¨ GLOBALIZING COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION: A SURVEY OF OPTIONS.  [RL32359]

Sharon Squassoni.Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS).  April 15, 2004.

http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32359.pdf [pdf format, 47 pages]

Increasingly, Congress and the Administration are looking to utilize nonproliferation assistance programs, including cooperative threat reduction, to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in states outside the former Soviet Union.  Thus far, the Bush Administration has proposed that such funds could be used for retraining weapons scientists in Iraq and Libya or for reducing uranium enrichment levels in foreign research nuclear reactors.  This report analyzes the range of possibilities for applying CTR funds, what kinds of assistance might be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance.

A key underlying issue is whether countries that pose particular risks are prepared to provide adequate cooperation to achieve CTR objectives.  As many observers have noted, CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other countries.  A common factor must be the willingness of such states to cooperate.  Across the board, Congress may wish to consider domestic and international legal and political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the nonproliferation regimes, low levels of transparency exhibited by most of the potential recipient states, and the lack of incentives for many of these states to pursue threat reduction measures.  In addition, Congress may wish to consider whether potentially expanding the geographic scope of CTR may have a negative effect on existing programs.  One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention.  Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus additionally on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.

¨ PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003.

United States Department of State.  April 29, 2003.

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/

The annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act.

Among the quantitative data presented in the report are the following:

·           There were 190 acts of international terrorism in 2003, a slight decrease from the 198 attacks that occurred in 2002, and a drop of 45 percent from the level in 2001 of 346 attacks. The figure in 2003 represents the lowest annual total of international terrorist attacks since 1969.

·           A total of 307 persons were killed in the attacks of 2003, far fewer than the 725 killed during 2002.  A total of 1,593 persons were wounded in the attacks that occurred in 2003, down from 2,013 persons wounded the year before.

·           In 2003, the highest number of attacks (70) and the highest casualty count (159 persons dead and 951 wounded) occurred in Asia.

The report may be downloaded in its entirety or users may choose to view/download one or more sections individually.  Included in the report are regional overviews, a chronology of terrorist incidents and background information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations as well as other terrorist groups. 

¨ SMALL-SCALE TERRORIST ATTACKS USING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS: AN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND PRELIMINARY COMPARISONS.  [RL32391]

Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS).  May 20, 2004.

http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32391.pdf

[pdf format, 89 pages]

This report presents a means of assessing the relative threat from terrorist-use of individual chemical, biological toxic agents.  It focuses on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks, rather than mass-casualty attacks.  The framework considers the elements of access, public health impact, medical treatment, prophylaxis, and dissemination.  Other factors that may affect potential use by terrorists include the range of lethality, covert employment of an agent, and the availability of dual-use technologies. 

The results of this framework may be useful in addressing the threat these agents pose, for example by indicating priorities for countermeasure funding.  Other uses include weighing the potential effectiveness of policy options, assessing threat reduction approaches to specific agents, and serving as a resource for developing other specialized frameworks.

Some chemical and biological agents are closely regulated, both domestically and internationally.  Expansion of policies controlling these agents may lower the threat posed by terrorist use of them.  Domestic policy options to reduce the threat posed by these agents include methods to prevent their use, consequence management after their use, and methods for protecting the public from them.  Specific policies to implement these goals include improving the general public health system, increasing prophylaxis research, development of new medical treatments, increasing intelligence gathering, and increasing regulation of dual-use technology.  International policy options include development of new biosecurity agreements and increasing participation in current nonproliferation organizations.

Important issues facing policymakers include balancing the need for increased security with the potential economic costs associated with increased regulation and redirected federal resources, determining the relative ratio between general and specific countermeasures against chemical and biological terrorism, and assessing the success of federal efforts at reducing chemical and biological terrorism vulnerability.

¨ STAFF STATEMENT NO. 15: OVERVIEW OF THE ENEMY.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9-11

Commission].  June 16, 2004.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/staff_statement_15.pdf

[pdf format, 12 pages]

The 10-member 9-11 commission released this report as it opened its final public hearings (June 16th and 17th) in Washington.   After 18 months of work, the bipartisan panel is preparing its final report to Congress and the White House, due July 26.

        This report provides a brief history of al Qaeda, the evolution of its organizational structure, and information about the financing of the group by Usama Bin Ladin and others.  “Contrary to popular understanding, Bin Ladin did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses.  Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fundraising network developed over time.”  According to the report, Bin Laden relied on couriers and the informal hawala system to move funds in and out of Afghanistan via Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere in the Middle East.  Recent information indicates that al Qaeda’s fundraising has declined since the attacks in the United States, and that control of the organization is much more decentralized than it was prior to the attacks.

¨ STAFF STATEMENT NO. 16: OUTLINE OF THE 9/11 PLOT. 

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9-11 Commission].  June 16, 2004.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/staff_statement_16.pdf

[pdf format, 20 pages]

In this report, the 9-11 Commission traces the comings and goings of the hijackers and their relationships among themselves and with other al Qaeda members.  The staff writers note at the beginning of the report:  “Much of the account in this statement reflects assertions reportedly made by various 9/11 conspirators and captured al Qaeda members while under interrogation.  We have sought to corroborate this material as much as possible.  Some of this material has been inconsistent.  We have had to make judgment calls based on the weight and credibility of the evidence.  Our information on statements attributed to such individuals comes from written reporting; we have not had direct access to any of them.”

        Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is identified as the originator of the 9-11 plot, which he pitched, ultimately successfully to Usama Bin Ladin, who eventually approved the idea and provided funding and recruits. 

¨ TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION, SCREENING, AND TRACKING UNDER HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 6.  [RL32366]

William J. Krouse.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS).  April 21, 2004.

http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32366.pdf

[pdf format, 40 pages]

[Note:  Homeland Security Presidential Security Directive 6 (HSPD-6) is available at:  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-5.html].

In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), the Administration announced plans to establish a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), as a multi-agency effort to be administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where several watch lists are being consolidated into a single terrorist screening database (TSDB).  The TSC is the latest of three multi-agency efforts undertaken by the Administration to better identify, screen, and track known terrorists, suspected terrorists, and their supporters.  The other two are the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).  According to the Administration, the TSC complements the FBI-led FTTTF’s efforts to prevent terrorists from entering the United States, and to track and remove them if they manage to enter the country.  The TTIC serves as a single locale where terrorism-threat data from all sources are further analyzed to more critically focus on terrorism.

Certain terrorist identification and watch list functions previously performed by the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) have been transferred to the TTIC and TSC under HSPD-6.  At the TTIC, intelligence analysts are building a Terrorist Identities Database (TID) based on TIPOFF — the U.S. government’s principal terrorist watch list database prior to HSPD-6.  From TID records, TSC analysts are building a consolidated TSDB.  The Administration plans to widen access to, and use of, lookout records by making them available in a “sensitive but unclassified” format to authorized federal, state, local, territorial and tribal authorities; to certain private sector entities; and to certain foreign governments.

Merging watch lists will not likely require integrating entire systems, but there are likely to be technological impediments to merging watch list records.  From system to system, and watch list to watch list, there remains no standardization of data elements, such as name, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, or biometric identifiers.  While elevating and expanding the terrorist identification and watch list function is an important step in the wider war on terrorism, additional work will remain to upgrade and integrate other consular and border management systems, criminal history record systems, and biometric systems.

¨ UPDATE ON THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING.

Mallory Factor, Lee S. Wolosky and William F. Wechsler.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).  June 15, 2004.

Report: 

http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Revised_Terrorist_Financing.pdf

[pdf format, 56 pages]

Appendix C:  A Comparative Assessment of Saudi Arabia with other Countries of the Islamic World

http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Revised_Terrorist_Financing_AppendC.pdf

[pdf format, 14 pages]

Appendix D:  A Technical Assessment of Certain Saudi Arabia Laws, Regulations, and Institutions

http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Revised_Terrorist_Financing_AppendD.pdf

[pdf format, 191 pages]

This task force report is a follow-on to the Council's 2002 report which concluded that persons and organizations based in Saudi Arabia were the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda.  The report includes both positive and negative findings and recommends that:

 * U.S. policymakers build a new framework for U.S.-Saudi relations.

 * Saudi Arabia fully implement its new laws and regulations and take additional steps to further improve its efforts to combat terrorist financing.  * Multilateral initiatives be better coordinated, appropriately funded, and invested with clear punitive authorities.

 * The executive branch formalize its efforts to centralize the coordination of U.S. measures to combat terrorist financing.

 * Congress enact a Treasury-led certification regime specifically on terrorist financing terrorism.

 * The U.N. Security Council broaden the scope of the U.N.'s al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.

 * The U.S. government increase sharing of information with the financial services sector, so it can cooperate more effectively in identifying incidences of terror financing.

 * The National Security Council and the White House Office of Management and Budget conduct a cross-cutting analysis of the budgets of all U.S. government agencies as they relate to terrorist financing.

 * The U.S. government and private foundations, universities, and think tanks increase efforts to understand the strategic threat posed to the United States by radical Islamic militancy, including the methods and modalities of its financing and global propagation.

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT:  STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Revised August 2, 2004, 12 p.

http://www.csis.org/

Congress and the executive branch should proceed cautiously in addressing the recommendations of the 9/11 commission report because the panel makes sweeping generalizations and neglects key topics, according to an analysis by Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy.