THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA by Joel Wit Brookings Institution, Policy Brief #74, March 2001, 7 p.http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb074/pb74.htm 'North Korea has been the poster child for rogue states for over fivedecades. It has pursued a nuclear weapons program, constructed and exported ballistic missiles, sponsored terrorist acts, allegedly participated in the drug trade and counterfeiting, and posed a continuous threat to U.S. allies and interests, resulting in the stationing of U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan. But it has also been the subject of a policy experiment. Both Republican and Democraticadministrations have tried to engage Pyongyang in order to improve  relations and end its objectionable behavior. That policy, albeit politically controversial, particularly during the Clinton administration, is probably here to stay, not just because its attraction has been compelling to a cross-section of mainstream Democrats and Republicans, but also because political trends in Northeast Asia, particularly the ongoing rapprochement between North and South Korea, only reinforce the logic of engagement. The key question for the new administration is how it should shape its diplomatic policy towards North Korea to further U.S. interests in a region possibly transitioning away from the cold war confrontation of the past five decades to some unknown status.'

2/  A GLOBAL AFFAIRS COMMENTARY: BUSH FACES CHALLENGES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA By Karin Lee and John Feffer Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2001, 3 p. http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/pdf/gac/0103korea.pdf http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/commentary/0103korea.html ...'The new foreign policy team must decide whether to continue the Clinton approach of engaging North Korea or to adopt a tougher stance toward the 'state of concern'.' 3/  STAY THE COURSE ON NORTH KOREA By Holly Higgins, Research Analyst ISIS Policy Brief, March 7, 2001, 4 p. http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/policybrief301.html 'South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Washington this week provides the new Bush administration with its first real opportunity to shed light on U.S. security and nonproliferation policy on the Korean peninsula. The Bush administration should send a clear signal that it intends to stay the course on engaging North Korea to give up its threatening nuclear and missile programs. According to a new policy brief issued by the Institute for Science and  nternational Security (ISIS), the new administration should continue to engage North Korea, particularly with respect to the 1994 Agreed Framework, which would rid North Korea of its controversial nuclear program. Secretary of State Colin Powell has tasked the State Department to conduct a thorough review of U.S. policy toward North Korea. According to ISIS Research Analyst Holly Higgins, 'a balanced review will find that engagement with North Korea has produced significant benefits.' In particular, the Bush administration should not undervalue the benefits of the Agreed Framework. 'The Agreed Framework capped North Korea's nuclear weapons program at an early stage; helped avoid military conflict; reduced tensions in the region;contributed to a rapprochement between North and South Korea; enabled the United States and North Korea to discuss North Korea's missile program; and paved the way to the suspension of North Korea's missile flight tests,' she adds. According to the ISIS policy brief, the Bush administration should continue engaging North Korea, with a few mid-course corrections. When former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry conducted a Congressionally mandated review during the final years of the Clinton administration, he recommended that the United States adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach to resolving North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. However, Perry emphasized that engagement would only work if there was a continuity of policy beyond the end of the Clinton administration. Secretary of State Powell got off to a good start by assuring South Korea that the Bush administration remained open to engagement with North Korea. Recent hints of change are evident, however, in a new emphasis on 'reciprocity.' Powell recently has signaled that U.S.-North Korean relations will only improve if North Korea first resolves its missile, nuclear, and even conventional weapons threats. In contrast, South Korean President Kim would like to see the Bush administration adopt a less aggressive stance, beginning with Bush's public support for Kim's engagement policy. 'U.S. public support for the South Korean engagement policy would strengthen Kim's hand against critics in South Korea who are urging greater South Korean restraint,' Higgins says. According to the ISIS policy brief, it is critical that the United States and South Korea continue to coordinate their policies towards North Korea. If 'reciprocity' is needed in dealing with North Korea, Presidents Bush and Kim should signal their intent to coordinate on understanding exactly what 'reciprocity' means for U.S. and South Korean security. Policy coordination between Japan, South Korea, and the United States under the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) is also vital. Coordination among these parties is currently stronger than at any time in the past. It is important to show North Korea that there are no cracks in this unified front. 'Should the U.S. go off on its own tangent without coordinating with South Korea and Japan, tensions on the Korean peninsula are bound to increase,' says ISIS President David Albright. Recent recommendations that the Agreed Framework be renegotiated have also raised alarms in South Korea. Critics of the Agreed Framework have focused a great deal of attention on the wisdom of providing nuclear reactors, the durability of North Korea's electrical grid, and the high burden of heavy fuel oil costs on the United States. Although the Agreed Framework might be supplemented with additional agreements, it should not be renegotiated. 'Many technical issues need to be studied carefully,' said Higgins, 'but renegotiating the Agreed Framework could enable North Korea to restart its nuclear weapons effort.' Albright emphasizes that the time is fast approaching when it will be necessary to ensure North Korean compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. In a lengthy study released by ISIS in November 2000, ISIS concluded that this verification effort must begin sooner and proceed more quickly. In particular, the United States should seek a process that would allow the IAEA inspection effort to begin morerapidly. 'Coordinating on how to get inspectors back into North Korea should be high on the agenda' of the Bush-Kim summit Albright says. If the Bush administration is looking for indicators of North Korean commitment to the Agreed Framework, the successof the IAEA inspection effort is the ideal measuring stick.'  

MEETING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Morton I. Abramowitz, James T. Laney and Eric Heginbotham. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).  May 19, 2003.

Despite some convergence of positions within the allied camp, significant differences remain, limiting the effectiveness of policies adopted by each.  Washington favors a policy of isolation while Seoul pursues one of engagement.  American friends and allies in the region part ways with the United States over how to manage the nuclear crisis and ultimately induce change in the North.  Regional partners fear that the United States will attack North Korean nuclear facilities and unleash war on the peninsula.  All of these states, particularly South Korea and China, tend to oppose anything resembling comprehensive sanctions for fear that an embargo would lead to war as North Korea has threatened.

        What the regional partners do agree on is that the United States should seriously negotiate with Pyongyang in hopes of reaching a peaceful resolution to the crisis and, at the very least, test North Korean intentions.  Though desirous of being included in the talks, on balance, they are far less concerned with being involved in multilateral negotiations than they are in ensuring that real negotiations - multilateral or bilateral - take place and that Washington and Pyongyang directly engage.  The United States has not persuaded its regional partners that it is serious about negotiations, making efforts to secure their approval for a significantly tougher position difficult if not impossible.  If negotiations fail or should U.S. intelligence confirm that North Korea has reprocessed its spent fuel, it is uncertain whether our partners would be willing to put significantly greater pressure on North Korea.

http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Korea_TF.pdf

Bush's Iran/North Korea strategy Is not what many think [Jane’s Foreign Report – first posted to www.foreignreport.com – 24 June 2003

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