* Promises And Reality: America's Military in 2001        http://www.stratfor.com/home/giu/archive/122700 ___________________________________________________________________

Summary As he prepares to move into the White House, the new American president-elect has placed a high priority on restoring U.S. military force, which he has described as overworked, under-funded and in need of new direction. But as he prepares to take office, George W. Bush faces a global landscape that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to immediately implement the improvements he wants in the American military. Analysis The Department of Defense's top-to-bottom review of priorities conducted every four years, the Quadrennial Defense Review  (QDR), is getting underway and the Bush camp was scheduled to meet with Pentagon officials the week of Dec. 18. While the QDR is Bush's best chance to chart his own course, his major defenseproposals are all filled with potential pitfalls. But facing increasingly intractable commitments abroad, as well as a partisan split at home, a series of key Bush defense proposals is likely to languish. In Kosovo, the situation is deteriorating as the ethnic Albanian campaign for independence is rekindled, making it difficult for U.S. forces to withdraw. At a global level, the Chinese and Russian governments are making headway in enlisting opposition - most recently Canada's - to an ambitious National Missile Defense. Throughout the campaign for the presidency, George W. Bush repeatedly attacked the entire approach of the Clinton administration toward the armed forces. A military of 1.4 million people - slashed by one-third since the early 1990s - has been deployed overseas more than three times as often as during theCold War. The net effect - Bush and his advisors argued - has been to place at risk future U.S. military supremacy in a world fraught with new and daunting challenges. *********** TO READ THE REST OF THIS ARTICLE CLICK HERE:***********     http://www.stratfor.com/home/giu/archive/122700.asp#During

Armed Forces

¨ MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL: AN OVERVIEW.  [RS21850]

Estela I. Velez Pollack. 

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS).  May 26, 2004.

http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21850.pdf

[pdf format, 6 pages]

The recent reports of abuse of prisoners held by the military in Iraq have raised questions about how the armed forces discipline and punish those who commit crimes or violate the rules and regulations of the military.

        Under Article I, sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and provide for organizing and disciplining them.  Under this authority, the Congress has enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the code of military criminal laws applicable to all military members worldwide.  The President implemented the UCMJ through the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), which was prescribed by Executive Order 12473 (April 13, 1984).  The Manual for Courts-Martial contains the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE), and the UCMJ. The MCM covers almost all aspects of military law.  Military criminal trial courts are known as courts-martial. Military courts are not considered Article III courts but instead are established pursuant to Article I of the Constitution.  This report provides an overview of military courts-martial.  It does not cover administrative disciplinary options such as non-judicial punishments.

¨ MILITARY FORCES: WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE SIZE FOR THE UNITED STATES?  [RS21754]

Edward F. Bruner.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS).  Updated May 28, 2004.

http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21754.pdf

[pdf format, 6 pages]

Throughout the Cold War, end strength of the U.S. active duty force never dropped below 2.0 million personnel and peaked at over 3.5 million during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  From 1989 to 1999, end strength dropped steadily from 2.1 million to 1.4 million, where it has remained.  Force structure dropped even more, with active Army divisions, for example, going from 18 to 10.  Expectations that military requirements would also diminish, however, were not realized: U.S. forces deployed to new missions in such places as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and, with the recent advent of the GWOT (), to Afghanistan and other far-flung places.  The results of Operation Iraqi Freedom suggested that U.S. ground forces, in particular, are stretched thin.

        Some Members of Congress and other military analysts have argued that the U.S. Armed Forces are too small to adequately meet all the requirements arising in the post-Cold War era, and particularly in the GWOT.  In January, 2004, the Department of Defense acknowledged a problem by temporarily adding 30,000 troops to the authorized active duty end strength of the Army.  The House and Senate are addressing the issue, in different ways, through the FY2005 Authorization Bill, H.R. 4200 and S. 2400.  This report describes the background to this action, current Administration planning, and assesses several significant issues for Congress.

¨ NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004.

United States Department of Defense.  Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Web-posted May 20, 2004. http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_377_National%20Military%20Strategy%2013%20May%2004.pdf [pdf format, 30 pages]

The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the 2004 National Defense Strategy (NDS).  It describes the Armed Forces’ plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future.  In the foreword, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers states that “This document describes the ways and means to protect the United States, prevent conflict and surprise attack and prevail against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies and friends.”

Myers identifies three key aspects of the security environment that come into play in the updated military strategy:

·           A wider range of adversaries, including both nation states and non-state groups;

·           A more complex and distributed “battlespace.”  Threats may against the United States or its interests, and they span “the global commons of international airspace, waters, space and cyberspace”;

·           Technology diffusion and access.  Increased access to advanced weapons systems and to commercially-available, low-cost information technologies is now widespread, expanding the potential destructive power of both state and non-state actors.

¨ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.  REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  June 1, 2004. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/iaea0604.pdf[pdf format, 21 pages

The IAEA’s Board of Governors requested the Director General to report on several issues related to Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.  This report reviews the steps that the IAEA inspectors have taken since March with respect to the review of Iran’s nuclear programs. 

The inspectors describe in some detail the outstanding issues that remain, and outline the next steps in the inspection process.  One of their main concerns remains the importation of centrifuge enrichment components and why different sets of centrifuge equipment have different kinds of contamination associated with them.  Further questions focus on Iran’s laser enrichment program, “in particular as regarded training in, and delivery of specific equipment (excimer lasers) by, another State”.

¨ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT [NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY] SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT OF THE SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA.  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  May 28, 2004.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/iaea0504.pdf[pdf format, 19 pages]

In this report the International Atomic Energy Agency reviews what it has learned through its nuclear verification program, which has been underway since early March 2004, when Libya announced its intention to eliminate materials related to nuclear weapons programs and to open itself up to IAEA inspections.

The report summarizes findings related to the last twenty years of Libya’s undeclared nuclear program.  In the report the IAEA also documents specific issues for which it is requesting more details from Libya, including specifics regarding that country’s acquisition of uranium hexafluoride as well as verification of uranium ore concentrate holdings in Libya.

The IAEA notes that “nearly all of the technology involved in Libya’s past nuclear activities was obtained from foreign sources, often through intermediaries.  Full verification of Libya’s declarations requires investigation of the foreign sources and intermediaries.  To this end, the Agency has been in contact with relevant governments and companies with a view to corroborating information received from Libya.  This is a slow process and will continue for some time”.

¨ NONPROLIFERATION: DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION RAISE CONCERNS ABOUT PROLIFERATION.  [GAO-04-361]

United States General Accounting Office (GAO).  April 27, 2004.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04361.pdf[pdf format, 61 pages]

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans chemical weapons and requires their

destruction by 2007, with possible extensions to 2012.  The CWC also seeks to

reduce the proliferation of these weapons by requiring member states to adopt

comprehensive national laws to criminalize CWC-prohibited activities.  The

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) monitors the

destruction of chemical weapons and inspects declared commercial facilities in

member states.  GAO was asked to review (1) member states’ efforts to meet key convention requirements, (2) OPCW’s efforts in conducting inspections to ensure compliance with the convention, and (3) Russia’s efforts to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile.

This GAO report finds that the OPCW faces resource challenges in addressing

the proliferation threat posed by commercial facilities and inspecting an

increased number of military facilities that destroy possessor states’ chemical

weapons.  Although the OPCW has conducted nearly 1,600 inspections in 58 member

states since April 1997, more than half have been conducted at military

facilities.  About 36 percent of OPCW commercial inspections have taken place

at facilities producing the most dangerous chemicals identified by the CWC. 

The OPCW recognizes that it must increase the number of inspections conducted

at facilities that produce dual-use chemicals. Some of these facilities may

pose a proliferation threat.

GAO also believes that the lack of a credible Russian chemical weapons

destruction plan has hindered and may further delay destruction efforts,

leaving Russia’s vast chemical weapons arsenal vulnerable to theft or

diversion.

¨ UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE:  A STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY.  [DRAFT]

George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller , Jon B. Wolfsthal and Jessica T. Mathews

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP).  June 2004.

http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/universal.compliance.FINAL.pdf[pdf format, 96 pages]

This draft strategy report offers a blueprint for U.S. leadership in rethinking the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.  The proposed strategy synthesizes some innovative approaches of the George W. Bush administration, the benefits of the traditional treaty-based regime, and many new elements.  It highlights both the necessity for strict enforcement of nonproliferation agreements and for global cooperation to forge those agreements.

        The draft report is in two parts: The first details the core principles and policies of this new nuclear security strategy. The second section is an in-depth technical and political elaboration of the various elements of the strategy, including restructuring of the nuclear fuel cycle, a global threat assessment, and pathways to resolve regional proliferation crises. 

Nuclear weapons

¨ FUTURE ROLES OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY.

Glenn C. Buchan, David Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic.

RAND.  Web-posted June 7, 2004.Full Report:

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1231/MR1231.pdf[pdf format, 152]

Summary: http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1231/MR1231.sum.pdf[pdf format, 9 pages]

This study examines the possible roles of nuclear weapons in contemporary U.S. national security policy.  The United States has a range of nuclear strategies and postures among which to choose: from abolition of U.S. nuclear weapons, aggressive reductions and “dealerting,” “business as usual, only smaller,” more aggressive nuclear posture, to nuclear emphasis. The authors argue that nation should have the operational flexibility to in fact use a modest number of nuclear weapons if the needs were overwhelming and other options were inadequate.  In order to meet standards of operational flexibility, say the authors, the following factors would have to be in place:

·           Suitable planning systems (e.g., near real-time target planning);

·           Training;

·           Inclusion of nuclear weapons in exercises

·           Nuclear expertise on theater planning staffs

·           Suitable command and control

·           Intelligence support comparable to that needed by conventional forces.

Peacekeeping

¨ POLICING IN PEACEKEEPING AND RELATED STABILITY OPERATIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS.  [RL32321]

Nina M. Serafino.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS).  Updated March 30, 2004.

http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32321.pdf

[pdf format, 58 pages]

After over a decade of intensive experience with multifaceted peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, many analysts have concluded that establishing a secure and stable environment is one essential element for achieving a sustainable peace.  As continued instability in Iraq and Afghanistan impedes the restoration of normal lives for those countries’ inhabitants, and as Haiti exhibits renewed instability, some Members of Congress are examining with renewed interest available tools to provide effective security.  While military forces are considered indispensable for establishing initial security and often are also used to maintain law and order in peacekeeping and related “stability” or “stabilization” operations designed to normalize conditions in post-conflict and post-intervention environments, their use is often controversial.  Over the past decade, international civilian police (known as “CivPol”) have become increasingly recognized as generally more suited than military forces for most law and order tasks, and their use has increased dramatically.  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its March 2004 Report 108-248 [Note:  http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_reports&docid=f:sr248.108.pdf] accompanying the FY2005 foreign relations authorization bill (S. 2144), stated that it recognizes “the importance of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, including its capability to deploy civil police forces, in promoting stability in post-conflict situations.”      Policymakers have recognized problems with their use and made efforts to deal with them. Among the current issues for Congress are whether to provide for continued improvements to the existing system and whether to build new U.S. and international

CivPol capabilities.  CivPol advocates have advanced proposals to (1) facilitate the recruitment and rapid deployment of adequate numbers of qualified police and related law enforcement personnel to complex post-conflict missions, and (2) ensure that such missions include personnel with the appropriate training and skills to handle a range of law enforcement situations.  These proposals encompass provisions that would stress continued implementation of U.S. and U.N. reform efforts, as well as provisions that would reform the existing system.

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID AND CHALLENGES http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04858.pdf

FACING ITS IMPLEMENTATION.  REPORT TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS, AND CAPABILITIES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.  [GAO-04-858]

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO).  July 28, 2004; Web-posted July 29, 2004.

[pdf format, 37 pages]

The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of transforming military capabilities.  The transformation relies in part on the Global Information Grid (GIG), which is focused on building a new Internet-like network capability that DOD envisions will enable weapons and other systems and people to share information quickly, allowing warfighters to identify threats more effectively and to respond with greater precision and lethality.  DOD plans to spend at least $21 billion through 2010 to build a core GIG capability. GAO was asked (1) to describe the GIG, including the concept, key acquisitions, and implementation and (2) to identify significant challenges facing DOD in implementing the GIG.

GAO contends that the most critical challenge ahead for DOD is making the GIG a reality.  While DOD has taken steps to define its vision and objectives for the GIG on paper and in policy and is beginning to make a heavy investment in the GIG as well as systems that will be heavily dependent on the GIG, it is not fully known how DOD will meet these objectives.  For example, it is not known which investments should take priority over others and how these decisions will be enforced.  Moreover, it is not known how DOD will assess the overall progress of the GIG and determine whether the network as a whole is providing a worthwhile return on investment, particularly in terms of enhancing and even transforming military operations.  According to DOD officials, the enhancements DOD is making to its planning and budgeting processes are meant to begin addressing these questions.  Until DOD implements an investment and oversight strategy for the GIG as a whole, says GAO, it is at risk of making investments that do not fit DOD’s vision for the future.

¨ FACT SHEET: MAKING AMERICA MORE SECURE BY TRANSFORMING OUR MILITARY

The White House, Aug. 16, 2004

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-5.html

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040816-5.html

Following President Bush's August 16 speech announcing an initiative to realign U.S. forces overseas from a heavy and slower Cold War posture to one of greater flexibility and agility, the White House issued a fact sheet outlining its proposed changes by region.

New security threats and advanced military technologies are driving the realignment, according to the fact sheet: "It is no longer relevant to measure America's war-fighting capability by the number of troops and equipment in a particular country or region."

Since global threats can come from anywhere and are unpredictable, the fact sheet states: "Leveraging U.S. advantages in speed, reach, precision, knowledge, and combat power is now the defining concept in military action."

¨ PRINCIPLES FOR RESTRUCTURING AMERICA’S GLOBAL MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE

by Jack SpencerHeritage Foundation, WebMemo #554, August 16, 2004

“On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced that the United S tates will alter its overseas basing infrastructure in the coming years. This realignment of forces could affect up to 70,000 servicemen currently stationed abroad and nearly as many dependants. The President should be applauded for this initiative to advance America’s national security.”

¨ U.S. ARMY’S MODULAR REDESIGN: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

Andrew Feickert.Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS).  July 19, 2004.

[pdf format, 32 pages]

In what the Army describes as the “most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years,” the Army intends to redesign its current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA force by FY2007.  The Army National Guard will also redesign its force structure in a similar fashion.  While the Army cites the need for a more responsive, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force, others suggest that the primary reason for redesign is the ever increasing long term troop requirements to support the (GWOT).  The addition of up to 15 additional active duty and a yet to be finalized number of Army National Guard brigade-sized UAs could provide an additional force pool of deployable units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations.

The Army has two other concurrent initiatives underway which it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign — restructuring to create new “high demand” units and stabilizing the force.  Both initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes from FY2004 - FY2009.

Many experts believe that modular redesign, selective restructuring, and stabilizing of the Army are prudent actions that should provide the Army with additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their families.  As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise, many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and reserve forces.  While the Army has some specific planning and cost information for converting its combat forces, some analysts suggest that more needs to be done for support units of action both in the active Army and the reserves.  This planning is considered crucial in light of evidence suggesting that the Army may have to contend with personnel and selected equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new force.

Restructuring and stability also raise a number of concerns.  Some experts suggest that the Army will have to significantly change how officers and soldiers are trained and note that there does not appear to be a master plan dealing with training and its associated costs.  Where these new units of action will eventually be based is also of interest to many analysts.  In addition to the costs associated with basing forces, there are questions about how this re-basing strategy will enhance deployability and how changes to Army bases could affect local communities.

¨ DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID AND CHALLENGES http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04858.pdf

FACING ITS IMPLEMENTATION.  REPORT TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS, AND CAPABILITIES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.  [GAO-04-858] United States Government Accountability Office (GAO).  July 28, 2004; Web-posted July 29, 2004. [pdf format, 37 pages] The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of transforming military capabilities.  The transformation relies in part on the Global Information Grid (GIG), which is focused on building a new Internet-like network capability that DOD envisions will enable weapons and other systems and people to share information quickly, allowing warfighters to identify threats more effectively and to respond with greater precision and lethality.  DOD plans to spend at least $21 billion through 2010 to build a core GIG capability. GAO was asked (1) to describe the GIG, including the concept, key acquisitions, and implementation and (2) to identify significant challenges facing DOD in implementing the GIG. GAO contends that the most critical challenge ahead for DOD is making the GIG a reality.  While DOD has taken steps to define its vision and objectives for the GIG on paper and in policy and is beginning to make a heavy investment in the GIG as well as systems that will be heavily dependent on the GIG, it is not fully known how DOD will meet these objectives.  For example, it is not known which investments should take priority over others and how these decisions will be enforced.  Moreover, it is not known how DOD will assess the overall progress of the GIG and determine whether the network as a whole is providing a worthwhile return on investment, particularly in terms of enhancing and even transforming military operations.  According to DOD officials, the enhancements DOD is making to its planning and budgeting processes are meant to begin addressing these questions.  Until DOD implements an investment and oversight strategy for the GIG as a whole, says GAO, it is at risk of making investments that do not fit DOD’s vision for the future.

¨ FACT SHEET: MAKING AMERICA MORE SECURE BY TRANSFORMING OUR MILITARY

The White House, Aug. 16, 2004 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-5.html http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040816-5.html

Following President Bush's August 16 speech announcing an initiative to realign U.S. forces overseas from a heavy and slower Cold War posture to one of greater flexibility and agility, the White House issued a fact sheet outlining its proposed changes by region.

New security threats and advanced military technologies are driving the realignment, according to the fact sheet: "It is no longer relevant to measure America's war-fighting capability by the number of troops and equipment in a particular country or region."

Since global threats can come from anywhere and are unpredictable, the fact sheet states: "Leveraging U.S. advantages in speed, reach, precision, knowledge, and combat power is now the defining concept in military action."

¨ PRINCIPLES FOR RESTRUCTURING AMERICA’S GLOBAL MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE

by Jack SpencerHeritage Foundation, WebMemo #554, August 16, 2004

“On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced that the United S tates will alter its overseas basing infrastructure in the coming years. This realignment of forces could affect up to 70,000 servicemen currently stationed abroad and nearly as many dependants. The President should be applauded for this initiative to advance America’s national security.”

¨ U.S. ARMY’S MODULAR REDESIGN: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

Andrew Feickert.Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS).  July 19, 2004. [pdf format, 32 pages] In what the Army describes as the “most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years,” the Army intends to redesign its current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA force by FY2007.  The Army National Guard will also redesign its force structure in a similar fashion.  While the Army cites the need for a more responsive, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force, others suggest that the primary reason for redesign is the ever increasing long term troop requirements to support the (GWOT).  The addition of up to 15 additional active duty and a yet to be finalized number of Army National Guard brigade-sized UAs could provide an additional force pool of deployable units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has two other concurrent initiatives underway which it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign — restructuring to create new “high demand” units and stabilizing the force.  Both initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes from FY2004 - FY2009. Many experts believe that modular redesign, selective restructuring, and stabilizing of the Army are prudent actions that should provide the Army with additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their families.  As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise, many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and reserve forces.  While the Army has some specific planning and cost information for converting its combat forces, some analysts suggest that more needs to be done for support units of action both in the active Army and the reserves.  This planning is considered crucial in light of evidence suggesting that the Army may have to contend with personnel and selected equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new force.

Restructuring and stability also raise a number of concerns.  Some experts suggest that the Army will have to significantly change how officers and soldiers are trained and note that there does not appear to be a master plan dealing with training and its associated costs.  Where these new units of action will eventually be based is also of interest to many analysts.  In addition to the costs associated with basing forces, there are questions about how this re-basing strategy will enhance deployability and how changes to Army bases could affect local communities.