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Viewing cable 09BERLIN978, GERMANY REASSURES THE BALTS TO INCREASE MANEUVER
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BERLIN978 | 2009-08-11 10:10 | 2010-12-06 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin |
VZCZCXRO9421
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0978/01 2231003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111003Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4915
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000978
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019
TAGS: GM MARR MOPS NATO PREL RU ZB
SUBJECT: GERMANY REASSURES THE BALTS TO INCREASE MANEUVER
ROOM WITH RUSSIA
REF: BERLIN 806
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Stan Otto for reason
s 1.4 (c) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Germany continues to regard proposed NATO
contingency planning to defend the Balts against possible
Russian aggression as counterproductive and unnecessary, but
it has gone out of its way in recent months to take other
measures to reassure the Balts that it takes their security
concerns seriously. Germany has again volunteered to head
the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission, and Defense Minister
Jung made an unprecedented trip to all three countries in
early June. The German MFA and MOD hope these and other
measures will assuage Baltic fears sufficiently to allow
German initiatives in drawing Russia closer to NATO to go
forward. The MFA sees an opportunity to deepen security
cooperation, even on missile defense given increased Russian
concern regarding Iran. Overall, Germany recognizes that
working with Russia is difficult, but hopes that U.S. efforts
to improve relations along with increased NATO-Russian
cooperation will move Russia further along the path to
becoming a reliable international partner. END SUMMARY.
REACHING OUT
¶2. (C) While the MFA and MOD offices responsible for the
Baltic countries and NATO do not characterize it as such,
Germany appears to have undertaken a deliberate effort in
recent months to demonstrate to the Balts that it takes their
security concerns seriously. It has volunteered again to
head the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission, beginning August
31, which involves the deployment of four fighter aircraft to
Lithuania. Everyone recognizes that the aircraft themselves
could do little against a Russian attack, but Germany hopes
the Balts see them as a symbol of German (and NATO)
commitment to Article 5. Given the extreme economic troubles
in the Balts, the German MOD expects this commitment to last
several more years, as the countries are unlikely to be able
to afford their own aircraft anytime soon.
¶3. (C) Another indication of German efforts to build bridges
to the Balts was Defense Minister Jung's unprecedented trip
to all three countries in early June to discuss how to
increase security cooperation. During the four-day trip,
Jung not only met his counterparts, but with the presidents
of all three countries as well. For the most part, the visit
was about building upon an already robust relationship, which
has included German training and exchange programs for
hundreds of Baltic troops in recent years.
THE WORRIES AND HOPES
¶4. (C) Although MFA Head of Northern Europe Division Thomas
Terstegen argues that the Baltic states are less concerned
about Russian aggression than they were last fall in the
immediate aftermath of the war in Georgia, contacts recognize
that the fundamental apprehension regarding Russia will not
disappear soon. MFA Deputy Head of NATO Division Gunnar
Denecke wondered whether the July 16 open letter to the U.S.
signed by former Central and Eastern European leaders --
along with Swedish Defense Minister Tolgfors July 3 comments
regarding the EU's Baltic Sea Strategy -- would cause the
Balts to become more suspicious of Russian intentions.
¶5. (C) The MFA considers the efforts of "some NATO partners,
like the Balts" to stall NATO-Russia Council (NRC)
cooperation as an impediment to U.S. efforts to improve
relations with Russia. Moreover, the Balts' demand for NATO
contingency planning against possible Russian aggression is
likely to worry Russia even more, according to the MOD. Even
though the Balts are proving troublesome in the NRC, the MFA
is equally frustrated by Russia's attempts to block
cooperation. The MFA believes the best move Russia could
take to improve NRC relations would be to remove (Russian
Permanent Representative) Rogozin from Brussels.
¶6. (C) Despite these tensions, the MFA sees a window of
opportunity to improve security cooperation with Russia
because of growing Russian suspicion of Iran. Looking at the
recent G8 Summit statement and conversations from
German-Russian consultations in July, the MFA thinks Russia
may be willing to cooperate more with NATO vis-a-vis Iran,
perhaps even on missile defense (MD). Although the MFA
acknowledges that it would be a hard sell, they do not
consider it a lost cause.
COMMENT
¶7. (C) The Germans are well-aware that their attempts to
accommodate and reach out to the Russians are viewed with
suspicion by many countries in eastern Europe. Defense
BERLIN 00000978 002 OF 002
Minister Jung's trip to the Baltic countries, Germany's
participation in the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission and
Steinmeier's joint visit to Ukraine with Polish FM Sikorski
(reftel) are all aimed at reassuring the Balts and other east
Europeans that Berlin takes their security concerns
seriously. The German calculation is that these efforts will
give them more freedom to draw Russia closer to NATO without
incurring automatic opposition from the new Allies. The
Germans are also hoping to forestall moves that they feel
would be counterproductive to the development of closer
NATO-Russia relations, particularly NATO contingency planning
oriented specifically against possible Russian aggression.
On MD, the Germans seem to be betting that in the end, we
will decide to pursue some kind of system to protect European
allies and forward-deployed U.S. forces against missile
threats. As a result, they are urging the Russians to keep
an open mind about MD so that this issue does not derail
overall NATO-Russia cooperation down the road. End Comment.
Bradtke