take up most of those offers. I'm reminded of a statement by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, upon the conclusion of the meeting of NATO's heads of state and government in June of last year, that, quote, "NATO's credibility is its capability," close quote. He made that statement to exhort the alliance's European members to spend more and more wisely -- on defense. That exhortation has not borne fruit, because Lord Robertson said publicly last month that, quote, "the truth is that Europe remains a military pygmy," close quote. To put the issue in some context, the $48 billion annual increase requested by President Bush for the defense budget constitutes 150 percent of the total defense spending of the United Kingdom or France, the next-largest NATO member states defense budgets after the United States. I must admit that I'm from the "glass is half full" camp. I'm a strong supporter of NATO, the most successful alliance in the history of the world. NATO successfully deterred an attack by the former Soviet Union and also,very importantly, helped to keep the peace among the nations of Western Europe for five decades. In recent years NATO forces fired shots in anger for the first time in its history and brought a negotiated end to the conflict in Bosnia. NATO conducted an air war against Serbian security forces and reversed ethnic cleansing for the first time in history. Even though the United States carried out the bulk of the Kosovo air campaign, I believe it was the moral strength and cohesion of 19 sovereign nations that led to the successful conclusion of the conflict. At the present time, the alliance is conducting three peacekeeping operations in the Balkans: in Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Macedonia. The Europeans are providing the bulk of the forces for these operations and the overwhelming majority of the civil assistance and financial support for those countries.
Pursuant to NATO's invocation of Article V in response the horrendous terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th, NATO airborne early-warning aircraft were deployed to patrol the skies over America, and NATO's standing naval forces were deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean at the United States' request. But the fact remains
(coughs) -- excuse me again -- that NATO must address a number of crucial issues no later than the November Prague summit.
Today we begin our consideration of all of these issues with three administration witnesses. I want to welcome
undersecretary of State for political affairs Mark Grossman; undersecretary of Defense for policy Doug Feith; and the commander in chief, U.S.-European command and NATO's supreme allied commander, Europe, General Joe Ralston.
It's good to have all three of you before us again.
Before I call on Senator Warner, I want to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Rudolf Petan, who is the chairman of the Committee for Defense of the National Assembly of the Republic ofSlovenia. And I'm wondering if he is in
the room, whether or not he would stand and be recognized.
It's nice to have you with us. We understand your ambassador is also with you.
And there may be some other ambassadors from other counties who are with us here today, and I don't know all of them, but I wonder if all the ambassadors who are here would please stand and be recognized, if there are other countries' ambassadors.
Nice to have you all with us. I wonder if you could just tell us what countries you are from, please.
(Each ambassador stands and names his country, with Sen. Levin repeating it for the record.) Romania. And you're Slovenia. And Lithuania. Nice to have you all.
Senator Warner, let me first thank you for pressing the urgency of this hearing. It is a very important hearing,as you have pointed out to me, and we are delighted now to call upon you.
SEN. JOHN WARNER (R-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman, I commend you on your statement.
And I will ask that my entire statement be placed in the record, and I shall give portions of it.
But I comment in my opening statement, consistent with yours, that our comments are not to be interpreted
in any way as -- I think either of us and, I think, the committee as a whole -- anything but the greatest respect for NATO, and our constructive concern with regard to its future. I want to make that very, very clear. I've been singled out as a critic since I took a strong stance about expansion in the last go-'round. I hope not to take that in the future, and will do so only if I compellingly believe that those steps have to be taken here in the Senate.
Basically, I asked the chairman for this hearing because I would not desire to see the Senate faced with a fait accompli sometime late next year, and we have to just simply say a yes or a no. We authorize in this committee.
The Appropriations Committee appropriates enormous sums of money for NATO, and I feel that the Congress should be a partner that's consulted as we move ahead, particularly in this year, where we're going to consider the enlargement issue. And I hope that our two witnesses, Secretary Grossman and Secretary Feith, can give this committee and, therefore, the Congress -- and most particularly the Senate, given its advise and consent role with regard to treaties and international agreements -- that we will be made a partner
in the consultations and the deliberations with regard to the expansion issues and any change with regard to the missions of NATO as they possibly will be defined in the forthcoming meeting.
So with that in mind, I'd just pose several questions as we go along -- chairman, and I join him, is what's the future role and mission of NATO in a world where threats to NATO members are now a non-state, in many respects, in the form of terrorism through global syndicates and organizations, and other threats that were never envisioned at the time the NATO charter was drawn up? The question is, is NATO beginning to equip itself with regard to these new threats?
And General, I hope you can comment on that. You have observed, as have others in your position, the
magnificent performance of our forces, the forces of Great Britain and other nations, in the Afghan region; to start with, the special operation teams which the chairman and I in our visit to that region in November, 15-, 20-member teams, highly trained to go in and perform a mission. Now, that is something that NATO should begin to envision. No longer are we faced with the one division up, one division in reserve. I mean, that type of warfare is most unlikely. I'm not saying that it should be totally eliminated from your op plans, but it is most unlikely, and this type of operation that we witnessed in operation would be needed by NATO if it were to be engaged to repel these global threats of terrorism.
The technological gap, the chairman referred to that. It's growing and it's of great concern. You quoted
General -- I mean -- yes, the Secretary-General Robertson. I'd like to give a little larger quote which seems to me -- and we know Robertson very well. The chairman and I and members of this committee have me with him regularly when he was the defense minister for the United Kingdom, and now he's done a brilliant job, I think, in the new role as secretary- general. Let me quote him: "The United States must have partners who can contribute their fair share to operations which benefit the entire European-Atlantic community, but the reality is, hardly any European country can deploy usable and effective forces in significant numbers outside their borders and sustain them for months or even years, as we all need to do today. For all Europe's rhetoric and annual investment of over $140 billion by NATO's European members, we still need U.S. help to move, command and provision a major operation. American critics of Europe's military incapability are right. So if we are to ensure that the United States moves neither towards unilateralism nor isolationism, all European countries must show a new willingness to develop effective crisis management capabilities." End quote.
I know of no initiative here in the Senate towards any unilateralism or isolationism. I don't know how he
selected those rather strong words. But we have an obligation to our taxpayers in the country who are contributing significant sums, to the men and women in uniform who are posted to the NATO commands, to make sure that this remains a viable organization and is worthy of our contributions.
History reflects the importance of U.S. presence on the European continent. There may be old jealousies and
animosities, but we have as a nation kept a steady hand to reconcile differences between those countries which go back for generations. Generations. And I think they recognize that and the value. And we wish to remain a partner -- not big brother, a partner -- in this operation.
Now the future enlargement. I can understand, and we welcome our ambassadors and others who will be
following these proceedings in the Senate, and I fully appreciate and respect the desire of your nations to be assessed as fairly and objectively as possible as this question of enlargement comes up. But I think we have to step back and say, is it really time to move forward with any significant enlargement, when internally we recognize these problems, from equipment to missions? Would it not be better just to let this round pass by and take our house and sort of put it in order, and then begin to look to the future for such enlargement as we feel is necessary?
My concerns with the NATO expansion have not changed substantially since the full Senate last debated the
issue in 1998, because if anything, the problems revealed by the Kosovo operation in '99 have increased my apprehension and, indeed, others, about the future rounds. I start from the basic premise that NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. That is why NATO was founded. That is why it continues today. Nations should be invited to join NATO only if there's a compelling military rationale, not political, for additional members, and only if those additional members will make a positive military contribution to the alliance. In my view, that case has yet to be made for the nine nations currently seeking consideration. We must always keep in mind that any country joining NATO will be extended the protection of Article 5 of the NATO charter, which states, "An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," end quote. That article was proudly invoked for the first time following the attacks on the United States on September the 11th. This security guarantee is the most solemn commitment any nation can make. Are the people willing to risk U.S. military troops and expend significant taxpayer dollars to defend the nine additional nations seeking NATO membership, pursuant to Article 5? That is the fundamental question.
If NATO expands beyond its current 19 members, some fear -- and I share that fear -- that the alliance will
become increasingly inefficient, indecisive, and just about a mini-United Nations for Europe, but a United Nations without a strong military capability.
We saw the Kosovo operation. We saw how 19 worked on those issues. You add nine, you get to 28. Does
that reach the almost unmanageable -- from a military perspective, unmanageable -- command challenge? You know -- and I say this only because of my sincere respect for the tens of thousands of men and women who have served in NATO proudly, the very large commitments of funds from the respective nations -- General Ralston, what number commander are you in the history of NATO?
GEN. RALSTON: Thirteenth.
SEN. WARNER: Thirteenth commander.
SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Lucky 13.
SEN. WARNER: Yeah. You know, in the annals of military history of certainly the Western world, there are
times when there's a great regiment or a great division, and when that nation can no longer support that regiment or division, rather than let it atrophy or change in some way, they proudly, as we say in the military, retire the colors. Maybe we should consider proudly retiring the colors of NATO and start over again, and figure out what is it we need by way of an organization and such military capabilities to meet the future threats and therefore preserve the integrity and the traditions of this organization, which so many have made -- given their -- indeed their lives and their careers to make it what it is. I think that's something that fundamentally we ought to take a look at. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Senator Warner, thank you for your very important and heartfelt statement.
While we're considering the expansion of NATO, I notice that our witness table is shrinking.
But before I call on our witnesses, let me see if any of my colleagues would like to have an opening statement.
Senator Lieberman?
SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Thanks, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. I do have a statement which I'd ask
you include in the record. I thank you for holding the hearing. I thank our witnesses. And I thank Senator Warner for his thoughtful statement just now. I know that in some sense his concern about the Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001, a bill of which I am a co-sponsor, has engendered this hearing. And that's appropriate and constructive. And I certainly agree with him that as we make these momentous decisions -- or the administration does -- that Congress and the Senate particularly should be fully involved, not afterward but as policy is being formulated.
I, as my sponsorship of this bill indicates, have a different point of view here, with all respect. And if I may try
to briefly state it historically. NATO is the greatest military alliance in the history of the world, created after the Second World War, clearly in the '40s, clearly for the purpose centrally of defending Western Europe and the values of freedom that we share with our European allies from Soviet threat, from, at the worst, Soviet invasion. I think it also always had another purpose, which was to be a unifier of Europe and the U.S., and particularly Europe postwar, to create a structure in which the nations of Europe who had fought one another would build a community together. And of course it's done that magnificently.
We have come a long way. We obviously won an extraordinary victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
And I know that there are some ways in which history tells us that when the reasons that motivated the
creation of an alliance no longer exist, that the alliance withers. But while we were victorious in the Cold War, obviously, it seems to me that the purpose of sustaining European unity within itself, now on a broader scale, as the Berlin Wall falls and the movement of freedom, our values spread to the east across Europe, that remains a very strong purpose. But also the alliance takes on broader regional and global responsibilities for security, and in doing so is a tremendous asset to us, to the United States as the sole superpower in the world. So in some ways my own feeling is that NATO has evolved since the Berlin Wall collapsed, and it has evolved in its mission as history has drawn it, but to go to places where its founders never could have imagined it would have gone, all in pursuit -- and this is my most important point to me anyway, which is in pursuit of the values that motivated the creation of NATO in the first place, which is the protection, advancement and spread of freedom.
On the military part, I just want to trace developments here. For years obviously physical defense of member
nations' home soil, as defined in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, has been at the core of our alliance.
That mission changed in the '90s, with Bosnia and then Kosovo, as NATO applied appropriate force outside --
although just outside its immediate borders -- for the common good of stability in Europe, and to advance ideals -- certainly anti-genocidal ideals that emerged naturally from the Second World War.
Now we have taken an additional turn in the response to the horrific attacks on the U.S. of last September
11th, where NATO invoked Article V for the first time in its history, responding to attacks on our soil, by supporting a war against an enemy half a world away from the United States -- hard for the founders of NATO to have conceived of.
But I think this evolution in our alliance is both realistic and healthy, and very much in advancement of the
values that NATO was founded on. Technology has obviously collapsed geographical distinctions to the point that today a plot conceived anywhere in the world can pose just as serious a threat to NATO's members' security as an aggressive military movement by a nearby neighbor nation. I think NATO has to accept that new reality, has accepted that new reality, and has to embrace a more expansive geographical understanding of its mission. And that is why I am a co-sponsor of the Freedom Consolidation Act. I believe NATO membership should be open to a large number of nations. If it is, NATO can become an even more potent protector of transatlantic and global security from threats that include terrorism. It can be a better facilitator of regional conflict resolution, and a more influential incubator of democracy. I mean, this -- expanding NATO to the countries that are mentioned in the act that I referred to -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania -- is a way to secure for as far as we can see forward the historic victory of American ideals that we won in the Cold War. Do we accept responsibilities thereby? Yes, we do. But I think that they are worth accepting. And I believe that any democratic European -- and I stress -- any democratic European nation that meets NATO's criteria and can be a net contributor to the security of the United States and of the alliance as a whole should be admitted to NATO -- hopefully this November at the meeting in Prague.
So I look forward to hearing how the administration is assessing the candidates. I look forward to working with
the administration on this, and I am anxious to hear today how the administration intends to involve the Senate and the House in these deliberations approaching the Prague Summit. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to say this.
SEN. LEVIN: Senator Warner wanted to be recognized.
SEN. WARNER: As you, colleague, stated quite accurately, that I did block the passage by the Senate of the
Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001, I did so not because of specific objections to the proposed legislation, but the procedural manner in which it was being handled. Namely, it was the last day of the session; there were not more than two or three senators on the floor, and therefore it should not have been acted upon by the United States Senate on what we call the unanimous consent calendar, where we just accept it -- without any debate, without any hearings. I think this is deserving of very careful consideration by the entire Senate -- perhaps this hearing will suffice. But, if not, additional hearings should be ordered so that we can consider it -- and then have some presentation and debate on the floor of the Senate before we adopt it.
SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thank you, Senator Warner. I absolutely agree, and I think this is very constructive.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay, we'll continue on our early bird venture. Senator Roberts.
SEN. PAT ROBERTS (R-KS): I thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 1999, when I approached the issue of NATO
enlargement, I said I am concerned that the organization is now at a fork in the road -- one path leads to continued relevancy and continued success; the other leads to disunity, and a loss of direction and also relevance. And today I share the senator from Virginia's concern. I am even more concerned with the future of NATO. It was created, as has been said, and will be said by virtually everyone, as a defensive alliance, and remained so through the end of the Cold War. But because of a myriad of reasons -- from the military capability gap, which does exist; current and emerging worldwide threats; lack of a direct threat to the continuing viability of Europe; the emergency of the -- or, pardon me, the emergence, if not the emergency, of the EU and its military capability, or the lack of it -- the very growth of NATO membership, I question whether NATO is or can remain purely a defensive alliance. There is going to be a great deal of pressure to continue to think of NATO for what it was during the last 50 years -- I have that prejudice: A defensive alliance of like-minded nations focused on a common threat. No matter how loudly we proclaim that NATO remains what it was and its formula for past success guarantees continued success, it seems to me we must face the facts that NATO has changed and will continue to change.
Now, how the transformed NATO fits into our notion of vital national interests must be explored -- that's why
we are having this hearing -- and examine certainly what has not changed -- not changed -- is that the United States must remain linked to our allies in Europe. But that's not the question or the issue. If NATO is no longer primarily a defensive alliance, then I would challenge any senator to take a look at the strategic concept adopted two years ago, two springs ago, at the 50-year anniversary of NATO, and read the obligations of what we now have in that strategic concept. I question seriously whether all senators or many senators have read that and know of our obligations in regards to this with organization: Will it remain viable and will it remain relevant? That's the question, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for holding the hearing.
I do want to say one other thing. Dick Lugar has to be one of the strongest supporters of NATO that I know
of in the Congress. He speaks -- well, when he does speak, people listen. He is a recognized expert and observer in regards to foreign policy, and he recently, on the 19th of January, delivered a very hard-hitting speech to NATO in Brussels, and he said, "If NATO does not help tackle the most pressing security threat to our countries today, a threat I believe is existential, because it involves the threat of weapons of mass destruction, it will cease to be the premier alliance it has been, and it will become increasingly marginal. "As important as they are, neither NATO enlargement nor NATO- Russia cooperation is the most critical issue facing our nations today. That issue is the war on terrorism. NATO has to decide whether it wants to participate in this war. It has to decide whether it wants to be relevant in addressing the major security challenge of our day." That's a pretty strong warning -- strong words from one of the Senate's most pro-NATO senators, and I think it's food for thought. And I look forward to the questions, and I thank the witnesses.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Roberts. Senator Reed.
SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to welcome Secretary Grossman,
Secretary Feith, and General Ralston -- and particularly welcome General Ralston who is a great leader of
our forces in Europe. Thank you, general, for being here. I was particularly struck by Senator Warner's questions which he laid out, which are fundamental to the consideration of all of these issues. And although some on the panel have reached a conclusion one way or the other, I think to many the situation or the issue is still subject to debate and questioning. But those questions, senator, are profound and very, very important. NATO was created, as we all know, as both a military and a political alliance -- predominantly a military alliance in its first several decades, I think, particularly focusing on, as Senator Roberts said, the defense of Europe. And it was the defense from a foreign threat, if you will, or at least an external threat, the Soviet Union, and also internal disputes which had cast Europe into two major world wars. All of that has changed fundamentally in the last several years. And indeed it's appropriate that at this crossroads we talk about the new mission of NATO and a new vision of NATO. I think we have to approach it with a recognition of the changes, and also with the questions that Senator Warner alluded to about its character today. Is it primarily a military alliance, or has it become a political alliance? Is it a way in which we can expand the values of the United States, or is it something that is more of an operational military arrangement? And these are the issues I think we will confront over the next several months as we consider the issue of expansion.
But there is no avoiding, one, the issue; nor, two, I think the reality that an alliance of some form, be it
political more than military, or military more than political, is in the best interests of the United States. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Inhofe.
SEN. JAMES INHOFE (R-OK): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me inquire of the chair -- we are doing opening
statements now, and then what are we going to have in the way of rounds?
SEN. LEVIN: Well, we'll start with round one, but perhaps depending on how long your statements are --
SEN. INHOFE: Okay, well -- I'll make a brief opening statement -- I don't have one prepared. But I just want
to say that, General Ralston, I have had a chance to be over there where we are training, visiting the hospital at Landstuhl, talking to these kids when they are coming back. And without exception they all said -- they have this spirit of patriotism and this drive that they all want to get back to their units, they all want to make a career out of it. So you have done a wonderful job over there, and instilling this in them. I particularly remember a young lady, whose name was Stennis, and she was on the U.S.S. Stennis, by coincidence. And she actually had an accident where she -- in a refueling operation -- you are familiar with this -- and she ended up going overboard and crushing her lungs, and she's anxious to get back.
Now, I see all this, and yet as it relates -- and I'd say the same thing to Secretary Feith. You and I were in
the Fletcher Conference as participants together, and I remember you said this would be one of your great challenges, NATO. I would hope that during your opening statements and during this meeting that we can talk about what effect on our op tempo is -- ops tempo -- is expansion of NATO going to have? I listened to Senator Lieberman, and I greatly respect him, but I disagree with the statement that they can be a net contributor -- I think I wrote this down right -- "net contributor to the security of the United States." I am not sure they have the capability of doing that militarily and politically. We were divided on our participation in both Bosnia and then in the Balkans, and I think it was because of NATO -- that was the argument that was used to get us in there. My concern was at that time we were down to about one-half the force strength that we had been during the end of the Persian Gulf War -- and can we really expect to maintain that op tempo?
We have got, what, 600 -- or I am not sure just how many Guard and Reserve we have over there right now,
but they can't sustain that level -- we all know that. The budget was deficient in two areas -- one, military construction and one in force structure. So I am concerned about how our participation in the expansion of NATO would affect our capability to meet our own strategy, and that is to defend America. So those are the concerns I've shared with you privately before, and I hope we have a chance to address in this hearing.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Nelson.
SEN. E. BENJAMIN NELSON (R-NE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Ralston, it's a pleasure to have you here
on this side of the water this week. Last week we spent time on your side in Brussels. I appreciate very much the information that you were able to provide to us as we spoke that time about NATO and the future of NATO.
And of course, Secretary Feith, I welcome you back, and Secretary Grossman -- very interested in your
comments, your thoughts about the future of NATO, and particularly as to the future relationships in the world. We are talking about membership in effect, but at the same time it's clear we are talking about mission, and we are talking about capacity, contribution of members. We may have to redefine contribution in terms of ability of allies to be able to fight the kind of war we have just been fighting in Afghanistan. With the technology that we are facing and the transformation of the military as we move forward, it's clear -- at least it seems to me, based on what I have learned, and continue to see -- that our technology, our ability in the United States perhaps supersedes the provide of others to have the kind of technology, whether it's precision bombs or whatever it may be -- we seem to lead that way. My concern about NATO and expanding it is a little similar to what I've heard Senator Warner say, and that is that expanding it may mean bringing individuals in, and it may -- perhaps it's on the basis of having allies and having friends and being supportive of democracy and moving forward in that direction. But is that the same direction that we want to go for mutual defense? Or would we be expanding the obligation of the United States to include others, if we were going to have the preeminent role in providing the technology, particularly as it relates to the percent of our budget, the GDP that we are investing in military spending, defense spending, on a comparative basis to our friends and our allies in other parts of the world. Contributions can come in all flavors. Clearly passing the plate to expand the capacity of technology and the cost of technology from some of those who may not be in a position to do much technology on their own would like to support the United States in the effort that we have for technology. I am not recommending that; I am suggesting that there may be all kinds of way to define contribution and the relationship.
But before we make a decision about expanding any kind of relationship, I think we in fact do have to have an
idea of what the mission is and what the expectation is of all the members to the mission. And lest it be said we are being unilateral, I think it is important for us to ask as part of the obligation that we have, are we expanding our role disproportionately to the process by expanding the number of members to the organization. Does it become a mini-United Nations? Should it become like that? Not suggesting for a minute that we ignored or that we scrap it, but I do think that we have to have it well-defined before we decide whether we add other members.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions.
SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you, Chairman Levin. I am really proud of the nations that desire to join
NATO. It's a thrill to see these countries that not long ago we had hostile relationships, who were nothing like a democracy, totalitarian and oppressing their people in so many different ways. So it's a positive event in the world that we have an opportunity to discuss whether or not NATO should include them.
And I share some of the concerns that have been raised about the broadening of the mission of NATO. Exactly
what does it stand for? What does it mean? We're talking about immigration, ethnic cleansing, crime, economic issues. Are those going to be now part of the treaty? So I'm concerned about that. Others have expressed that better than I.
So I guess my two comments at this point would be, this is a good development. Whatever we do, we need to
affirm our commitment to seeing these nine and others develop economically, develop their security and enhance their personal quality of life in those countries, which, in the long run, will advance our national interest.
One of my specific concerns, however, is that as the group gets larger, I will want to inquire of you what the
power of one nation is. How can one nation -- what power does that nation have to block an otherwise unanimous vote, unanimous agreement? I remember distinctly, during the Kosovo war, that we had to have nations vote on targets of our United States Air Force as we carried that through. And I remember the commander of that air campaign testified with some emotion in this committee that had they been allowed to be more aggressive, as he recommended from the beginning, the war would have ended much sooner, with much less loss of life.
So this unanimous agreement caused us to be less effective in ending a war promptly and it exacerbated the loss of life. So that's one of my concerns.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Sessions. Senator Landrieu.
SEN. MARY LANDRIEU (D-LA): Thank you. I'll be brief because I have a statement, Mr. Chairman, to submit for
the record, a more formal statement. But let me just say for the opening that I am supportive of the expansion
of NATO and think it is a most positive development that our alliance, that has served this country and this
world so well, would want to expand.
I do acknowledge, though, along the lines of what Senator Roberts said, and according to Senator Lugar's
statement, that the threat has fundamentally changed. Therefore, the purpose of the alliance needs to also
change and to be brought into more focus for the challenges today.
I think the threat of terrorism is something that, while the United States can fight unilaterally, we would be
much more effective fighting within the alliance, a structure of an alliance. So just because the threat has changed, which is obvious, the need for alliances, I think, is greater today than at almost any time. And I mean that.
Secondly, I also think the expansion should be focused on providing strategic strength to the alliance. And
looking to the south in terms of the strategic expansion, as you can see from the map, would be something that we need to keep in focus.
And finally, what Senator Nelson mentioned, I think, is important, and that's the capability gap between the
members. So those are some of the things that I'm interested in and have more to submit for the formal record. Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Landrieu. Now our witnesses. Secretary Grossman.
MR. GROSSMAN: Senator Levin, Senator Warner, other members of the committee, first of all, let me say
what an honor and a privilege it is for me to be here, and I know I speak on behalf of my colleagues that we're very glad to have this conversation, to have this consultation, to have this hearing about where NATO is headed, what we want for NATO, and as Senator Warner said, how to make sure that the Senate of the United States is a partner in trying to figure this out for us.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I have a statement also for the record that I'd like to leave, and I'd like to
use part of it. And with the permission of General Ralston and Undersecretary Feith, I might just give a broad overview of where we stand. And then, of course, they will make a statement, and we'd be very glad to answer any questions anybody might have.
SEN. LEVIN: All the statements will be made part of the record in their entirety.
MR. GROSSMAN: Thank you, sir. Before I do anything else, though, I want to make sure that I thank you and
so many other members of the Senate for what you have done, are doing, and I know will do to continue to support NATO, as many of you have said, the greatest alliance in history. And Senator Warner, that very much includes constructive criticism. They get it from us. We get it from you. That includes constructive criticism.
I've had the privilege, I've had the good fortune to take advice and consent from all of you over the years,
and I believe we've always made better decisions because of it. When I remember back -- and Senator Roberts talked about it; Senator Warner talked about it -- the debate in 1998 and 1999, I recall the importance of Senator Kyl's amendment. I recall the work that many senators did in this committee and in other committees to include Senator Helms, Senator Biden, and as Senator Roberts said, Senator Lugar. And for my part, Mr. Warner and Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that we will be in closest possible consultation with the Senate, not when this is all over, but as much as possible in advance.
Mr. Chairman, you said in your invitation letter that we come to you at a time when people on both sides of
the Atlantic are asking questions about the future of NATO. Some people run away from this debate. I actually welcome this debate. I think our governments, our senates, our houses, our parliaments, our people, ought to be talking about the future of NATO. That's what a democratic military and political and security policy is all about.
But we all know the future of NATO has been debated before, and we've always come back to the
fundamentals. Values matter, as Senator Lieberman said. Collective defense matters. Capabilities matter. The trans-Atlantic relationship matters. And because NATO has always adapted to the challenges that have been before it, I believe NATO matters.
Before I try to answer some of the questions, Mr. Chairman, in your invitation letter, I ask you just to consider
three quotations. First quotation; Winston Churchill, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe -- Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia."
The second quotation; President Vaclav Havel in Prague, July 1, 1991: "Prague, once the victim of the Warsaw
Pact, has become the city where the Warsaw Pact met its end as an instrument of the Cold War."
And third; President George Bush, Warsaw, June 15, 2001: "All of Europe's democracies, from the Baltics to the
Black Sea and all that lie in between, should have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe as Europe's old democracies have."
I think we've come a long way. And like Senator Sessions, I believe these are positive developments. Let me
say clearly, as you have all said, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a fundamental pillar of America's foreign and defense policy. As President Bush's speech in Prague shows, we want NATO to succeed.
I believe that this alliance should be an even more effective tool in our world after the 11th of September, and
I have come to the conclusion that NATO is more important after the 11th of September and not less important.
The attacks of September 11th and NATO's rapid and steadfast response prove NATO's continuing (value?). As
many senators have said, invoking Article V for the first time in NATO's history sent a clear message that the alliance is united and determined to defeat terrorism.
We greatly value NATO's collective response, as well as the contribution of individual allies to Operation
Enduring Freedom, to the international security assistance force in Kabul. And as the chairman said, NATO AWACS have logged over 2600 hours patrolling the skies over American cities. And as he also pointed out, NATO ships patrol the eastern Mediterranean, and all NATO allies have provided blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases, refueling assistance and stepped-up intelligence efforts.
Fifty years of cooperation through NATO made natural the participation of allied and partner forces in these
operations. And I think you understand that. I believe General Ralston will take you through more detail of that, and also Undersecretary Feith.
But again, I come back to my conclusion that September 11th has brought home to all of us the new threats
and the challenges that we face. And that is why, when NATO foreign ministers met together in Brussels last December, they agreed to intensify common efforts to meet the threats, first from terrorism, and second, from weapons of mass destruction. And when President Bush meets with allied leaders in Prague, we expect that allies will be ready to approve a program of action to enhance NATO's ability to deal with these and other threats.
I am confident that NATO will respond to these challenges, because NATO has adapted successfully in its
history. As the chairman pointed out, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been key to the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. From my perspective, a rounded enlargement began to erase the line that Stalin had drawn across Europe. NATO acted to end the war in Bosnia. NATO responded to end murder in Kosovo, and NATO has built new partnerships with countries interested in NATO membership or in the Euro-Atlantic area.
You all, in your statements, talked a little bit about what's the future of NATO and what was foreseen in the
future. I want to try a quotation out on you. Speaking in 1950, following a NATO meeting in Brussels, Dean Acheson said this: "The attitude we take is that we and our allies are moving ahead with courage and with determination to build our common strength. We regard dangers as common dangers and we believe they can and must be met with common strength. We are taking the policy that we are going forward with vigor and determination and with courage, and we reject any policy of sitting quivering in a storm cellar waiting for others to decide what fate they may prepare for us."
And although he might have been talking about a different threat at that time, I believe that is tremendous
foresight into what this alliance can still do for the United States as we face issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
The 11th of September made clear that the world is far from safe and secure. Czech President Havel, if I could
quote him again, who will host the Prague summit in November, said that September 11th -- and I quote here -- "alerted us to the evil existing in this world." And I would say, from our perspective, we still reject the policy of quivering in a storm cellar. I agree with Senator Landrieu that in this world allies are indispensable if we are to defeat new threats posed by terrorists and hostile states seeking weapons of mass destruction.
I think we should be honest about this, and that is that NATO faces many, many challenges. I guess I'd put
myself in the glass half-full or even a little bit more than half-full. We can meet these challenges. And I think the Prague summit will mark a crucial step in our effort to shape this alliance for a new century. There are three themes that we'd like to present to you. First, we ought to ensure that NATO has the new capabilities needed to meet today's threats. Two, we ought to extend NATO's membership to more of Europe's new democracies. And three, we ought to intensify NATO's relationship with Russia, with Ukraine and with other partners. New capabilities, new members, new relationships.
Let me start first with new capabilities, because clearly, from your comments and from our beliefs, that is
where we have to start. If the Prague summit is only a summit about expansion or only a summit about new partnerships, we don't believe it will be a success. It has to also be a summit about new capabilities, because the required effort to improve NATO's capabilities to meet 21st century's threats is key to our ability to go forward.
Senator Roberts talked a little bit about NATO's strategic concept. And I think this goes back to a great deal
of foresight by people who worked on the strategic concept, both in 1991 and in 1999, because the strategic concept in 1991 said alliance security history -- interests, I'm sorry -- can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and acts of terrorism; 1991.
Nineteen ninety-nine's strategic concept reiterated this recognition and I think took a step forward by saying
that there are new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability that become clear: Oppression, ethnic conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the global spread of weapons technology and terrorism. The growing capabilities gap between the United States and Europe is the single most serious long-term problem facing NATO. And I know that General Ralston and Undersecretary Feith will address this issue.
You both quoted Secretary General Robertson, and we want to support the efforts that he is making to
improve NATO's capabilities. And I can assure you that from our perspective, this will be a centerpiece of the Prague summit.
I'll talk for a moment, if I could, about new members. As I say, our second goal for Prague is to continue the
process of building the united Euro-Atlantic community by extending membership to those democratic European countries who have demonstrated their ability to defend the principles of democracy, individual liberty, rule of law, and are ready to make a military contribution.
As President Bush observed last year in Warsaw, Yalta did not ratify a natural divide. It divided a living
civilization. And this process of enlargement to Europe's new democracies launched in 1997, in my view, has begun to fulfill its promise and has brought us closer to the vision of NATO's founders for a free and united Europe.
But I believe our work is not yet done. In his first meeting with allies last June, President Bush secured a
consensus to take concrete, historic decisions at Prague's advance to enlargement. He made clear to allies and aspirants his belief that NATO should not calculate how little we can get away with, but what we can do -- but how much we can do; I'm sorry -- to advance the cause of freedom.
Since President Bush spoke, we've been working closely with allies and the nine current aspirant countries to
strengthen their military preparations, to strengthen their societies, so that these aspirants, who will be asked to join NATO, will add to NATO's strength and its vitality. And, in fact, today an inter-agency team led by Ambassador Burns is finishing a consultation in each one of these countries, where we've been very clear with them what it is to be required to meet NATO's standards.
I want to repeat, Senator Warner and Senator Levin and others, that we look forward to close and continuing
dialogue with the members of this committee and others as we approach these historic decisions. The Senate has great responsibility on this question, and we want to work with you to forge a united approach to enlargement.
Some people have asked whether, since the 11th of September, enlargement should remain a priority. I think I
can speak on our behalf and the president's behalf to say that the answer to that question is yes. The events of September 11th have reinforced the importance of even closer cooperation and integration between the United States and the democracies of Europe.
As you have in your first round of statements, you are rightly concerned about the capabilities and
contributions that potential new allies will bring to this alliance. All nine aspirants know that NATO involves serious commitments and solemn responsibilities. Many have already demonstrated this, both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.
And I would particularly point out a statement from the Vilnius group, the group where these countries get
together and consult, meeting in Sofia last October, where they declared their shared intention to fully support the war against terrorism and to act as allies of the United States of America.
We believe that NATO enlargement is a means of achieving NATO's core purposes and will contribute to
NATO's continuing dynamism and the core security institution of the Euro-Atlantic area. We look forward to the closest possible consultation with the Congress on this subject, and if the alliance does offer new invitations, to the debate in the Senate on that proposition. Third, if I could talk for just a moment about new relationships. Our third goal in Prague is also aimed at advancing NATO's core principles, those principles that say we ought to live in peace with all peoples and promoting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. As we work to complete the vision of a united Europe from which Winston Churchill once observed "No nation should be permanently outcast," we should continue to reach out and expand cooperation and integration with all of NATO's partners. NATO and Russia have taken steps to give new impetus and direction to their extensive cooperation in the aftermath of September 11th. President Bush's vision is of a Russia fully reformed, fully democratic, and closely bound with the rest of Europe, which is able to build partnerships with Europe's institutions, including NATO.
At the most recent ministerial meeting in Brussels, allies agreed to create a new NATO-Russia body, separate
from the North Atlantic Council, to facilitate joint decisions and actions in areas of common concern between NATO and Russia. We've been working intensively with allies to develop this new body, and I report to you that we expect to have it in place by the time of the Reykjavik NATO ministerial this May.
This so-called "At 20" relationship will offer Russia not the guarantee but the opportunity to participate in
shaping the developments of cooperative mechanisms in such areas that the allies choose, such as counterterrorism, civil emergency preparedness, air- space management, and joint training and exercises.
Let me be clear: "At 20" will not give Russia a veto over NATO actions in any area. It is not a back door to
NATO membership. It will not infringe on NATO prerogatives. NATO members will continue to take any decision by consensus on any issue. The NATO-Russia Council, as I say, will be fully separate from the North Atlantic Council, which will continue to meet and make decisions, as it always has, on the full range of issues and on NATO's agenda.
While forging these new relationships with Russia, our cooperative vision for NATO embraces all of NATO's
partners, including Ukraine, countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and our Mediterranean dialogue partners.
Mr. Chairman, nearly 53 years after its creation, NATO remains the core of the United States commitment to
Europe and the bedrock of our security and stability in this dangerous world. I think Secretary Powell made this point well when he observed that the value of NATO can be seen by the fact that 10 years after the Cold War, nations are still seeking to join the alliance, not to leave it. NATO's fundamentals, its values, its common commitment to defend freedom, remain sound. President Bush has a profound respect for NATO's achievements and a determination to strengthen it for the future. As you have all pointed out, we and our allies have much work ahead of us, but I believe also a historic opportunity, because a Europe whole, free and at peace, which is something that we used to talk about as a goal, is now fast becoming a reality.
As we look to our agenda in Prague of new capabilities, new members and new relationships, we look forward
to consulting closely with the members of this committee to ensure that NATO will meet the challenges of today and tomorrow as successfully as it has met the challenges of the past. I thank you very much, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Secretary Grossman. Secretary Feith.
MR. FEITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee. I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss the future of NATO with you. As happens from time to time, and especially since the West's victory in the Cold War, questions arise about NATO's relevance, and as Senator Warner raised the question this morning about the justification for its perpetuation. I agree that such questions are useful. It's not a good idea to take our large institutions for granted. It's salutary to review the alliance's rationale and examine its institutions. Today we perform this review in light of the lessons of September 11th, lessons about key vulnerabilities of our country despite our conventional military power, lessons about new types of threats, lessons about the global nature of our military responsibilities, lessons about surprise, unpredictability, and the necessity for the United States military to be adaptable and flexible, and lessons about the value of our community of allies and friends around the world. NATO and our NATO allies responded to the September 11 attack quickly, loyally and usefully. NATO showed that it can adapt and respond to unforeseen challenges.
Less than 24 hours after the terrorist attack against America, our NATO allies, as has been pointed out by
many of you, invoked for the first time in history Article V, the collective defense provision of the alliance's 1949 treaty. Soon after that, NATO took steps to assist us in the war. For example, seven NATO airborne warning and control system, AWACS, aircraft, are now patrolling U.S. skies, protecting Americans at home, and freeing up the U.S. AWACS fleet for important work abroad. Individual NATO allies and partners are contributing to the war effort and to the post-Taliban reconstruction and security effort in Afghanistan. Some of the allies' contributions have come through the formal mechanisms of the alliance, and some outside those structures. But all should be appreciated as the fruit of more than 50 years of joint planning, training and operations with the alliance. NATO's core mission remains as it should the collective defense of its members, as stated in Article V. But NATO will continue to adapt to deal with new threats and to capitalize on its strengths. The Prague Summit, the first in the new millennium for NATO, is scheduled for November of this year. And at the summit the United States hopes to accelerate NATO's transformation, stressing, as Secretary Grossman said, new capabilities, new members and new relationships. President Bush has reaffirmed the U.S. affirmation to promote a Europe whole and free. In Warsaw last June, he declared, "I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings." As we plan the Prague Summit we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.
Mr. Chairman, we recognize that enlargement of the alliance is not an exercise free of risks and difficult
judgments. People of experience and wisdom warn of the dangers of making the alliance excessively unwieldy. They do not want the alliance to dilute its military capabilities through expansion, and they are concerned about NATO's relations with important neighbors. They want to ensure that any enlargement will strengthen NATO's ability to perform its essential defense mission. They want to ensure that the commitment of new members to the alliance's principles and work will be enduring and fulfillable.
These are prudent cautionary considerations, and they are informing the administration's enlargement
strategy. We think NATO can enlarge -- indeed should -- in ways that will serve the national security interests of the United States and of our current allies. A Europe united on the basis of democratic principles, the rule of law, respect for individual rights and other tenets of the alliance, will be better able to resist and defeat terrorist threats and other threats. The U.S. government believes that an enlarged alliance that conducts joint defense and operational planning promotes interoperability and encourages realistic training exercises will be a more effective partner in answering global security challenges.
The aspirant countries have made impressive contributions to NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In
2001, seven of the nine NATO aspirants made force contributions to NATO operations in Kosovo; and eight of the nine to NATO operations in Bosnia. They have also shown much appreciated solidarity with the United States through their contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom. They have conducted themselves as we want our allies to act. For operations in Afghanistan, the aspirants have provided troops, intelligence, overflight rights, access to bases, and public diplomatic support.
As the administration debates on specific candidacies, the Defense Department will be assessing the state of
the aspirants' military structures, their implementation of defense reform, the readiness of military units dedicated to NATO missions, and the military value the aspirant countries can add to NATO.
The transformation of NATO's capabilities can and should proceed hand in hand with its enlargement. This --
maybe I would actually say this is the greatest challenge for the alliance in the coming years. NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, as has been commented on by several of you, exposed collective alliance shortfalls in the capabilities most relevant to modern warfare. They also exposed a disturbing and growing capabilities gap between the United States and its allies. We heard encouraging rhetoric in the 1999 Washington Summit, but by and large have seen meager results. The widening capabilities gap not only weakens the alliance's military potential; it could in time erode NATO's political solidarity.
In our view the alliance needs to focus on a few priorities, including: defending its forces and populations
against weapons of mass destruction; doing a better job of getting allies forces to the fight; ensuring that allies forces can communicate easily with one another without fear of eavesdropping or jamming by their adversaries; and improving allies' contributions to modern, fast-paced and more precise combat operations. We can't transform NATO's capabilities overnight, but we can't afford to settle for business as usual. As we encourage allies to spend more on defense, it is even more important that we get them to spend smarter. The Joint Strike Fighter program is a model of cooperation and efficiency involving the United States and several allies.
A third goal for the Prague Summit is strengthening NATO's relationship with Russia, and revitalizing its
relations with other partners. We are working hard with our allies to enhance the NATO- Russia relationship. I was in Moscow on Monday, and discussed this with the representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry.
The best way to proceed, we think, is to build a record of success on practical projects that benefit everyone
involved. We believe that this effort can dissipate vestigial fears in Russia that NATO threatens its security. We also think that fostering engagement with Russia can induce further democratic, market and military reform in that country, and contribute to improved Russian relations with its neighbor. In short, we view the NATO-Russia relationship as complementing our direct efforts to establish a new framework of U.S.- Russia relations.
As we build the NATO-Russia relationship, and as the alliance and Russia work together where we can, it is
essential that NATO retain its ability to decide and act independently on important security issues. We are conscious of the importance of protecting alliance solidarity and effectiveness. As Secretary Grossman has pointed out, the North Atlantic Council will decide by consensus on the form and substance of our cooperation with Russia. Russia will not have a veto over alliance decisions, and NATO-Russia cooperation will not be allowed to discourage or marginalize other partners. We are confident that we can respect these safeguards as we improve NATO's ties to Russia.
The Partnership for Peace is a NATO success story, having produced practical cooperation between the allies
and 27 partners from Europe through Central Asia. We want to maintain and strengthen Partnership programs beyond Prague, especially in ways that increase the partners' ability to operate with NATO in crisis response operations. And we shouldn't be surprised if following invitations to some number of aspirants at Prague other partners step forward to declare interest in NATO membership.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years, as has been stated and restated here as a sign of the
widespread appreciation of this point and its importance to the Senate, to the administration and to the United States in general, NATO has not only been a successful alliance, but perhaps the most successful alliance in history. This year we have an opportunity to enlarge and transform it, to help ensure that future generations of our Euro-Atlantic community, which I view as the core of the community of the world's democratic states, are ready and able to secure their freedom. Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Secretary Feith. General Ralston.
GEN. RALSTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner and members of the committee. I will be brief. I
would like to talk to you for a moment about European Command, as well as NATO. And, starting off, I would like to thank the committee for your support of our budget request for last year and 2002. When I was here, I told you my number one priority was for the military construction and the facilities that our people like and work in EUCOM. For the first time in a decade you reversed the trend of declining spending, and you gave us about $360 million. That is much appreciated by every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine in the European theater.
In our budget request for '03, once again my top priority is the facilities that our people live and work in, and I
request your continued support in that regard. Mr. Chairman, if I could direct your attention to this chart that we have over here, I think it helps to remind us about European Command, and it may be a bit misnamed. It includes the countries not only of Europe, but most of Africa that you see in green, and some very important Middle Eastern countries of Israel, Syria, Lebanon. There are 91 countries in total in the European Command area of responsibility. We have about 115,000 troops there to do that. That is eight percent of the active duty military strength that we have. And I would just like to give you my opinion that eight percent is not excessive for half the countries of the world that we are responsible for maintaining the stability in.
I would also like to remind the committee that as we speak this morning, EUCOM is involved in five ongoing
combat operations. First, we have our pilots flying over Northern Iraq. And just before I came to this hearing this morning, I got a call that our pilots were fired upon and attacked this morning, and we responded by taking out some air defense sites that are there. We have the operations ongoing in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. I would like to talk about one of those for a moment, if you could give me my next chart. Sometimes we need to remind ourselves of the progress that has been made in Bosnia. And troop levels is not the only indicator. But because troop levels are dependent upon the situation on the ground, as you remember, we went into Bosnia with 60,000 troops six years ago. Americans were 20,000 of that. We were 33 percent of the effort. Every six months we'd take a look at how we are doing -- what's the situation n the ground? -- and we'd adjust the troop level to correspond to that. Today we have less than 1,800 total troops. The U.S. is about 17 percent of that effort. And when I briefed you last year, when I testified before this committee, we had 4,400 Americans in Bosnia. Today we have a little over 3,000. Next month we should be at 2,500. And my recommendation back to the North Atlantic Council for this fall will be about 1,800 Americans -- that will be less than 10 percent of what we started. And I do believe that that represents the progress that is being made on the ground in Bosnia, and we have tried to adjust our troop levels accordingly. NATO's commitment to the stability in the Balkans and its September 12th invocation of Article V clearly demonstrate the strategic flexibility of the alliance. Much has been said already about the NATO AWACS, the Standing Naval Forces-Mediterranean. I won't repeat that. I might like to add that several NATO allies, as well as other nations in our area of responsibility, have provided intelligence, they have frozen terrorist financial assets, they have detained suspected terrorists in their respective countries. I might add that in the European theater over 1,500 terrorists have been arrested and taken off the street in the past 90 days. They have provided basing and overflight rights and other forms of key support in our global efforts to combat terrorism. NATO nations provided cargo aircraft and manpower and expertise to prepare and load cargo pallets for shipment in support of our efforts in Afghanistan. Some contributed directly to the strike missions in Afghanistan, and several countries in the EUCOM area of responsibility are contributing to our stabilization efforts there.
I might say a word about NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Sometimes that does not get the attention
that I think it deserves. But to give you an example, every time we have a NATO meeting in Brussels of secretaries of state or secretaries of defense, or chairmen-equivalent of the joint chiefs, it is not only the 19 NATO nations that meet and do the business, but we reset the table and we set the table at 19-plus-27 -- that's 19 NATO nations plus 27 Partnership for Peace nations. That's several times a year at the very highest levels of our government we are meeting and interacting with these people. I think it is no surprise that when the United States of America needed Uzbekistan for our efforts in Afghanistan, that Uzbekistan has been a member of Partnership for Peace, and their foreign minister, their defense minister, their chairman of the joint chiefs equivalent have been interacting with their NATO counterparts for many years. And I think that was very much important in their decision to support the United States in our effort. Mr. Chairman, that's all I have. I am certainly prepared to answer any questions you might have. SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, General Ralston. And thank you all for very helpful statements.
I have a couple of questions which are not directly related to today's subject, but which are very pressing and
very much on the mind of many of us and on our publics.
First, General Ralston, relative to the situation in the country of Georgia, yesterday a senior U.S. official said
that the Pentagon will soon begin training several Georgian battalions to counter the growing terrorist threat in
Georgia Pankisi Gorge region. And today Russian officials expressed some concern about that mission. But my
question is this: Has the decision been made to carry out this train- and-equip mission in Georgia?
GEN. RALSTON: Mr. Chairman, let me give a little bit of an explanation before I answer directly to that.
SEN. LEVIN: Let me interrupt for one second. We will have an eight-minute round the first round -- so if you
can keep all your answers brief. We will go in strict early-bird order. I mistakenly deviated from that in one
instance, and we'll have to go back to a strict early-bird order. I thank the senators who understand the
mistake that I made.
Now, General Ralston, let me go back to you.
GEN. RALSTON: Mr. Chairman, Georgia is a member of Partnership for Peace. I was tasked last fall to send an
assessment team to Georgia, which we have been working with for many years, to see if there was something that could be done to help them in their terrorism efforts in Georgia. That assessment was provided back to the Pentagon in December. I have not been given any tasking or any order to carry out that mission. We are prepared to do so, if given that order. But, to my knowledge, a decision has not been made, because I have not been tasked to do that.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, general. Secretary Feith, there is a quote this morning on the Internet of the official
spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yakovenko, regarding the conversations which he just had with you, Russian-American talks at the experts level focusing on the progress in preparing a draft treaty on reduction of strategic offensive arms. And this is what he said, quote, "There is some progress. First of all, a common understanding was reached that a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms will bear a legally binding character, and the sides will submit it for the consideration of their legislative bodies," close quote. Is that accurate?
MR. FEITH: Mr. Chairman, what we agreed to was that there would be an agreement of a legally binding
nature. We didn't make a decision as to whether that agreement would be a treaty or what is known as an executive legislative agreement.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. One other matter, Mr. Feith, as you know I wrote Secretary Rumsfeld a letter which
is apparently now in your office for drafting a response relative to that proposed Office of Strategic Influence. I know now a decision has been made not to proceed with it. I ask for a number of documents and had other questions. Will that information be forthcoming promptly to me?
MR. FEITH: Yes, it will, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. Let me ask General Ralston this question relating to the possibility that there be
some role specialization within NATO. British Defense Secretary Hoon is reported to have stated recently that the European allies should seek to improve their defense capabilities by cooperation among themselves and, quote, "perhaps role specialization," closed quote.
Can you give us your views as to whether you believe that role specialization, particularly on the part of
smaller European nations, might be appropriate as a way of addressing some of the new threats issue and the capabilities question, which we're all struggling with relative to both existing members and new members of NATO?
GEN. RALSTON: Mr. Chairman, a complex subject, but I'll give you the short answer. I think some of it is
appropriate. We have a defense planning process where all the nations come together. We try to make sure that we've got the capabilities that we need. But let me give you an example. Let's take the Czech Republic, one of the new members that's just come in. The Czech Republic has a very good capability in chemical, biological and radiological defense capabilities. They have provided those capabilities to us. And this is an example where a country has a certain expertise. And if you call that specialization, then I think that is good for the alliance and it's something that could be looked at in a broader context.
SEN. LEVIN: The possibility of new roles and missions, particularly the possibility of NATO special forces, is
that a possibility?
GEN. RALSTON: This is something that the nations have to look at. And right now many of the alliance
members have extremely capable special forces. That's not the issue. I think the issue is, should NATO have a NATO special forces like NATO AWACS? There are some significant issues with that, and I think that's something that we just have to look at.
SEN. LEVIN: Would you keep us informed on any progress along that line?
GEN. RALSTON: Yes, sir, I will.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. I believe that Secretary Feith made the statement that the results of the
commitment of NATO allies and everybody in 1998 for improved capabilities in five functional areas has produced, I think in his words, meager results. General, would you give us your assessment on the overall result of our NATO allies in achieving the objectives of that Defense Capabilities Initiative which was launched by Secretary of Defense Cohen in June of 1998?
GEN. RALSTON: Mr. Chairman, first of all, the DCI initiatives are 58 specific issues that were in there. They
were broken down among the five categories, but they included such things as strategic lift, for example. And while some progress has been made on some of the issues, I would have to tell you that my overall assessment is that it has not been as successful as what any of us wanted. We still have, I think, some very glaring holes in our capabilities, strategic lift being one of them, in order to get troops anywhere soon. One of the things that's being looked at is the A-400M airlifter, if you will. That has not moved forward, although there's a lot of talk and a lot of rhetoric on it. I might add that if it did move forward, it would be 2008 or 2010 before we would have the first one. And so that is the type of thing that I think needs to be worked on very hard.
SEN. LEVIN: I thank you. Secretary Feith, you mentioned that you visited the Russian defense ministry. What
was their reaction? You discussed NATO enlargement, I think you said, with them. What was their reaction to it, briefly?
MR. FEITH: We discussed actually the NATO-Russia relationship. I don't think we explicitly discussed NATO
enlargement.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay, thank you. Let me ask Secretary Grossman this question. It's one I've been concerned
about. In a way, it goes back to Senator Sessions' question about the difficulty of getting consensus when it comes to something like targets. It's a very debilitating kind of a requirement in the middle of a war. I want to push that problem beyond even what Senator Sessions has raised, to a more fundamental problem but which is similar. What happens if a NATO member no longer is committed to the fundamental values, as we've talked about here, of NATO?
What happens if it turns from democracy to dictatorship? And the more countries that are involved in NATO,
the greater the at least statistical likelihood of that happening without any identification of any country where it's more likely than not, but still statistically it's more likely that sooner or later one of the countries in NATO or that might join NATO could turn from a democracy to a dictatorship. And yet there is no way of suspending or removing a country from NATO who no longer complies with the fundamental values that are set forth in the Washington charter.
Should NATO have available a mechanism to suspend a member which no longer adheres to the fundamental
principles of the Washington treaty -- democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law -- to get around this problem of blocking a consensus in a very fundamental way or in a very specific way, as Senator Sessions has pointed out?
MR. GROSSMAN: Let me try to answer that question a couple of ways. First, to start where Senator Sessions
started, of course, the consensus principle at NATO has applied since 1949, and I would argue actually has been quite successful. And, yes, there are times when one country or another country may object to a certain NATO policy. But since these are all democracies and have to get together, we think it's a useful thing for the consensus principle to exist. And that matters whether you're Iceland or Luxembourg or the United States of America. That's a fundamental principle of the alliance.
The reason I start there, Senator, is I think, Mr. Chairman, that that is part of the answer to your question,
which is that this consensus principle that we have -- it seems to me, anyway -- is the biggest incentive to keep people on the right track.
SEN. LEVIN: That assumes they're all democracies. Now go to my assumption, when one becomes a
dictatorship and vetoes what everyone else in NATO sees as essential for NATO's self-defense.
MR. GROSSMAN: I think that what we would have to do is make sure, through the MAP process, that we're
only -- that we're trying to get people in who we are sure are going to stay democracies. I don't mean to avoid your question here, but --
SEN. LEVIN: You are doing it; not successfully, but you are avoiding it.
MR. GROSSMAN: I want to -- I deal with this at the front end, which is to make sure that people have met a
certain standard before they get in. And to kick people out, it seems to me, lowers our standards rather than raises them. And the consensus principle is what keeps it all together.
SEN. LEVIN: Senator Warner.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you. Secretary Feith, in response to Senator Levin's question about your successful
meetings in Russia here a few days ago, you replied that the current thinking with regard to this type of agreement, or whatever you want to call it, between Russia and the United States would be in the nature of an executive agreement or something less than a treaty?
MR. FEITH: What we have said to the Russians is that we're interested in reaching agreement on a number of
issues. It could be one agreement. It could be multiple agreements. And depending on what the agreements are and what their subject matter is, they would be suited for different forms. And we're perfectly happy to enter into a treaty with them if we can come up with an agreement that warrants treaty status.
SEN. WARNER: Well, there's no -- let's just put it on the record -- no effort to reach some type of
understanding that would circumvent the advise-and-consent role of the Senate with regard to that type of agreement.
MR. FEITH: No, there is not. And there is actually a recognition of the value of having the Congress, the
Senate in particular, involved with us as we go forward this.
SEN. WARNER: (Inaudible) -- question. Proceeding on --
SEN. LEVIN: Yield just for 10 seconds on that subject.
SEN. WARNER: Yes, of course.
SEN. LEVIN: If you don't enter into a treaty, it's not legally binding on anyone other than the current
administration. I think you might as well be aware of that; not just the wisdom of involving the Senate. We ultimately have the power of the purse and can override whatever you do anyway technically. It is the fact that it does not bind future administrations or this country beyond the current administration if you do it by executive order. I thank you for yielding.
MR. FEITH: Mr. Chairman, I was referring to a particular kind of international agreement that is often referred
to as an executive- legislative agreement where both houses of Congress have a vote on it.
SEN. WARNER: It seems to this senator -- and I've followed the relationships between the United States and
the Soviet Union now for over 30-some years -- that we're enjoying, under President Putin, a positive trend. I mean, there are certainly many things which any one of us could pick out as entirely non-satisfactory, but overall a positive trend.
If we were to go into a situation where, for example, the Baltic nations were recommended for membership,
would that not affect our relationships with Russia as, for example, their participation in the Balkans, participation in the Afghan situation? In a broad front now, they're working with our president on the war on terrorism. And to me, that is an imperative of the highest order as compared to expansion of NATO.
Maybe I'm looking at it selfishly, but I think properly our country is beginning to look inward with homeland
defense and the extraordinary attack that we suffered on the 11th and how best to deter and, if necessary, defend against that attack again. To the extent Russia helps is to the extent we're protecting the homeland of the United States of America to some degree.
Of course, we're relying on a wide range of allies to help us. But, nevertheless, they have stepped forward as
a partner. But if we were to proceed on, say, an issue like the Balkans, which is -- I mean the Baltics -- which has been a difficult question all along, it seems to me it could be disruptive. Do you have some views on that?
MR. FEITH: Senator, it's a serious concern that you raise. We have, though, in recent months, had some
experience that I think allows us to evaluate the danger that you are flagging.
The discussion about NATO expansion and the possibility that it may include the Baltic states has been very
lively and very prominent now for months. And over these same months, while this discussion is going on, we have been working with the Russians on creating this new framework for relations between the United States and Russia.
And what is remarkable is in the course of these very intense discussions that we've had in the foreign
ministry channel, the defense ministry channel, and, of course, the summit meetings between our presidents, what is clear is although the Russians understand and recognize and pay close attention to this debate and understand the possibility of NATO's expansion, their reaction has not been to say that this will destroy our relationship. On the contrary, they are eager to get closer to NATO.
And so I think that we have things to learn from the way the dialogue has developed about the Russian
recognition over time that we've been working on that we are not a threat to them. NATO is not a threat to them. And I think that we can proceed with these decisions about how we want the alliance to grow without really worrying that it's going to set back a relationship that we consider enormously important and are intent on improving, which is our relationship with Russia.
SEN. WARNER: This is one senator that will be watching that issue, because I'm gravely concerned about our
homeland defense and the need for a wide range of assistance from many nations, including Russia, as we hopefully deter and then defend against it.
General Ralston, I think you quite properly brought up the mission that we're flying around the clock in the
north and the south on Iraq. I think it will be important in this hearing if you'd give us an update on the threat that Iraq poses, the need for the continuance of those operations, presumably, in your professional judgment, and how we reconcile the fact that our men and women flying those missions -- together with Great Britain, is my understanding -- and taking a risk of life, and at the same time we're openly trading with Iraq for our -- to meet our demands here at home for petroleum. We're importing now over 50 percent, and Iraq is a growing figure in that 50 percent.
GEN. RALSTON: Senator Warner, let me state, from the European military perspective, we have this ongoing
operation that we're flying in conjunction with the UK and Turkey, I might add; it's the three countries that are involved. We have been enforcing the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel. Everything in Southern Watch and the rest of Iraq, General Franks and Central Command is responsible for.
It is a significant effort that we undertake. Last year we flew over 6,000 sorties enforcing the no-fly zone in
the north. And I might add, as I have said before, there are numerous times when our aviators are fired upon.
We respond whenever we can to take out any threats in order to ensure their safety.
Whether or not the benefit that comes out of enforcing that no- fly zone offsets the risk and expense that
goes into it, I'm not in a position to judge. That is properly a call for the policymakers in Washington. But we do our very best to carry out the mission that we have been given. We've been doing that for 11 years now, and it is a significant effort.
SEN. WARNER: General Ralston, lastly, as we approach this new round of consideration of new members, we
took in three last time -- Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. What were the criteria that we laid down for their admission and what they had to do to fulfill their criteria in a period of time? And where are they today in meeting that criteria? And will they have met it by the fall, when we're looking at a new round of membership?
GEN. RALSTON: There were numerous criteria that were outlined, Senator Warner. And let me try to list some
of those: Reform and restructure of their military; and let me give an example. Only a nation can decide what level of expenditure they're going to commit to their defense. And let me talk about Poland for a moment. And in the case of Poland, that's approximately 2 percent of their GDP. Those of us in uniform, once a country decides what level of resources they're going to provide, we give the best advice we can on getting the proper balance between the size of a military, the training of that military and the equipment that that military has. In the case of Poland, Poland had something like 400,000 troops in uniform. There's no way that Poland can adequately train and equip a force of that size. So our advice was, in order to get that into balance, you need to draw down the size of your force but make it better-trained and better-equipped. I was in Poland a year ago. They had drawn down to 207,000 troops. I was there a month ago, and they're now at 165,000 troops, enroute to 150,000, which is their goal. So they have been coming down each year, approaching that goal that was outlined.
Now, with regard to the interoperability of their equipment, it's no secret that the new members had
Soviet-era equipment. You don't replace that overnight. But they are trying to get the proper balance again between the size and put the expenditure now into systems -- western systems, if you will -- that will be more interoperable with NATO.
We are not there yet, and we're not there yet in any one of the three countries. But I don't believe there was
any expectation that we would be there by 2002. This was at least a decade-long project, and in my judgment will probably take longer than that.
SEN. WARNER: My time is up. You failed to answer about the present threat of Iraq today to our security, and
indeed to the security of the region. Can you give us a capsule estimate of that threat?
GEN. RALSTON: I think the concern that we've got, that I've got -- and let me speak personally here -- the
issue with regard to the threat from Iraq is not so much one of whether they were tied to 11 September and what happened here, but you have to look at what is their capability in terms of weapons of mass destruction, the ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and what is their intent to do that. My own judgment is they have a capability. I am less certain as to what their intent is. That is where I think the policymakers need to focus in that regard.
SEN. WARNER: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a letter asking for this hearing be placed in the
record.
SEN. LEVIN: The letter will be placed in the record at the appropriate place, and also a statement of Senator
McCain on the future of NATO will be placed in the record at the appropriate place in the record as well. Senator Reed.
SEN. REED: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Not only is NATO expanding outward, but also within Europe
there is a conscious attempt to develop sort of a European identity for their defense forces; the European
security defense policy.
And in addition to that, you've (already?) mentioned the "NATO At 20," where Russia is being at least
approached to have some type of counselor role, if not an active role. Could you comment on these
developments, particularly the independent initiatives for European security forces? Secretary Grossman and
Feith and then General Ralston.
MR. GROSSMAN: Sure, I'd be glad to, Senator. First of all, let me say that we support Europe's efforts to get
stronger and we support Europe's efforts to have a European security and defense identity and a European security and defense policy.
What we did in 1999, and have since, is to make sure that that European security defense identity and policy
is built up in support of the NATO alliance. And we have always felt that the actions or the possible actions of that European security and defense identity and policy should come if the NATO alliance is not engaged as a whole, is not engaged militarily in this action. And that's kind of a diplomatic way of saying that we want to make sure that NATO has the right of first refusal.
But in terms of Europe building up its capabilities, in terms of Europe meeting the headline goal that they set
for themselves for 2003 to have 60,000 forces deployable in 60 days, sustainable for a year, we think that would be an outstanding thing and something that would really help in terms of Euro-Atlantic security. SEN. REED: Secretary Feith, do you have a --
MR. FEITH: I agree with what Secretary Grossman said. The -- if this is -- if the European security defense
concept is the spur necessary, is the vehicle that will succeed in increasing European capabilities that will be available to NATO, then it will have proven to be a good thing. But, I think as is -- was stressed here by many people, and it's -- I'd like to say it's extremely useful that this committee does stress this point, and we -- we are pleased to make reference to the interest that this committee takes in NATO capabilities when we are talking with our allies. But, as has been stressed, the -- there has been over-promising and under-delivery on the whole issue of capabilities -- whether it's specifically regarding NATO or the ESDP.
SEN. REED: General Ralston.
GEN. RALSTON: Senator Reed, first of all, I agree with the two previous statements there. In particular, if the
European Union is going to increase the military capabilities for their own reasons whatever, then that's a capability that also is available to NATO, so I support that with on proviso. I have said that we need to do that in a way that doesn't detract from the NATO alliance. And in particular, if the European Union builds a duplicative planning mechanism to that of NATO, then I think that would be very destructive. I will give you three quick reasons of why that's bad. If you tried to duplicate, for example, the planning headquarters that we have at SHAPE you are talking about thousands of military officers and the physical plant by which to house them. Where are those resources going to come from? There's only one place. They would come from the battalions and the squadrons and the ships that we need to do the fighting.
The second reason -- what do military planners do in times of crisis? We make options for our political masters.
We come up with options A, B and C. And option A has a certain set of forces and a certain risk factor and a certain chance of success. And option B, a different set of forces, different risk, different change of success. If the European Union does this independently, they will not come up with options A, B and C, they'll come up with options 1, 2, and 3. And then the two political bodies, the European Union and NATO, are going to have great confusion as they try to talk through this issue together, because one of them is using option 2 and the other one is talking about option B.
The third reason, if the European Union goes off and plans this on their own and they want Battalion X for
their operation, someone has to ensure Battalion X is not committed to a NATO plan and a NATO operation. Now, these are solvable problems, and I would offer at least for consideration that this is not hard to solve. You can take the four nations that are not in NATO that are in the European Union -- they're all good nations -- that's Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland -- and bring their planners to SHAPE headquarters, and we will together plan options A, B and C. You haven't wasted resources by having extra planners and extra headquarters. You haven't introduced confusion into the system because both political bodies will have the same set of options, and you haven't double-tasked units to do that. By the way, I've got officers from all four of those nations at my headquarters today, so I think with the proviso that you don't duplicate the planning mechanism, this can be a positive thing.
SEN. REED: Let me raise another issues that's been addressed by practically all of my colleagues -- that is the
gap between our capabilities and the capabilities of all of our allies -- those that are in NATO and those that aspire to become part of NATO. It seems to me that they have a very daunting task, because the gap keeps widening, and dramatically widening. And I'm wondering, maybe this is all just back to the envelope analysis, in your view, General, and perhaps the secretaries, is that gap so wide now that it could never be effectively breached unless an inordinate amount of spending, and as you indicated in the case of Poland, they basically decide that they're going to spend two percent and that's it, and they structure their forces around there. Are we in a perennial sort of mismatch between capabilities even if there is a bit of an accelerated spending in Europe in terms of our capabilities and their capabilities?
GEN. RALSTON: First of all, there is a gap today, there is no question about that. But it's not across every
nation because there are certain nations in the alliance that can perform and do perform every day very well with their United States counterparts. But as a general rule, as you look at the defense spending of each of the European nations, and as that continues to go down, here's the problem you get into. If defense budgets go up slightly, procurement goes up a lot. Conversely, if defense budgets go down even slightly, procurement goes down dramatically, because such a high percentage of a budget is taken up in the personnel costs and the base infrastructure costs and all of that. If you have a country that has a 10 percent decrease in their budget three years in a row, their procurement is going to go absolutely to zero, and that's the problem we've got. That's why I think Lord Robertson has been so aggressive in trying to get the European nations to increase their defense budget. Even a slight increase helps you on the procurement side, because, again, that's something that can go into the research and development and the procurement of systems.
SEN. REED: Now, just to follow on a question, General Ralston and Secretary Grossman if you can respond,
in your prospective planning, particularly looking at the countries who are aspiring to enter, have you suggested a budget pathway for them in terms of getting up to a level where they can operate with us, perhaps with this gap, and an ultimate level where they are fully interoperable with the kind of expertise and technical skill that we have? Do you have anything like that in your plans?
GEN. RALSTON: Let me try that, and then also have Secretary Grossman and Secretary Feith address that.
Once again, I look at it -- once a nation decides how much they're going to spend -- and let's talk about the
Baltics here for a minute, let me talk about Lithuania, and Latvia, and Estonia. I was very impressed by the job that has been done there in terms of trying to get their people programs right. They said the first thing you've got to do is work with your people, and I think they're right about that -- educate the people, give them a decent place to work as you start through it. They have collectively gotten together and said let's put together an air defense network that would be useful to NATO if we become NATO members.
I have visited their air defense centers there, and quite frankly I was in one in Estonia that I would have been
very proud to have had when I was commander of the Alaska NORAD region. It was absolutely up to date and modernized. The -- Nokia had done, from Finland, a lot of work in terms of wiring their things together. There was a young lieutenant on this radar scope that was a graduate from West Point. There was a young lieutenant on this radar scope who was a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. They were working very hard on training their people from the bottom up, and I think they made a remarkably good start on working that.
So, what do we do? We encourage them to keep doing that and keep working in that direction.
SEN. REED: Thank you. My time expired, but if Secretary Grossman -- MR. GROSSMAN: Well, sir, I just wanted to say, Senator Reed, that I also want to just support a point that General Ralston made in his opening comments, which was if you look at the number of defense capabilities in the defense capabilities initiative 58, we have now concluded not only did we not get what we needed from that, but it was too many. And so the points that Undersecretary Feith made about focusing in on getting people to the fight, sustaining them there, focusing on weapons of mass destruction, is how we're going to be working toward the Prague summit. So, too many now -- we want to get that number down so that we can actually produce some results.
SEN. REED: Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Roberts.
SEN. PAT ROBERTS (R-KS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to make a comment on the Levin Doctrine -- i.e.,
no treaty, no binding commitment from one administration to another, that the strategic concept that was adopted two years ago, as a matter of fact, I wrote a rather detailed letter to the Clinton administration asking if in fact those commitments, as outlined in the strategic concept, represented a treaty. It took a while to get that back, but they indicated no, it was not, so I think that is subject to change -- not that we want to change it, and I'm not trying to either say I'm for it or to purger it, it's just that I think it's an important point that the chairman made.
I have several observations. I'm going to read again what Senator Lugar said. If we fair to defend our societies
from a major terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction, we and the alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations and our way of life, and no one will care what NATO did or did not accomplish on enlargement at the Prague summit -- pardon me, the Prague summit. That's why the alliance must fundamentally re- think it's role in the world in the wake of September 11th, which I agree with. I am on the Intelligence Committee. It is my opinion that the sober reality is that the danger of Americans and Europeans being killed today at work or home is perhaps greater than at any time in recent history.
I believe that, and so I think from the threat standpoint we should consider that which underscores the value
of intelligence and the analytical ability of our intelligence. The other observation I would make is that this threat is global. We have to have allies, have to have alliances. NATO has to play a part. They can't be circumscribed by any artificial boundaries. And all of our alliances are going to be reviewed and recast in light of this new challenge.
Now, let me say also that rightly or wrongly the legacy of Kosovo has reinforced the concern that NATO is not
up to the job of fighting a modern war. Again, I don't mean to purger NATO, but we didn't do that in Afghanistan, obviously, or wherever else that we will conduct our military missions.
Now, having said that, in the Emerging Threats Subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee, here, chaired
by Senator Landrieu, I am the ranking member, I always ask people, "What keeps you up at night in regards to any emerging threat or real threat?" I'd like to ask each of you what emerging threat to NATO keeps you up at night?
MR. GROSSMAN: Weapons of mass destruction, Senator.
MR. FEITH: Senator, I think it's clear that the danger of nuclear weapons or biological weapons in the hands
of terrorist is about the most troubling prospect that we have from the point of view, I think, of the whole
range of national security officials in our government.
GEN. RALSTON: I would only add to that -- first of all, I agree with that, but secondly, the reason that I stay
awake at night worrying about it is not that there aren't other threats out there, but I know how to handle the other threats. I've got capabilities to handle the other threats. We are not where we need to be in terms of handling that kind of a threat, and that's why we need to put effort into that.
SEN. ROBERTS: Well then if that's the case, and if any justification for expansion of NATO and the
continuation of NATO, the modernization of NATO has to be threat-based, because then I think Senator Lugar's advice is well taken, and also that of Senator Warner, but how do we do this? NATO has always operated as a consensus organization. Sixteen was difficult. Nineteen has been challenging, and that's the nicest way I can put it, especially after Kosovo. Twenty-eight? This is like trying to transport, you know, frogs in a wheelbarrow. And I don't mean to make any light of it, but I would assume we're going to continue as a consensus organization. If the answer is yes, it seems to me we're going to have a coalition of the willing, or maybe follow Senator Warner's suggestion, although I'm not sure I want to, you know, call it the Warner Suggestion, but something like the U.N. and a security council, or the coalition of the willing. If the answer is no, how are we going to handle that problem from a simple military procedures standpoint?
MR. GROSSMAN: Sir, if I could answer your question -- try to answer your question in three ways. First, in
terms of weapons of mass destruction, you got essentially the same answer from all of us. Our objective, it seems to me, in transforming NATO and in bringing new members into NATO is to make sure that they understand that this is the threat. And again, we talked a little bit in your opening statement about the strategic concept. If you go back to the strategic concept before 1991, there's nothing in there about weapons of mass destruction. The '91 strategic concept starts to talk about it. The 1999 strategic concept holds it out as a real threat to the alliance. We said in 1999 that NATO had to do more in the are of weapons of mass destruction. We now have a WMD center, but much, much more needs to be done.
The second thing is, like General Ralston, to give you an example, I think of how new members actually are
quite useful in changing people's perception of the threat. One of the ways to deal with weapons of mass destruction, of course, is missile defense. And I think if you go around now and see who in the alliance are among the most enthusiastic supporters of missile defense, you would find Poland, for example. A new member, recognizes a new threat, has a new policy. And in a way, I think those things -- the new members and the new threats allow us to transform the alliance.
Final point, and that is that I think none of us would want to sort of let say here that what our objective is to
make NATO into the OSCE or the U.N. Security Council or anything else. This is an alliance for collective defense. And it's our -- it's my judgment anyway that the way to keep it an alliance of collective defense is to keep it based on consent, to keep it based on standards, but to recognize that sometimes those threats change.
SEN. ROBERTS: Would anybody else like to comment? I guess not.
GEN. ROBERTS: I think Secretary Grossman did a pretty good job.
MR. FEITH: I'd actually add one sentence if I could, Senator, and that was this question of coalitions. And I
may be getting out of my lane here because I don't work at the Defense Department, but I think Secretary Rumsfeld has got this pretty right, where he says that one of the lessons of Operation Enduring Freedom is you want the coalition to match the mission and not the other way around. And I think that's a very important point, and something that NATO can use to build on.
SEN. ROBERTS: I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Roberts. Senator Inhofe.
SEN. JAMES INHOFE (R-OK): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Building a little bit on what Senator Roberts asked,
what keeps you up at night, can I assume, and I think, Secretary Grossman, you've already responded to this, that when we say weapons of mass destruction you're also concerned about the missile delivery of those weapons. Is that correct --
MR. GROSSMAN: The whole package. Not only the delivery, but as Undersecretary Feith said, the connection
to terrorism.
SEN. INHOFE: Yes, thank you. Let's go back to something Senator Reed was talking about, in terms of the
capabilities gap. I kind of -- I think he was referring to how that would affect the new nations coming into the alliance. But you said, Secretary Feith, I believe you said Bosnia and Kosovo exposed the capability gap between the United States and its allies. Do you have any way of quantifying that? Have you thought about that? Because I'm interested in two things: one is the capabilities gap that we learned -- the lesson we learned in Bosnia and Kosovo -- and then secondly, how that might apply to new partners coming in to the alliance.
MR. FEITH: Senator, I think that General Ralston may be better able to talk about what kind of quantifiable
measure we have for that.
GEN. RALSTON: Let me talk in capabilities. What we desperately need are abilities to get forces wherever they
need to be around the globe. That's the strategic lift piece. There's a deficiency there, something we need to work on.
Let me talk air systems for a moment. Precision attack. The United States has made great progress in terms of
our ability to attack not only with laser-guided bombs, many of the other allies have laser guided bombs, but we have gone the next step, the J-DAM, so that it will work in all weather. That's something that needs to be worked upon.
Capabilities for electronic warfare, in terms of jamming of enemy defenses, there is a huge deficiency there
that needs to be worked upon. If we're going to go in an operation anywhere today, it's almost imperative that
the United States of America provide the EA-6-B jamming platforms of wherever you're going to go because
nobody else does that.
So, there is a -- I can quantify it in terms of those kinds of capabilities that we need to carry out modern
warfare. I can't quantify it and put a number on it.
SEN. INHOFE: Oh, okay. But any, if you later on can decide there's somewhere, when we're talking about this
gap, that would help us in quantifying it, just for the record you might send in anything in that you can.
General Ralston, let me just carry that a little bit further. Senator Sessions brought up the problem with
strategic lift. We've been -- you know, I chaired the Readiness Subcommittee for four years, and that's one of the things that I've really been concerned with, and that's one of the great drains that the Kosovo and Bosnia has made. Now we find out that our refueling capacity -- we have bladder problems in fuel cells in the KC-135 that are going to have to be addressed. All these problems, lift problems, are very expensive problems. We know where we are with the C-141s now -- they're going to go out. We're talking about, and I see growing support for increasing our C-17 capabilities, and then, you know, of course, the aging C-5.
What do you see out there as a solution to this problem, because we've been talking about the lift capability
and what's happening right now with the use of our C-17 fleet. It's been a great success. It's been wonderful.
But we also know that it's wearing out.
GEN. RALSTON: Let me try to address it two ways. I think there is a U.S. issue here. The United States of
America needs to decide how you're going to keep a modernized, strategic lift capability -- not only air but at sea.
SEN. INHOFE: We need -- yes, and we need to do that, but we're depending on you to help us with that.
GEN. RALSTON: Yes sir. What I have to state as a unified commander is I need the capability to get X amount
of stuff to Y place in a certain time period. I'm going to have to depend upon General Jumper and the United States Air Force and Secretary Roach to decide what is the right acquisition strategy here, whether you upgrade C-5s or you buy more C-17s or some combination of both, or what do you do about the tankers -- those are the types of things that I am not staffed for. I am trying to fight the war this afternoon, not 15 years downstream. But we do have a mechanism to do that.
SEN. INHOFE: Right.
GEN. RALSTON: Now, let me take that to NATO. Here is where I think we have really got to put as much
pressure as we can on the other nations to come up with their strategic lift. I am not going to tell them what kind of airplane it needs to be. But it certainly has got to be able to get from point X to point Y, carry the types of things you need to carry, and be responsive. And right now that capability doesn't exist.
SEN. INHOFE: Well, and I appreciate it. One other thing that I'd like to ask you just for clarification. I am very
proud that you are able to get this down -- looking toward the future in Bosnia, for example -- getting down to 10 percent of the force that we had in -- back when we were only supposed to be there for 12 months.
But it -- I think we need also to talk about the fact that while that may be 10 percent, the lift capability
drain, the logistical support that comes out of what they used to call the 21st TASCOM -- I don't know what they call it anymore. But that is -- actually that is going to be up around maybe a quarter as opposed to 10 percent of it. So it's -- the total effort in expenditure and the use of our assets are probably even when the number of troops are down to 10 percent of what they were before, would be actually greater than 10 percent -- wouldn't you agree to that? We are using our logistics support down there that could be used somewhere else?
GEN. RALSTON: I'd have to do some thinking about that --
SEN. INHOFE: Maybe for the record --
GEN. RALSTON: The reason I might slightly quarrel with that characterization is that we don't provide logistic
support for the other nations. We support only the United States. And so if the U.S. forces are 10 percent of what they were, I don't know that exactly it's linear, but I think it's pretty close.
SEN. INHOFE: Is it? Well, I'm glad to hear that if it is. I just got back from, as I say, the former 21st TASCOM,
and talked about what they are doing and what their drains are and what their expectations are --
GEN. RALSTON: Yes, sir.
SEN. INHOFE: -- for incursions.
GEN. RALSTON: And I might say that they are very busy. They are doing an extraordinarily fine job. But some
of the things they are doing are not normally appreciated. Rather than sending everything to Afghanistan by air, 21st TASCOM worked out a capability to send it by train. So we sent a couple of practice trains with things -- let's see if we can get through all of the diplomatic hurdles to get a train from Germany to Afghanistan, and they were successful, and they do that. And now in something like two weeks we can get a huge train from Germany to Afghanistan, which reduces tremendously the capability to have to ship it by air.
SEN. INHOFE: I saw that over there, and I am very grateful that they were able to accomplish that.
Secretary Feith, one of the things that people have talked about is perhaps waiting for this expansion until such time as they are more suitable for allies in terms of what their capabilities are, what their contributions could be. Is this something that is being discussed now?
MR. FEITH: Senator, the issue of timing is being discussed. And there is a recognition that it's important when
we issue invitations that we have countries that are ready to enter the alliance, and have met the standards. So while we haven't as an administration made a firm decision on the point, this issue of timing is very much at the fore of our minds, and we have been discussing it, and we are going to be discussing it a great deal more as we head up toward the May meetings and then on to Prague.
SEN. INHOFE: Secretary Grossman, I know you were quoting George the First when you talked about the
characterization of sitting quivering in your storm shelter. I'm not one of those who is sitting and quivering, but I am one of those who has not really decided yet on what we are going to do in terms of all the things that we have been discussing. But Senator Levin brought up a thing on the process at termination. And you said of course you were on the front end of that. Secretary Feith, do you have any thoughts on that? Because, you know, let's say somebody comes in, they are qualified, and we rejoice, and we embrace them, and then we find out that they are not making their contributions. What are your thoughts for a policy on that?
MR. FEITH: It has been a subject that while it has been raised over the years has not been thought of as an
imminent problem. And nobody has worked out an answer to it, because I guess, number one, it is not viewed as imminent; and, number two, the working out of the answer may be more disruptive than constructive.
SEN. INHOFE: That's fine. Thank you very much. My time is expired, but I think, General Ralston, I may send
some questions for the record on this troop strength that we are dealing with, and the Guard and Reserves, the 60,000 that we have over there right now, and their op tempo, and what -- and some of the problems and the critical MOSs. That's of great concern to me, and I know it to you too. Thank you very much.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Sessions.
SEN. SESSIONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Grossman, I appreciate your effective testimony and
directness and candor as we discuss some difficult issues. You noted that Secretary Rumsfeld said the coalition needs to meet the mission. And we were able to do that in Afghanistan. We were able to put together the kind of coalition we needed to do that. Now, if this were a conflict in NATO, would we not under the NATO rules of unanimity not have that flexibility, and as we expand the NATO does not that add to a limitation on our ability to put together a coalition to fit the mission?
MR. GROSSMAN: Maybe General Ralston can help me if I get this wrong. But it seems to me that the
unanimity principle in NATO is a decision that NATO will do the work. And then those people who want to go ahead and do the work sign up to do the work. And so whether it is the Czech Republic coming with chemical weapons or chemical weapons and biological weapons defenses, or the United States with what we bring, or the British with what they bring -- then essentially you have a coalition inside of NATO. So, I don't mean to answer both your questions at the same time, but NATO would have to decide as a group, Yes, we are going to take on that mission -- and then it would fall to General Ralston to carry out that mission with a group of countries that would be interested in doing so.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, let's follow that a little bit further. Let's say, as Senator Levin suggested, that maybe
there's a significant ethnic problem, not unlike the Balkans that we have had, and everybody is putting pressure for reform and trying to make it -- avoid war, but putting pressure on as we did in Kosovo. And let's say as a result of these tensions one NATO member has a regime change -- just like that, boom. And now we have got a group in that identifies with the people we are trying to correct, and they vote to solidly against any action whatsoever. What do we do then?
MR. GROSSMAN: I think, Senator Sessions, first, I don't think we should have too rosy a view of what has
happened in NATO on this issue since 1949. I mean, it hasn't been kind of without its bumps and its lumps in the road. I mean, I don't want to name countries here, but you know countries have changed regimes in NATO over time, and sometimes that has been a big challenge. But we believe that if countries are in NATO, that they signed up to these values, that they will in the end do the right thing. And I say that's been our practice -- it's been our experience really for 50 years.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well --
MR. GROSSMAN: I mean, you might be right, and Senator Levin might be right, and we may all be here five or
six years from now with a big, big problem on our hands. But that's why we are so focused on getting the standards right in the membership action plan.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, Secretary Feith suggested it could be disruptive, and surely would be somewhat
contentious to discuss this openly and directly. But I am inclined to think we should. There would be two ways that come to my mind, Senator Levin. I would think one would be lessen unanimity in a vote; or the other would be the ability to vote out a member who rejects the ideas and overall commitment of the NATO group.
And those are two. What would be the possibility if those were discussed openly with our NATO members?
MR. GROSSMAN: I don't mean to be flip here, but if you look at the history of NATO and what the United
States has tried to do in pushing, pushing, pushing new missions, new mandates, new things, I wouldn't be surprised if there are some afternoons that there are a number of countries who wouldn't like to vote us out of the alliance. (Laughter.) And I think we -- no, I think we have to be careful of that. And to lower -- again, I tried to answer Senator Levin's question -- not to his satisfaction, but --
SEN. SESSIONS: I mean, that would really break my heart. (Laughter.)
MR. GROSSMAN: It would break mine.
SEN. SESSIONS: And there was something a lot deeper afoot if that occurred than just --
MR. GROSSMAN: Indeed. But I think it's -- as I said, I didn't answer the question very well for Senator Levin.
I think that if the standard is set --
SEN. SESSIONS: You answered it -- as he said, it's just -- just not real satisfactory or we are not sure we
agree with it.
MR. GROSSMAN: Fair enough. The standard has to be higher rather than lower. And I believe if there was a
way out of the alliance standards would go down rather would than go up. That's just my -- that's my perspective. I --
SEN. SESSIONS: What if a nation does not opt out of the war, sends a token force, but wants to
micromanage the mission, as we had this last time, General Ralston? What do we do then?
GEN. RALSTON: Well, first of all -- I don't want to give a long answer here. But I take a little bit of issue with
the characterization that we had it wrong last time. There are some things that we could have done better, and I take blame for this, because I was here in Washington. For the first week of the war we struggled. At the end of that first week, we drew up a piece of paper on a Saturday morning in the Pentagon, and I got it coordinated with my ally friends, and said for 95 percent of the targets we don't ever want to hear about them in nations' capitals. General Clarke has got the authority to do whatever he needs to do on those fielded forces.
There were some categories of targets that we said rightly need to go to nations' capitals. And let me give
you an example. Should we or should we not attack a target in Montenegro? There was a valid political reason as to why you might want to keep Montenegro out of the war. And we said, Before you attack anything in Montenegro, go back to the capitals and get a political consensus that that's the right thing to do. Even that had an escape clause that says if there is anything there that threatens an air crew or an airplane, then you are automatically cleared to take it out. So there -- and once we put that piece of paper out, from my perspective things got much, much better. And if I had to do it all over again, we should have put that piece of paper out before Day One, not after we were in to the conflict. So --
SEN. SESSIONS: But if a nation asserts itself, and does not agree with your directive about what targets are
to be, and says, We insist on being involved -- you are not going to attack Belgrade, you are not going to knock out electric plants, you are not going to knock out bridges -- and that was discussed during this time -- aren't we -- put ourselves in a -- haven't we hamstrung ourselves?
GEN. RALSTON: Well, once again, I would take the construct that if we were looking solely at the tactical
aspects of the Kosovo campaign, then I might have done it differently than what the alliance did it. But I don't think that's the significant point. The significant point is that at the end of 78 days we had 19 nations that were even stronger united. And I think that was by far the most important event for the successful outcome of that campaign.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I appreciate that. And I don't say that this was a failure or a disaster in a campaign. I
just say it evidences a potential for a greater problem in the future. Maybe we'll have an even greater gulf between what we need to be doing to effectively complete a combat mission than we had in Kosovo, and how can we get around that? Particularly, if you -- as you -- the lowest common denominator was afraid that you had used -- and as we increase the number, the lowest common denominator gets lower -- or it is higher? Gets lower. So it's more difficult --
GEN. RALSTON: Yes, sir.
SEN. SESSIONS: -- to maintain unanimity.
GEN. RALSTON: Let me try one other thing. On the political side of the house that Secretary Grossman has
talked about we have a parallel on the military side of the house. We have a military committee where everyone of the 19 nations has a military officer who represents their national military view. And as we put together, we get a mission from the political authorities. We then have a force generation exercise that we conduct in the military headquarters. And that's when we decide what capabilities we are going to pick from what nations. And we are not going to pick capabilities from a nation where that nation doesn't -- is not up to snuff or up to standard.
So there are many operations that we do today where we don't have all 19 nations' military forces involved.
There may be 16 nations or 12 nations or 6 nations as we do that. So you have a mechanism by which you can pick the capabilities that you need to carry out that mission. Secondly, for those nations that for whatever -- take Task Force Fox in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia right now -- you only have a handful of nations that are involved in that. There may only be five or six nations doing that. Those people who don't have troops involved in that -- my personal experience is we have not had a problem at all. They recognize they are not -- they don't have troops at risk in that, and so they are not going to try to drive the operation, even though they may have views on it.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I just felt like it was basically honest to say that NATO met and directed the
deployment of United States Air Force in Kosovo. And that's a big deal. That is a big deal, and we are great nation, and I want us to work in partnership and harmony. But we have got to be pretty clear that are not unnecessarily tying the hands of a military that sometimes has to act decisively and quickly, without delay, and maybe 19, 20, 22, 25, 27 votes may not be so readily available. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Sessions. I don't think there's any doubt that the challenge or the
complications of working in a coalition are greater than if you act unilaterally. I think that's clear. But the advantages of working in a coalition -- at least in the case of Kosovo or Bosnia -- clearly outweighed those constraints. Could you not agree with that, general?
GEN. RALSTON: Yes, sir, I would agree with that.
SEN. LEVIN: The value. And you described the value, and I think all of you actually did this morning, as what
we ended up with, which was the strength, the cohesion, the message which is sent when you've got 19 nations acting together for a common goal. If you can achieve that, even though along the way there's more complications in working out some things, that can far outweigh -- and I think it did outweigh in Kosovo and in other places those complications. And you're shaking your head, so I would assume that you all would agree with that. I think that's the -- is that accurate? You want to say something there? MR. FEITH: If I may, Mr. Chairman, the -- your point that it is not all black and white and that what you have is a real problem -- and I think that what Senator Sessions is calling attention to is a real problem, and we shouldn't leave the impression that we are denying the premise of his question, which is that the larger the group gets the more the danger of it being unwieldy. That's absolutely correct. That does have to be balanced against the whole range of benefits of enlargement. I mean, it needs to be netted out. And I think that the point that my colleagues have made is that, first of all, the problem in practice hasn't been as great as one might thing theoretically. And, secondly, the irreducible problem still has to be netted out against the other points.
There's one additional point that I think is important to highlight, and that is what has happened in the war on
terrorism is we have developed a new model, a very interesting model, where NATO as an institution has functioned as part of the war. And yet we have this concept of rolling coalitions that Secretary Rumsfeld has expounded and Secretary Grossman was referring to earlier. So it is not -- it is not the case that the United States cannot act in the world in its own defense under circumstances without consensus at NATO. And I don't think we should leave anybody with that impression. We have the ability to act. And even when we are acting as we are in the war on terrorism, where it is not entirely a NATO war, NATO is not irrelevant, and NATO has contributed valuable. So this I think shows the -- how valuable it is to be able to flexible in your policymaking, and for NATO to be flexible as an institution to deal with new circumstances.
SEN. LEVIN: I hope that the value of coalitions will be remembered when we talk about the war on terrorism,
by the way. I think some of the rhetoric which has flowed from Washington has made it more difficult to put together essential coalitions. I'll leave it at that, because that's not the subject of today's hearing. But it is an important subject.
And since you raised the question of the war on terrorism and at least the value of having coalitions to fight
that war at times, even though you want to reserve the right to act unilaterally, I would just make that statement. I do think some of the rhetoric that has come forth from Washington has made it more difficult to hold together coalitions, keep together coalitions which are so essential in the future to carry out that war. I want to go back to the enlargement issue. General, there have been some recent reports that NATO may decide to issue invitations to several nations in November but to stagger their admission into NATO as they meet the criteria for membership.
This would be a departure from the last enlargement round and would seem awfully complicated to me and
create lots of problems, including any problems relative to the procedures here to ratify those admissions or to approve those admissions. Can you tell us if there's any truth to the reports that there may be staggered enlargement and, if so, what the justification for that process might be?
GEN. RALSTON: Do you want me to take that?
SEN. LEVIN: Whoever can answer that is fine; Secretary Grossman.
MR. GROSSMAN: I'd be glad to answer it, Senator. There has been that conversation, mostly in Europe.
People have talked about this as a way to deal with a number less than nine. I think it's fair to say that
although the president has not decided, and I don't think maybe even our bosses have decided, at our level, we're not attracted to this at all, for precisely the reasons that you say. And the additional reason I would put in is I would have a hard time anyway understanding how you give somebody a partial Article V guarantee. So I think at our level, when we talk about it, this is not something we're very much interested in at all.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay. Now, on another matter, European members of NATO that have adopted the Euro as their
common currency have pledged not to run deficits higher than 3 percent of their gross domestic products. Germany, for instance, which has only been devoting about one and a half percent of its GDP to defense, is already bumping up against its 3-percent-of-GDP ceiling, which is something they adopted when they adopted the Euro. They're up against that ceiling. So, for instance, they were unable to recently give a guarantee to the partners that they have to fund a full share of the development of a new Airbus military transport aircraft. Is the -- Secretary Grossman, maybe I'll throw this at you -- is the 3 percent ceiling I've referred to a problem for NATO members who have adopted the Euro but who seek to and should spend more to improve their defense capabilities?
MR. GROSSMAN: Senator, I would say -- of course, it's really for them to respond -- but I would say that,
from my perspective, it's not the 3 percent limit that's the problem. It's the choices that they make in their own societies about what to spend their money on. I mean, we make choices all the time. You are here. You make choices between social programs and defense and all the things that we do.
And when you're dealing with European countries, they've made a series of choices over the years that have
been different. And our message to them is that in the society that you have, if you're going to defend yourself, you need to spend more money on defense. If you have simultaneously, as a European Union member, pledged yourself to the 3 percent, then you need to change your priorities inside your society.
SEN. LEVIN: General Ralston, you've commented on the reduction of forces in Bosnia. When Senator Warner
and I visited Bosnia during Thanksgiving, we talked to the stabilization force commander, General Silvester, and Ambassador Bond about an exit strategy from Bosnia. They both emphasized, as you have emphasized, the need for addressing all of the elements of the rule of law in Bosnia, including prosecutorial, judiciary and penal-system reform.
Now, I understand that the U.N.'s task force or international police task force mandate expires in December
and that the European Union is going to provide a follow-on police mission but that it is not going to address fully the issues involved with the rule of law. You've pointed out, I believe, also that the international community's approach in Kosovo does address those other elements of the rule of law. Can you describe to us the approach that's being made in Kosovo, the approach that's being made in Bosnia, tell us which approach is preferable, and what changes you believe would need to be made in Bosnia, if any, to provide that exit strategy?
GEN. RALSTON: Mr. Chairman, as you have stated, the two situations are different. I think what everyone
agrees upon is that we do need the rule of law, which is more than police. It includes all the things that you mentioned. But I think everybody agrees with that. Now, the question is, how do you get there quickly? In the case of Bosnia, as you have pointed out, the United Nations has provided the international police task force there for the last six years. They have got today about 1500-and-some unarmed police officers that are in Bosnia. Their mandate does expire at the end of this year. The European Union has recently taken the decision that they would take over that particular mission.
My understanding is -- and these are approximate -- that there is about 530-some officers, I think
460-and-some uniformed officers, another 60-some civilians, unarmed, that would go in to replace those 1500.
Now, my concern I've got with that is -- my own personal view is you need to get the local people involved in
their policing of their own functions and their rule of law. In Kosovo, for example, OSCE set up a police academy; happens to be run by a retired American military officer. And they have trained 4300 local Kosovar citizens -- Serb, Albanian, minority, female, male. And we have those 4300 on the streets. And every three months we're putting out about another 300. The next class graduates in March. We'll have about 6,000 by the end of this year.
But the difference is, it is the local people that are there on the street doing the police functions and
ultimately the rule of law, whereas in Bosnia we do not do that. And, again, these are decisions that the nations have to take. If I could offer an idea, I think there is some merit to having the police academy and training local people, as opposed to depending upon the United Nations or the European Union to do the policing.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. Senator Warner.
SEN. WARNER: Mr. Chairman, I think our witnesses today, and indeed the participation by our colleagues, has
made this a very important hearing. And I really commend each of you. Secretary Grossman, I have to tell you, in the business in which the senator and I engaged, when a senator whispers in my ear that they would not want you as an opponent, that measures up in our estimate.
SEN. LEVIN: That wasn't me, by the way. (Laughter.)
MR. GROSSMAN: I was going to say, that's right. I haven't convinced the chairman of that.
SEN. LEVIN: But it damn well could have been me. (Laughter.)
SEN. WARNER: But you're a great tribute to the marvelous career force that our nation has in the Foreign
Service. Thank you. I can remember when you were DCM in Turkey, and now you're third in rank in the hierarchy. Well done.
MR. GROSSMAN: Thank you, sir.
SEN. WARNER: Therefore, I'll give you this question. (Laughter.) Now the boom.
MR. GROSSMAN: I knew there was no free lunch. (Laughs.)
SEN. WARNER: The subject of missile defense. We watched our president and secretary of State and
secretary of Defense, I think, in a very brilliant way, work through concerns of Russia. Those concerns were expressed somewhat, perhaps -- this is my judgment -- in a less strong way than we anticipated at the time. And allied reaction was in some areas rather high for a period, in a negative sense. What's the status of the European allies now that we're working through -- and Secretary Feith, you'll be given a chance to comment on this -- are there significant residual concerns about the proposed U.S. missile defense among our allies?
And are they beginning to get what I say -- and I say this respectfully -- a more realistic appreciation after
9/11 of what can happen, even by way of not state-sponsored attack but terrorist attack, and/or the accidental attack that could -- I shouldn't say accidental attack; the accidental firing of a weapon, which is a threat in itself.
MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir. I think, first of all --
SEN. WARNER: Why don't you take it just generally --
MR. GROSSMAN: Right.
SEN. WARNER: -- so that I can get one or two other questions in, and then expand that for the record,
because this response will be very carefully examined.
MR. GROSSMAN: Okay. First of all, I think there is an increasing recognition of the threat on the part of our
allies because of 9/11, as you say, and also because all of us, in our own way, have tried again and again and again to make them recognize that if you look at the map and see the circles from places like Iraq and Iran and other countries that are developing weapons of mass destruction, those circles include lots of Europe. And so we think that we're making some progress there.
Second, I always believed that if we were going to be successful -- and I think the president, Secretary
Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell were very successful in, as you say, making the Russia issue come out right -- that our allies would be much relieved. And I think they are. So we've got an opening to do more.
And third, since we're talking about NATO, I am still convinced that NATO is going to be one of the ways into
this issue of missile defense, what used to be known as theater missile defenses in NATO. I mean, who's working on missile defenses today? NATO is. And for some countries, theater missile defense is missile defense. And so --
SEN. WARNER: Absolutely.
MR. GROSSMAN: -- (I think we can?) build on that.
SEN. WARNER: Secretary Feith, do you have anything to add? Or if you'd put it in the record, or General
Ralston likewise put it in the record. Secretary Feith, the United States is providing a substantial amount of assistance, dollar assistance, to the aspirant nations looking to the fall meeting on expansion. In the last year, $55 million were distributed. To what extent are other nations in NATO providing comparable assistance to the nine nations seeking to join NATO? And which nations provide assistance dollar-wise that approximates that of the United States taxpayer? Either one of you, Mr. Grossman or yourself.
MR. FEITH: Senator, with your permission, I'd like to respond on the record --
SEN. WARNER: Fine. All right.
MR. FEITH: -- afterward. I don't have the answer on the top of my head.
SEN. WARNER: I raised that that night that I interjected my opposition to the passage of the proposal that Mr.
Lieberman discussed as one of the reasons. I mean, I'd like to know what the others are doing, because this had a very significant dollar amount in it as proposed. Either of you gentlemen, if you want to put this in the record, because it's quite (voluminous?); give us the views of our allies on NATO expansion and sort of a summary of what they feel, each of the other 18 nations, because I think it's important for the Senate to have that information as we begin to proceed hopefully as a partner in the deliberations on this expansion issue.
And lastly, I'll read this one and you can do it for the record. As you know, NATO's membership action plan,
called MAP, established a program of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for profitable future membership in NATO. The MAP states that aspirants would be expected, and I quote, "to settle ethnic disputes or external disputes, including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighborly relations," end quote.
This is an area of the world -- that is, the proposed nine acquisition, those nine nations seeking to join -- that
area of the world with many ethnic minorities and long-standing border and other internal or cross-border disputes. We all recognize that. What progress have the various aspirants, nine of them in total, made with regard to settling such disputes within the framework of the MAP? I presume that progress has been made; if you can say that much, and then place the rest of it in the record. Anyone wish to comment?
MR. GROSSMAN: Yes. I was just trying to think where to start. Senator, I want to go back to your first
question, which was what other allies are thinking about expansion. We have asked our allies -- and we have tried very hard to live by this rule ourselves -- that nobody start choosing particular names until sometime later in the year. We want to avoid a beauty contest. We'd like to make sure that we continue to get progress from these countries.
So what I'm about to tell you would be my judgment, which is to say that I believe that the vast majority of
allies, certainly all the people I've talked to, are interested in some expansion. I believe there's a consensus forming around President Bush's statement that we ought to do as much as we can and not as little as we can. I think it won't surprise you also that there will be -- as I think Senator Landrieu said, there'll be differences in perception between countries in the north and countries in the south. And those are all conversations yet to come.
But I believe that there's nobody in the alliance today who stands up and says, "It would be absolutely the
wrong thing to do." But as I say, we've tried very hard to kind of keep ambiguous, for reasons that you would understand, and I hope you will support us, and we want as much progress as we can possibly make.
On the second question, yes, I'd be glad to respond kind of individually for the record. I can tell you that in
every single one of the visits to the nine countries that Ambassador Burns and his team made, this was high on their agenda. I'll give you one from the past and one from the future. What we saw, it seems to me, anyway, between the Czech Republic and Hungary, as both of them were getting ready to join NATO, was a settlement of some of their disputes, a positive thing. And aspirants -- I would cite the very good work that has been done in the Baltic states to deal with people who speak Russian there, Russian minorities, through OSCE and other ways. I'm sure there are others, and I'd be glad to submit them for the record.
SEN. WARNER: Well, at this time, I'm glad the chairman recognized the presence today of several ambassadors from those nations in the category of aspirants. I and other members of the Senate, and perhaps the House also, are frequently invited to various functions here in the nation's capital. I know a person for whom I have high regard. Mrs. Finley (sp) often hosts a number of these informal discussions where members of Congress have the opportunity to talk with the ambassadors and other representatives from these nations. And in every instance in which I've participated, I think it's been done on
a very high level, absolutely superb professional exchange of views.
And I think that their active participation, be it the ambassadors or defense ministers, secretaries of State and
so forth, foreign affairs ministers, it's been done very well. And it will continue, I am sure. The intensity is likely to pick up in the months to come. But we shouldn't discourage that. We should encourage it. I think you're wise that we don't begin to have a short list beginning to develop until we look at the overall thing.
I come back to the basic proposition: Do we need to get the house more in order before we decide to acquire
more teams? You could look at the baseball franchises here in the United States. There's a lot of concern that that house isn't in order before they get new franchises. But anyway, so much for that.
Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much.
SEN. LEVIN: Well, talking about houses being in order, NATO Secretary General Robertson on February 3rd, in a major speech entitled "NATO's Future," after urging the Europeans to get their house in order and to spend more on defense, said that, quote, "The United States must do more, too, not in terms of soldiers on theground or aircraft in the air, but in facilitating the process of European defense modernization. By easing unnecessary restrictions on technology transfer and industrial cooperation, Washington can improve thequality of the capabilities available and diminish any problems our forces have in working together."
Secretary Feith, do you agree?
MR. FEITH: Yes.
SEN. LEVIN: Are those efforts being successfully made?
MR. FEITH: Yes, we are working on harmonizing export control policies with our allies so that we can have a more open exchange.
SEN. LEVIN: A more open exchange?
MR. FEITH: A more open exchange of technology.
SEN. LEVIN: Oh, okay.
MR. FEITH: The --
SEN. LEVIN: You're not talking rhetoric here. You're talking --
MR. FEITH: No, no. We're talking technology. (Laughs.)
SEN. LEVIN: Just one quick comment on missile defense, because it's irresistible. (Laughter.)
SEN. WARNER: That's why I'm waiting. (Laughter.)
SEN. LEVIN: (Laughs.) In that case, I'm tempted to make it a very long comment, because I love to have you at my side. Secretary Grossman, you talked about more realistic appreciation of threats after 9/11. I couldn't agree with you more. I think 9/11 gave us a very realistic appreciation of where the real threats lie. We differ as to howto answer that question, but that is the test: What is the lesson of 9/11 in terms of realistic threats to us and the likely threats?
We'll leave it at that; otherwise we'll be here all afternoon, I think. We join Senator Warner in thanking you all for your testimony. Next time you're here together, we will give you a little wider table. (Laughter.) And we thank again our special visitors for joining us today, and we will stand adjourned.
END
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