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Viewing cable 09MONTERREY284, MILITARY PRESENCE NO PANACEA FOR NUEVO LEON
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MONTERREY284 | 2009-07-27 13:01 | 2011-02-10 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Monterrey |
Appears in these articles: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/02/10/index.php?section=politica&article=006n1pol |
VZCZCXRO7213
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0284/01 2081355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271355Z JUL 09
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3839
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 4910
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9433
218302
2009-07-27 13:55:00
09MONTERREY284
Consulate Monterrey
CONFIDENTIAL
08MONTERREY390|09MONTERREY242|09MONTERREY250
VZCZCXRO7213
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0284/01 2081355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271355Z JUL 09
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3839
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 4910
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9433
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000284
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/27/2019
TAGS: KCRM CASC PHUM PINS SNAR ASEC PGOV MX
SUBJECT: MILITARY PRESENCE NO PANACEA FOR NUEVO LEON
REF: A) 2008 MONTERREY 390, B) MONTERREY 250, C) MONTERREY 242
MONTERREY 00000284 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Drug traffickers are continuing their
campaign of intimidation against the publishers and staff of
Northern Mexico's leading dealing newspaper - El Norte. El
Norte leadership has reached out to local army commanders as the
threats come in, but as the military is not set up to provide
protective police services it has not always been able to
respond in a timely manner. Meanwhile, military commanders find
that as their troops collect intel and provide necessary
firepower in anti-drug enforcement raids, their institution
becomes enmeshed in the day-to-day violence on the street. The
unreliable nature of the state/local police and the inability of
the military to fully fill that void have left the public
wondering who it can call upon when it is threatened. End
summary.
The Challenge Facing El Norte
--------------------------------------
¶2. (U) On July 22, Consul General met with Alejandro Junco de
la Vega Sr. and his son, Alejandro Junco de la Vega Jr., key
shareholders in Grupo Reforma. Grupo Reforma is the largest
print media company in Mexico and Latin America. It publishes 9
daily newspapers in 4 cities, including the leading newspapers
in Mexico's 3 largest cities. In Monterrey, Grupo Reforma
publishes "El Norte," Northern Mexico's leading daily newspaper.
In June, the Columbia School of Journalism had bestowed its
annual journalism award upon Junco de la Vega Sr. for his
lifelong commitment to reporting.
¶3. (C) In 2008, due to a continuing series of threats from the
drug cartels, see Ref A, both father and son and their families
relocated temporarily to Texas, although the two return to
Monterrey often to oversee newspaper operations. The elder
Junco de la Vega noted that while they had been able to
accomplish the delicate task of dismissing one of their
reporters who they discovered was working for the cartels - this
reporter subsequently took another job with a prominent local
television outlet - the struggle to maintain the newspaper as an
independent voice was continuing. Junco Sr. stated that in
Monterrey the Zetas focused on El Norte reporting on cartel
activity because press coverage was a necessary first step for
civil society to demand a more effective law enforcement
response. Military action and civic protests were important
too, he said, but to solve the problem the press needed to bring
it to the citizenry's attention; in contrast, cartel bosses
preferred to go about their business with as little publicity as
possible.
¶3. (C) Threats from the Zetas had subsided, the Juncos
observed, until El Norte decided to host an in-house luncheon
meeting with local military commanders to discuss the overall
situation. Although to lower the public profile of the event
the commanders had, at El Norte's request, arrived in civilian
clothes, as was their usual practice they brought with them four
truckloads of soldiers to ensure security. Since that time,
harassment from the Zetas has increased. Junco Jr. stated that:
--- an El Norte reporter who had written a story on anti-drug
checkpoints had been kidnapped for five hours in the neighboring
community of Santa Catarina, during which time she was beaten
and threatened with rape/death.
--- the hawkers who sold the newspaper at key intersections in
Santa Catarina had been forcibly driven off the streets.
--- a dead body had been dumped on the Junco's family ranch
south of the city.
--- a day camp the family had contemplated opening at the ranch
had been the subject of phone calls threatening violence/death
if bribes were not paid.
¶4. (C) Junco Sr. noted that while the army had been a key
participant in the recent arrests of narco-corrupted police in
the Monterrey region, ref B, the military suffered from the same
fractures and pressures as every other element within the
Mexican law enforcement community. While public approval of the
army's performance was high, the military still needed to be
wary of corruption and ineptitude within its ranks. For
instance, Junco Jr. noted, when the day camp threats came in,
the family telephoned the military for immediate assistance,
given that the caller had stated that a vehicle with armed
assailants was nearby and waiting. Seven hours later they
received a return phone call.
¶5. (C) The principal advantage the military enjoyed in the war
against the cartels, Junco Sr. declared, was not its
institutional transparency or even greater tactical ability (as
many of the Zetas themselves had previous military experience).
The military had encountered success, he said, because it
MONTERREY 00000284 002.2 OF 002
invariably could count on the element of surprise. Because the
soldiers were quartered on the cartels, the traffickers were
unable to pressure them into revealing operational plans and
methods.
The Army's Point of View
--------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Earlier in the day, CG had met with General Luis
Moreno Serrano, Commander of the Fourth Military Region (which
comprises Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, and San Luis Potosi) and his
number two, General Sergio Garcia - both officers with more than
40 years of military experience. During this conversation CG
brought to their attention allegations of torture on the part of
a U.S. citizen detained by the military for drug possession.
See Ref C. Clearly chagrined, General Moreno stated that it was
not the army's policy to mistreat detainees and pledged that his
staff would thoroughly investigate these charges. Post will
keep tabs on the local army command's inquiry into this case.
¶7. (C) Moving beyond the specific allegations, Moreno noted
that the military was institutionally unable to act as a
substitute police force. It could develop intel, he said, and
mount enforcement actions based upon that information. However,
it did not have the resources to supplant civilian law
enforcement (however flawed/corrupted civilian authorities might
be) or patrol communities to make them safe. For instance,
Moreno declared, while the public perceived the recent string of
arrests of narco-police as a military initiative, in reality
the impetus had come from the state government - all the
military did was to provide the necessary firepower to deter a
violent reaction from those arrested. Even in his most
conflictive state - Tamaulipas - when the cartels saw the
military they ran because they knew that could not match their
muscle, he observed.
Comment
-------------
¶8. (C) The differing points of view of the Juncos and Moreno
highlight one of the dilemmas facing the local citizenry: when
threatened, what institution can one call upon for protection?
Or to ask the question another way, if the federal, state, and
local police are unreliable and the military is
resource-constrained and unavailable, who's left?
WILLIAMSONB