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Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI316, IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09RPODUBAI316 | 2009-08-03 11:11 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET//NOFORN | Iran RPO Dubai |
VZCZCXRO3166
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDIR #0316/01 2151125
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 031125Z AUG 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0474
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0475
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000316
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/2019
TAGS: PREL PROP PGOV PINR IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?
DUBAI 00000316 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) This is a joint cable by the Iran Regional Presence
Office and the Dubai Regional Media Hub.
¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Since Iran's June 12 presidential elections,
Arab media have intensely focused their coverage on the
demonstrations in Iran and the international community's
response to the government crackdown. Whereas in recent years
the Arab media have limited their commentary to Iran's external
relations -- particularly its regional ambitions and the
international implications of its nuclear program -- during the
post-election crisis Arab commentators have, for the first time,
poked a hole in the veneer of the Islamic Republic's internal
political system and explored its underpinnings more closely,
often challenging the system's very legitimacy in on-air
commentary. A number of these commentators have opined that
Ahmadinejad has, at least in the near term, lost standing among
some moderate Arabs, who have come to view Ahmadinejad's
administration as oppressive, unpopular, and undemocratic, much
as they criticize many Arab governments. However, all of the
Arab media figures we spoke to emphasized that Arab criticism of
Ahmadinejad has not necessarily led to increased support for
U.S. policy in the region. On the contrary, closer analysis
suggests that Ahmadinejad's eroding popularity in the Arab world
has created a scenario in which any U.S. effort to engage the
current Iranian government will be perceived by a wide spectrum
of Arabs as accommodation with Ahmadinejad.
ALL EYES ON IRAN
----------------
¶3. (S/NF) Iran's post-election crisis has dominated the Arab
media's news coverage for the past seven weeks. The
demonstrations have garnered special coverage on Al-Arabiya and
have consistently been among the top headlines on Al-Jazeera.
The marketing director of the Middle East Broadcasting Company
(MBC), parent company of Al-Arabiya, told IRPO/DRMH that
Al-Arabiya's viewership has skyrocketed since the June 12
election. Al-Arabiya's news website has also experienced a
dramatic increase in visits from users living in the region
between Tripoli and Amman, which the marketing director, a
native of Lebanon, attributed to the tremendous interest Sunni
Arabs have in watching the drama in Iran unfold. Coverage of
Iran's election aftermath is not limited to straightforward news
reporting; editorial pages, media commentaries, and the Arab
blogosphere have also been abuzz with debate over the
demonstrations, the international community's response, and the
implications of these events for the Arab world. While Iran's
elections may no longer command daily headlines in the Western
media, nearly all the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke
recognized that the Arab street remains firmly focused on the
recent unrest and continuing political drama playing out in Iran.
THE BENEVOLENT DICTATOR'S FALL FROM GRACE?
------------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) A Syrian journalist and blogger, who owns a media
consultancy firm in Dubai, believes that many in the Arab street
initially viewed Ahmadinejad when he came to power in 2005 as a
"benevolent dictator." Citing the tradition of the Mahdi, the
media consultant argued that both Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are
taught from early childhood to await the arrival of a strong and
unimpeachable figure who will lead the Muslim world. The media
consultant maintained that even secular Arabs view the world,
albeit unintentionally, with this ingrained mindset. Our
contact argued that Ahmadinejad played in to this narrative, and
when Ahmadinejad arrived on the international stage many Arabs
saw him, in contrast to their own flawed leaders, as a humble
and pious man who was brave enough to stand up for his people
and the greater Muslim world by confronting Israel and the West
head on. However, both the intensely competitive campaign
period and the forceful reaction by the Iranian people to the
official election results have led some moderate Arabs to
rethink Ahmadinejad's true disposition. The election, the media
consultant said, led some Arabs to understand that despite his
astutely crafted and well-marketed image in the Arab world,
DUBAI 00000316 002.2 OF 003
Ahmadinejad is resented by many Iranians for domestic
mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption. Because of this
public fall from grace, so the media consultant told us,
Ahmadinejad is no longer the "untouchable, holy figure" in the
Arab world he once was -- his flaws have brought him down to the
level of the Arab world's own imperfect leaders. An Al-Arabiya
executive, speaking at a recent conference, said that the
election aftermath had destroyed the image many Arabs had of the
Islamic Revolution, and Ahmadinejad's legitimacy as a leader was
now open to question. [NOTE: The media consultant attributed
Iran's perceived "victories" over the U.S. and the West to
Ahmadinejad, as opposed to Supreme Leader Khamenei. While
conventional wisdom in the West is that Khamenei has the final
say over Iran's most vital interests, including the nuclear
program, the consultant's comments suggest that the Arab street
views Ahmadinejad as much more influential in the Islamic
Republic's decision-making system.]
POST-ELECTION CRISIS NOT A SILVER BULLET FOR ARAB REGIMES
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad's fall from grace notwithstanding, most of
the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke agreed that Arab
governments have a limited ability to capitalize on
Ahmadinejad's missteps because of the skeletons in their own
closets. Al-Arabiya's former Tehran bureau chief observed that
Arab regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who no doubt
would like to exploit Ahmadinejad's current vulnerabilities,
have remained noticeably silent. In his view, they realize that
any statement condemning Tehran's crackdown on peaceful
dissidents would appear untenably hypocritical in the eyes of
their own citizens. He considers this public silence yet
another "missed opportunity" for Arab leaders to take a stand to
counter Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and further detract from his
popularity with the Arab street.
NEW SPACE TO DISAGREE WITH AHMADINEJAD AND THE U.S.
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶6. (S/NF) All of the Arab commentators and news media figures
we spoke to agreed that the U.S. "played it right" throughout
the post-election crisis by staying away from detailed public
comments that could be perceived as interventionist. However,
the Arab commentators were quick to distinguish between
criticism of Ahmadinejad in the Arab street and support for U.S.
policies. The Syrian media consultant said that the heated
debates before the election, in which the three challengers --
Mousavi, Karroubi, and Reza'i -- publicly criticized Ahmadinejad
for corruption and economic mismanagement, made it clear to
Arabs that this election was about Iran, not the U.S. This
distinction, coupled with the U.S.' restraint in commenting on
the election, provided an unprecedented window for Arab
commentators to criticize Ahmadinejad without appearing to side
with the U.S.
¶7. (S/NF) Examples of this played out during two separate
appearances by the Dubai Regional Media Hub Acting Director on
live panel discussions on Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanese New TV
regarding regional issues, including events in Iran. Whereas
fellow Arab panelist resolutely disagreed with her comments in
support of U.S. policy in the region, in particular the peace
process, they felt free to openly criticize Ahmadinejad's
government, which they refrained from doing in the past, for its
internal crackdown and regional ambitions. One Saudi
commentator contrasted Turkish regional mediation, which he
described as a positive force in the region, with Iranian
regional intervention, which he called pernicious and
destabilizing. A Lebanese commentator noted the irony of Iran
accusing outsiders of interfering in its internal affairs when
there is not "one corner of the Arab world" where Iran does not
intervene behind the scenes.
AHMADINEJAD DOWN BUT NOT OUT
DUBAI 00000316 003.2 OF 003
----------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) As Al-Arabiya's Tehran bureau chief noted, while
Ahmadinejad's image may have taken a hit in the Arab street as a
result of the government's handling of domestic dissent, the
damage is not necessarily permanent. In his view, the Arab
street is notoriously emotional and "could easily be turned to
support Ahmadinejad once again" with some trumped up slogans and
public bravado. The bureau chief believed that, in the
perceived leadership void left by Arab leaders on regional
issues, Ahmadinejad could rally public opinion by capitalizing
on any number of sensitive issues for the Arab street, most
prominent among them Israel, at upcoming international fora.
The Syrian media consultant, too, cautioned the U.S. not to
overestimate any erosion in Ahmadinejad's popularity with Arabs.
In his opinion, Ahmadinejad has only lost standing with a
segment of moderates in the Arab street; he believes that most
Arabs are so polarized, either for or against Ahmadinejad, that
the allegations of voter fraud and the violent post-election
crackdown on protesters will not permanently sway their
positions one way or the other.
ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN: NO PLEASING THE ARAB STREET
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Once the dust settles on Iran's
post-election crisis, Arabs will look to see if the U.S. deals
with Ahmadinejad as it pursues its nuclear nonproliferation
agenda despite the lingering questions over the legitimacy of
his election. If the U.S. enters negotiations with
Ahmadinejad's government, moderate Arab observers may argue that
the U.S., for the sake of its own national interest, has cut a
deal at the expense of pro-democracy advocates -- just as many
in the Arab street believe the U.S. has done with a number of
Arab regimes. Those Arabs who continue to support Ahmadinejad,
on the other hand, may perceive negotiations as a personal
victory for a humble leader who brought the U.S. to its knees
through steadfast resistance. Thus, Ahmadinejad's "fall from
grace" in the Arab world may have created yet another obstacle
to improved Arab perceptions of the U.S. -- in which engagement
with an Ahmadinejad-led government is now a potentially
lose-lose scenario in which Arabs at both ends of the pro- and
anti-Ahmadinejad spectrum will consider negotiations with
Teheran an accommodation with the Iranian president.
RICHARDSON