- CHINESE ARMS EXPORTS: POLICY, PLAYERS AND PROCESS. Report. July 2000.

Medeiros, Evan S.; Gill, Bates. U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2000/chinarms/chinarms.htm http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2000/chinarms/chinarms.pdf Global arms proliferation continues to be a key concern for the UnitedStates, particularly the export role of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although China experienced a significant decline in its arms exports in the 1990s (down from the boom times of the 1980s), the PRC provides a significant array of lethal weapons and sensitive defense technologies to states around the world. These exports provide an invaluable means by which to assess the progress and performance of China's military-industrialcomplex. Moreover, these products may present the very systems and technological know-how that the United States and allied forces will encounter in a future conflict.' -- CHINESE ARMY BUILDING IN THE ERA OF JIANG ZEMIN. August 2000. Scobell, Andrew.U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2000/Chinarmy/chinarmy.htm To many in the United States, China looms large and threatening. This monograph attempts to answer, through an analysis of China s defense establishment under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, questions such as: What are the national security and national military goals of China's leaders? What strategies are Chinese leaders considering in pursuit of these goals? What is the likelihood that these goals will be attained? It assesses the political and economic determinants of China's effort to modernize its armed forces. Four possible strategies are outlined: (1) 'playing the superpower game,' (2) 'playing to its strengths,'(3) 'changing the rules of the game,' or (4) 'don't play that game.' The factors that will determine the selection of a strategy are examined. The most likely strategy is identified, and its outcome is evaluated. Lastly, the implications of the study for the U.S. defense community are addressed.' -- KOREAN PENINSULA: REPORT ON THE MILITARY SITUATION. September 22, 2000.U.S. Dept. of Defense. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html 'The FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1233) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. This report provides an assessment of the warfightingcapability of the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command when compared to the armed forces of North Korea. It also provides an assessment of the North Korean threat to the Republic of Korea. Finally, it examines the current status and future direction of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.' -- PROPER SCOPE, PURPOSE, AND UTILITY OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA'S MILITARY. Yates, Steven J. et al. Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lectures, No. 689, Oct. 10, 2000. http://www.heritage.org/library/lecture/hl689.html http://www.heritage.org/library/lecture/pdf/hl_689.pdf 'High-level visits to Beijing earlier this month by Undersecretary of State for Security and Arms Control John Holum and Secretary of Defense William Cohen signal the resumption of official dialogue with China's military and security establishment. Is this a good sign? What are the objectives of this strategic dialogue? How does such a dialogue serve American interests? In a few months, there will be a new administration coming into office. No matter which way the election goes, there will be a new team facing some of these similar questions: How, under what circumstances, to what extent should we have relations with China's military? What is the purpose of these relations? What should the Chinese see? What should we see? How should this relationship be structured? In the interests of helping pave the way for a new administration to be able to hit the ground running, we would like to get three different perspectives on this question. Al Santoli has an extensive and multifaceted background, from veteran of the Vietnam War, to journalist, to Pulitzer Prize-nominated author, to being a distinguished staff member on Capitol Hill working for Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (Republican-CA). He also is the editor of the CHINA REFORM MONITOR, published by the American Foreign Policy Council. Randy Schriver formerly served in the office of the Secretary of Defense as a Country Director for the People's Republic of China and has experience in looking at what the Pentagon's interests were in moving forward with this kind of a relationship in the past. Dr. Larry Wortzel, the Director of our Asian Studies Center, twice served the U.S. Army in China - - first as the Assistant Army Attaché in Beijing and second as the Army Attaché. Larry can help enlighten our thinking on what has worked on the ground on that end in this military-to-military relationship and offer advice on how this kind of relationship should proceed.' -- UNDISCUSSED LINKAGES: IMPLICATIONS OF TAIWAN STRAITS SECURITY ACTIVITY ON GLOBAL ARMS CONTROL AND  NONPROLIFERATION. Paper. October 11, 2000.Bullard, Monte R. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. East Asia Nonproliferation Program. http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/illinois.htm 'It is a simple but undeniable truth that the Taiwan issue has remained theprincipal and most enduring problem in Sino-U.S. relations over the last 30 years. China's overall foreign policy approach toward the U.S. and specifically its willingness to trust U.S. leaders is increasingly being defined by the U.S.'s policies on Taiwan. The central issue in bilateral debates on Taiwan has been US arms sales and China's perception of their impact on Taiwan's willingness to reunify with the mainland. China'sconcerns about the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan issue pervade all aspects of Sino-U.S. relations. From China's perspective, U.S. support for Taiwan dramatically influences the extent to which leaders in Beijing can trust the U.S. and further develop bilateral relations. Yet, in recent years, the Taiwan issue has begun to significantly influence another area in U.S.-China relations: arms control and non proliferation dialogues. Further, itadversely influences China's participation in global arms control and nonproliferation agreements. The relationship between the Taiwan issue and Chinese policies on arms control and nonproliferation is one of both direct and indirect linkages.These new links are increasingly assuming a key role in defining Chinese arms control and nonproliferation policies. Just as the United States linked Most-Favored Nation status to China's human rights behavior, China has begun to implicitly link its arms control and nonproliferation commitments to U.S. security support to Taiwan. For the U.S. the linkage is justified in terms of promoting democratic enlargement all over the world and for China the Taiwan issue is one of security, national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This paper seeks to examine the growing relationship between theTaiwan issue and arms control issues and the impact of this linkage on bilateral and global debates about each issue.' -- UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: ADVANCING TOWARD A MATURE PARTNERSHIP. INSS Special Report. October 11, 2000. U.S.  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/SR_JAPAN.HTM http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/whatsnew.html (for access to the PDF Version). 'Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world's largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involvethe United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment's notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world's second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America=s global security strategy. We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st Century.'