![Keep Us Strong](../../../static/gfx/ja-cg.jpg)
![WikiLeaks logo](../../../static/gfx/WL_Hour_Glass_small.png)
Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1170, BRAZIL ON IRAN: A SOFT VOICE IN THE CHORUS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRASILIA1170.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRASILIA1170 | 2009-09-18 15:03 | 2010-12-23 07:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO9259
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBR #1170/01 2611510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181510Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5114
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9950
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8211
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4565
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0328
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001170
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA IR PREL AORC BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON IRAN: A SOFT VOICE IN THE CHORUS
REF: A. STATE 95073
¶B. STATE 94757
¶C. STATE 91633 D.
BRASILIA 1038 BRASILIA 00001170 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).
¶1. (C) Summary. Brazilian MRE Undersecretary for Political Affairs Roberto Jaguaribe, recently returned from a diplomatic mission to Tehran, told Charge D'Affaires on September 16 that additional dialogue rather than sanctions will be most the most effective means of pressuring Iran to develop a responsible nuclear program. Jaguaribe emphasized that Iran's nuclear program enjoys broad internal support and will not ultimately be stopped, so the goal should be to push Iran to follow international nuclear guidelines. He said that top Iranian officials draw a distinction between IAEA directives, which they are attempting to follow, and UNSC resolutions, which they view as unfair and in some cases illegitimate. Jaguaribe said he told the Iranians they are still not meeting their IAEA responsibilities, but he believes they are making progress. The Undersecretary did not discount the possibility of Brazil making a statement on Iran at UNGA but said any such remarks would be "balanced," referencing Iran's lack of full compliance along with Brazil's basic skepticism toward sanctions as a motivating tool. End summary.
Back from Tehran ----------------
¶2. (C) Upon returning from his September 9-10 visit to Tehran, Undersecretary Jaguaribe took great care in his meeting with CDA to give not only the Brazilian but also the Iranian perspective to the points made in reftels A, B, and C. While in Iran, he met with Foreign Minister Manouchir Mottaki, National Security Council official Said Jalili, and Parliamentiary Foreign Policy Chair Aladdin Bourojerdi, among others. He issued joint press statements in Iran with each of these men to the effect that dialogue, not sanctions, was the key to solving the dispute at hand. In his meeting with CDA, Jaguaribe's core message was not substantively different, but he went into greater detail on areas in which he had pressed Iran, areas where he saw Iran as non-compliant, and thoughts on how to influence them toward compliance. The Undersecretary's basic view of post-election Iran had not changed. He characterized the nation a compromised democracy, but with a robust civil society that will make them ultimately open to substantive negotiation.
Brazil's Message to Iran ------------------------
¶3. (C) Jaguaribe was careful to point out that, despite the friendly press conferences and the desire to schedule an Ahmadinejad visit to Brasilia in December, he raised specific criticisms with Iranian officials about their nuclear program. Most notably, he said that he told Mottaki and others that Iran was still not carrying out all its IAEA responsibilities, despite the late August decision to allow inspectors at Natanz and Arak. He also viewed the September 9 proposal to the P5 1 by the Iranian government, which was forwarded to him by the Iranians, as far too general to be an effective point of departure for further discussion. Jaguaribe said he had asked the Iranians to be more specific in their dialogue, and he told us that he thought the Iranians could be brought around to the point where they would make more specific proposals.
Brazilian Views on IAEA Report and Amcit Demarches --------------------------------------------- -----
¶4. (C) During the meeting, Jaguaribe agreed with the U.S. interpretation of the main points of the IAEA report (ref C), i.e., that Iran has refused to suspend proliferation-senstive nuclear activities as required by the UNSC, has refused to implement the additional protocol, and has only partially cooperated with IAEA inspection demands. At times he reflected Iranian views without endorsing them, such as his reference to IAEA questions about past weaponization-related activities as "alleged reports." Jaguaribe had no immediate response to our demarche concerning Amcits detained in Iran (ref B) but sounded favorably disposed. During his meetings in Tehran, Iran gave Jaguaribe their own list of complaints/demands toward the U.S. These included complaints about "three U.S. Army personnel detained last month in Kurdistan," extradition of several Iranians, and disappearance of Iranians in Saudi Arabia and Istanbul.
BRASILIA 00001170 002.2 OF 003
Brazilian Engagement Strategy ------------------------------
¶5. (C) While trying to outline an overall engagement strategy toward Iran, Jaguaribe emphasized repeatedly that Iran will never give up its nuclear enrichment program, though it may be pressured into suspending it for periods of time. He argued that Iran's nuclear program is broadly popular across all segments of society, including most government opponents and members of the exile community. Therefore, he continued, sanctions should not be used because the pain caused by them would push Iranians "with alternative views" toward supporting the current regime on a rare issue in which they are in general agreement. (He believed that oil import sanctions would be especially damaging to Iran's economy -- and especially effective in rallying popular Iranian support for its nuclear program.) Jaguaribe believed that the Iranian government was ultimately persuadable to follow international protocols, if pressured by both the international community and its civil society. He praised earlier U.S. efforts to initiate dialogue on the issue, and said that continued dialogue, even if not immediately successful, strengthens the hand of the more liberal elements of Iranian society.
Iranian, Brazilian Views on IAEA, UNSC --------------------------------------
¶6. (C) The Iranians pressed upon Jaguaribe their view that IAEA safeguards (and related directives) constitute broadly agreed upon international technical norms that the Iranians can follow, and will work to adhere to in the future. The Arak and Natanz inspections were cited as cases in point. Jaguaribe left convinced that the Iranians fully believe they are following IAEA guidelines -- a point of view that the Undersecretary characterized to CDA as "delusional." Tehran drew a distinction between the IAEA and the UNSC, which they view as a body issuing political decisions that are "not legitimate." Jaguaribe did not endorse this view but said of the Iran-UNSC relationship, "there needs to be some movement on both sides." (Note: Brazil has long held the position that nuclear matters are best dealt with in the IAEA, and not in the UNSC. End note.) He added that a UN proposal related to nuclear disarmament would be helpful to resolve the impasse. He praised recent U.S. efforts in this regard and hoped more would be forthcoming.
Expanding the Chorus: Statement at UNGA ---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Regarding the request outlined in ref A, Jaguaribe said there was a possibility that Brazil would consider addressing Iran's nuclear program in its UNGA statement. He said that any such mention would be a balanced reference, mentioning both Iran's need to meet IAEA and UNSC responsibilties while expressing skepticism toward UNSC sanctions as a motivating tool. He also said that Brazil would not shy away from saying that Iran's September 9 response to the P5 1 needs to be more robust to be effective. (Comment: We believe it is very doubtful that Brazil will actually reference Iran in its UNGA statement. End comment.)
Comment -------
¶8. (C) Having returned from Tehran less than a week earlier, Jaguaribe focused on the approach he believed would work best in resolving the disconnect between Iran's confidence that it has given satisfactory answers about its nuclear program and the sense in the international community that the Iranians must be moved toward compliance. In general, Brazil can be expected to continue a cautious approach to the issue, keeping in mind its sometimes-competing desires to increase commercial relations with Iran, to develop Brazilian nuclear military technology for non-weaponmaking purposes without drawing international attention, and to gain a permanent UNSC seat -- with the last goal being most important. In the short run, the easiest way for the GOB to massage the various interests is to call for increased multilateral dialogue and adherence to IAEA standards in order to forestall having to take a firm position in the UN on sanctions once Brazil assumes its temporary seat on the UNSC in January 2010. Brazil is aware, however, that Iranian compliance with IAEA safeguards would not necessarily equal Iran becoming a responsible nuclear power -- as Jaguaribe mused during the meeting. In light of its traditional hesitance to take firm positions on contentious country-specific issues, and with visits by Ahmadinejad to Brazil and top Brazilian officials
BRASILIA 00001170 003.2 OF 003
to Iran being planned for the next few months, Brazil will have a soft voice in the chorus -- but may prove useful nonetheless if senior GOB officials can be encouraged to whisper into Iran's ear the idea that negotiation and compliance are its best option. End comment.
KUBISKE