![Keep Us Strong](../../../static/gfx/ja-cg.jpg)
![WikiLeaks logo](../../../static/gfx/WL_Hour_Glass_small.png)
Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10STATE13750, READOUT OF JANUARY 20 U.S.-FRANCE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10STATE13750.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10STATE13750 | 2010-02-17 03:03 | 2010-11-29 12:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXRO5206
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #3750/01 0480313
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 170309Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8385
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1309
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6409
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6148
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0360
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7288
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 013750
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/20
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO RS FR IR TU
SUBJECT: READOUT OF JANUARY 20 U.S.-FRANCE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
IN WASHINGTON
Classified By: Under Secretary Bill Burns for reasons 1.4(b,
d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. On January 20, 2010, Under Secretary Bill
Burns and Defense Under Secretary for Policy Michele Flournoy
hosted the third U.S.-France Strategic Dialogue with
counterparts Jacques Audibert and Michel Miraillet.
Discussions focused on Afghanistan, Pakistan, NATO Reform,
Missile Defense, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the Middle East
Peace Process. The French indicated an announcement of
further civilian contributions to Afghanistan would be made at
the London Conference, but hedged on a decision regarding
additional combat troops. On NATO's new Strategic Concept,
the French highlighted the potential for a split in the
Alliance between old and new members, and agreed that a
document that linked to NATO reform measures was needed. The
French requested more information on the U.S. proposal to make
Missile Defense a mission for NATO. Both U/S Burns and USD(P)
Flournoy underscored that the potential sale of a French
Mistral-class Helicopter carrier to Russia would be unhelpful
in terms of regional stability. Next steps on Iran were
discussed with the French agreeing that the European Union
(EU) was more unified than ever on the need for increased
pressure and welcoming U.S. efforts to engage the EU as a
whole on this issue. End Summary.
------------------------
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) U/S Burns praised the French contributions and
previewed U.S. goals for the London Conference on Afghanistan,
which included agreement on growing the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), reintegration, and choosing a new UN
Senior Representative for Afghanistan. USD(P) reviewed the
POTUS decision and highlighted that July 11, 2011 was an
inflection point -- the beginning of a process. She noted
that POTUS was careful to not create an artificial timeline
for transition to Afghan responsibility and that the U.S.
message to the region is that "we are not leaving." Deputy
SRAP Jones described the new U.S. regional stability strategy
and our efforts to align Karzai with the international
community's civilian priorities.
¶3. (S/NF) Audibert remarked on France's "special" commitment
to Afghanistan based on France leading the invocation of
NATO's Article 5 after 9/11. Nine years later, the French
cite Allied unity as the mission's principal success. France
believes the President's announcement of 30,000 more troops
substantively changed the operation. While the London
conference is a chance to impress upon Afghan President Hamid
Karzai that he must implement the commitments in his
inauguration speech, the French are concerned it might be too
early to put too much political pressure on Karzai. Audibert
suggested a second international conference on Afghanistan in
the spring would be helpful and was pleased to hear about
plans for an April conference in Kabul. Audibert also stated
that France will make an announcement about its "civilian
surge" at the London conference, but that commitments on
further troop deployments were not ready. Miraillet lamented
French public opposition to the war in Afghanistan, but
believed that the government was making progress in convincing
the French people of the necessity for the operation. He also
explained that the military staff had developed several plans
for additional contributions, which were now with President
Sarkozy for action.
----------------------
NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT
----------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Audibert noted that the Strategic Concept (SC) was
"not a redrafting of the Washington Treaty," and should not
open troublesome issues such as new missions and redefining
Article 5. He further emphasized that France wanted to stay
as close to the 1999 Strategic Concept as possible on language
STATE 00013750 002 OF 004
relating to NATO nuclear issues. Audibert highlighted the
risk of a split between old and newer members of the Alliance
on these questions and advocated for a short, simple document.
The French want to use the Strategic Concept to drive reform
at NATO. He noted that France had submitted several proposals
on reform and that France was keen for U.S. support.
Miraillet added that with the dire state of NATO financing, it
was important to stress financial reform even before the
drafting of the Strategic Concept. Miraillet also warned that
SecGen Rasmussen might put a tight grip on drafting the
concept and cautioned that Turkey would play a stronger role
in drafting than in 1999.
¶5. (C/NF) USD(P) asserted that the U.S. has played a leading
role in the Senior Officials Group (SOG) because of our strong
commitment to NATO reform. On the SC, she said it was
important that the key Allies make their input to the SecGen
before pen was put to paper. Further, USD(P) clarified that
the U.S. did not believe Alliance transformation could happen
without financial reform and that it was a priority for the
U.S. State Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian
Affairs Phil Gordon agreed; any misperception that the U.S.
did not want to link the Strategic Concept to reform must be
corrected. OSD Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs Alexander Vershbow added that the new concept must put
a public face on the Alliance and address issues for the
future, such as Article 4 and crisis management capacity. He
agreed that reform of financing was critical as the current
budget crisis evidenced. ASD Vershbow stressed that we must
work with the UK to solve the financial crisis at NATO and
suggested that the idea of "zero real growth" be put aside.
Audibert was pleased to hear that the U.S. was on the same
page as France regarding reform and that this was a priority
goal for the French side during the Strategic Dialogue.
---------------
Missile Defense
---------------
¶6. (S/NF) USD(P) briefed the French on the current state of
play regarding worldwide U.S. missile defense plans. She
noted that the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) would
soon be submitted to Congress and noted the Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) would be a U.S. contribution to a NATO Missile
Defense project. This plan would protect both U.S. forces and
interests in Europe and our NATO Allies. USD(P) requested
French support for securing NATO approval for the Active
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to
become the Command and Control (C2) backbone of a wider
European Missile Defense program. USD(P) stressed that NATO
approval for the C2 relationship between ALTBMD and the PAA
was important as Turkey was unlikely to approve participation
unless it was part of a larger NATO enterprise.
¶7. (S/NF) Miraillet conveyed that France was pleased with
the Obama administration's swift action on Missile Defense and
welcomed the U.S. development of the PAA. France shared the
U.S. perception of the threat and had ideas on ways it could
participate in the U.S.-proposed system. However, Miraillet
emphasized that France needed more information before the
government could endorse a NATO-PAA linkage through ALTBMD,
and argued that the Lisbon Summit may be too early for a NATO
decision. He said that France wanted information on phases
three and four of the PAA and whether the SM-3 Block 2B could
be perceived as a threat by the Russians. Audibert added that
France needed much more detail on the potential costs to NATO
Allies before endorsing ALTBMD as the C2 for the European
Missile Defense system. He also asked how the C2
relationships in the system would work in a NATO context.
Audibert concluded by underscoring that French hesitation on
accepting a NATO role for European-wide Missile Defense is not
reluctance, but a reflection of the need for greater clarity
on what was being proposed.
¶8. (S/NF) In response, USD(P) Flournoy said we would soon
share additional details on C2 arrangements, noting that
authorities would need to be delegated given the short
decision time for a response. She and ASD Vershbow pressed
the importance of a political decision at Lisbon to adopt
territorial Missile Defense as a NATO mission, both to secure
Turkish agreement to host the forward-based radar and to
demonstrate that NATO was addressing real Article 5 threats.
STATE 00013750 003 OF 004
------
Turkey
------
¶9. (S/NF) Miraillet and Audibert were remarkably downbeat on
Turkey and lamented poor French bilateral relations with
Turkish leadership, though they believed ties were slowly
improving. Miraillet believed the military leaders were no
longer what they once were as the recent Ergenekon scandal had
weakened the influence of the Generals in Turkish politics.
Miraillet asserted that FM Ahmet Davutoglu had kept with his
theory of "strategic depth," which he had described in his
previously published books, through Turkey's continued
engagement with neighbors like Syria and Iran and in Turkey's
proactive approach to the Caucasus and recognition of the
Iraqi Kurds. Miraillet, in noting that the Turkish military
had of late established a better relationship with the
Pakistani military, stated that Turkey was a nuclear threshold
country and that France did not know if there were similar
civilian nuclear cooperation linkages with Pakistan. In
highlighting Turkey's unwillingness to engage in combat in
Afghanistan, its improved relationships with Syria and Hamas,
its willingness to negotiate with Iran outside the P5-plus-1
process, and its position on selecting a new NATO Secretary
General at the April 2009 Strasbourg Summit, Miraillet summed
up that Turkey was becoming more of a global actor, but not
always a positive actor in the international system.
¶10. (S/NF) USD(P) asked whether the EU was closer to
identifying a way that it could signal to Turkey that the door
was open to a closer relationship, such as observer status in
the European Defense Agency. Audibert noted that President
Sarkozy had been particularly upset with the Turkish position
on Rasmussen at Strasbourg and that Sarkozy's objection to
Turkish membership in the EU was one of five pillars on his
political campaign that the public still remembered. Further,
when France tried to move forward with closer NATO-EU ties
during its 2008 EU presidency, Turkey rejected every plan that
was put on the table. For these reasons, it would be
difficult for France to see any opening on EU membership for
Turkey in the near future. All French interlocutors agreed
that a "more arrogant" Turkey could present a problem during
NATO Strategic Concept discussions this year. In response,
Flournoy, Vershbow and Gordon reiterated that by closing the
door on the Turks, the EU was creating a vicious circle that
fueled Turkish obstructionism at NATO.
------
Russia
------
¶11. (S/NF) Audibert began by stating that France was taking
pragmatic approach to Russia, but that President Sarkozy had a
"problem of confidence" and did not fully trust Russia.
Audibert said Russia's two treaty proposals on new European
Security Architecture were unacceptable and mere provocations,
but that the French position was to use the proposals to
engage the Russians on new approaches to crisis management,
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and on the
adoption of the Open Skies/verification measures. However, he
noted, these issues will continually be bogged down over the
situation in Georgia, which Audibert saw as intractable as
Russia will never "derecognize" the sovereignty of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia while also never recognizing Georgian
sovereignty over its territory, including the two enclaves.
¶12. (S/NF) Audibert, noting he was raising his "if-raised"
point, brought up the issue of France's potential sale of a
helicopter carrier Mistral-class ship to Russia. He asserted
that the French had merely agreed to negotiate with Russia on
the potential sale, but then argued that sale would be only
for the ship without armament systems. Audibert also said
that while France understood U.S. concerns over the potential
for Russia to use the ship for projection of power, it was
important to note that any decision on the issue would, in the
end, be political in nature. Miraillet stated that this sale
would be a gesture of good will to Russia as France assessed
the Russian Navy was in dire condition. In any case,
concluded Miraillet, if France did not make the sale, the
Netherlands and Spain would likely sell similar technology.
¶13. (S/NF) On Mistral, USD(P) observed the optics and policy
behind the sale were perplexing as it would "fly in the face"
STATE 00013750 004 OF 004
of President Sarkozy's personal engagement on resolving the
Georgia crisis in 2008. She asserted that this sale would
send a confusing political signal to Russia as well as to
other Europeans. U/S Burns concurred with USD(P), noting the
sale would feed Georgia's fears and could lead to an arms
race, increasing the chance of miscalculation by one or both
sides. USD(P) concluded that while we understood that France
wanted to actively engage Russia, the U.S. would prefer that
France find a different confidence-building measure than a
Mistral sale.
----
Iran
----
¶14. (S/NF) U/S Burns stated that the international community
had reached a point where it had to begin looking for further
consequences for Iran as the credibility of our efforts was at
stake. U/S Burns noted that other actors were watching
Western actions on Iran. He cautioned that moving China
toward greater sanctions would not be easy, but that we need
to continue engaging them.
¶15. (S/NF) Audibert noted that France was using every means
possible to bring the EU together on Iran. He noted a
recently EU Council decision to task Foreign Ministers with
developing new ideas on the way forward with Iran. Briens
stated that since the Iranian regime cracked down following
the June 2009 elections, the EU was more solid as a block on
sanctions. In particular, Spain and Sweden, who were
reluctant to support sanctions in the past, were more
supportive because of recent gross human rights violations.
-------------------------
Middle East Peace Process
-------------------------
¶16. (S/NF) Audibert hailed U.S. efforts to reestablish peace
talks between Israel and the Palestinians. He asked pointedly
where the U.S. saw the process in the next six months, and how
to further involve Europe, especially regarding a possible
settlement. Notably, the French did not advocate for a Middle
East summit in Paris.
¶17. (U) Participants:
United States:
Department of State
William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Phil Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs
Paul Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan
Maureen Cormack, Director for Western Europe
Tamir Waser, Special Assistant to U/S Burns
Andrew Lorenz, Senior France Desk Officer
Department of Defense
Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Jim Townsend, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
European and NATO Policy
Andrew Winternitz, Deputy Director for European Policy
France:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jacques Audibert, Under Secretary for Political and Strategic
Affairs
Martin Briens, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
Nonproliferation
Nicolas Roche, Political Counselor, Embassy of France
Ministry of Defense
Michel Miraillet, Director for Strategic Affairs
Gen Gratien Maire, French Defense Attache to the U.S.
Gen Emmanuel de Romemont, Deputy Director for Disarmament and
Proliferation
Col Cyrille Claver, Deputy Director for European and NATO
Affairs
Col Frederic Pesme, Director for North America
18.This cable was cleared by U/S Burns and USD(P) Flournoy.
CLINTON