

Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09MAPUTO713, RISING CONCERNS ABOUT NARCOTRAFFICKING AND MONEY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MAPUTO713.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MAPUTO713 | 2009-07-01 04:04 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Maputo |
VZCZCXRO3029
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHTO #0713/01 1820455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 010455Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0443
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0430
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000713
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: SNAR EFIN KCOR PTER PGOV PREL MZ
SUBJECT: RISING CONCERNS ABOUT NARCOTRAFFICKING AND MONEY
LAUNDERING IN MOZAMBIQUE
REF: A. 08 MAPUTO 1228
¶B. 08 MAPUTO 1098
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd C.Chapman, Reasons 1.4(b+d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Large-scale narcotics shipments pass
through Mozambique, taking advantage of a vast and lightly
guarded coastline. Money laundering may be increasing.
Narcotraffickers in the country have connections to South
Asia, and some appear to have links to the ruling Frelimo
party and the GRM. Using Department of State INL funds, the
Embassy has led a successful border security program with the
Portuguese Embassy that has resulted in the seizure of
narcotics. The mission has also provided support via DoD and
Treasury, and directed counternarcotic assessments by the
Africa Command, LegAtt, and DEA. While not a
thoroughly-corrupted narco-state, the trends in Mozambique
suggest cause for concern unless the GRM takes quick action
to address these growing problems. End Summary.
-------------------------------
Large Scale Narcotics Shipments
-------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) In a series of investigative reports late last
year, Mozambique newsweekly Zambeze claimed Mozambique was
considered by some estimates to be the second largest drug
transit country in Africa after Guinea-Bissau. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Recent incidents suggest that larger amounts of
narcotics are indeed passing through the country, taking
advantage of a coastline twice the length of California's
with minimal control. Long-time commentator on Mozambique
Joseph Hanlon publicly declared in May that the value of
illicit drugs passing through the country probably surpasses
combined legal external trade. In mid-May, police seized $5
million in heroin at the Ressano Garcia-Lebombo border with
South Africa. In mid-June, police destroyed 7,000 liters of
precursor chemicals discovered at the port of Maputo from
China en route to South Africa; the United Nations Office of
Drug Control indicates that this port is heavily used to
import chemicals used for meth production. XXXXXXXXXXXX
have described to P/E chief how
Pakistani-owned trucking companies based in Sofala province
over-declare imports at the Beira port as one way to hide the
quantities of drugs coming into the country. Early on June
20, police discovered about one ton of hashish at Chongouene
beach in Gaza province after receiving calls from local
fishermen about suspicious vehicle movements in the area.
-------------------------------------
Signs of Money Laundering Proliferate
-------------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) A source inside the Frelimo party recently told
the Embassy that Mozambique, with ten banks and thirty
legally-registered exchange houses, has significantly more
financial institutions than the market in such an
impoverished country should be able to support with
legitimate business. He also observed that 1500 construction
projects are currently underway in Maputo--most financed with
cash and mostly in real estate, and noted that it was unusual
that housing prices in Maputo are increasing in spite of the
world financial crisis. Separately, Hanlon indicates that
the rapid growth in Mozambique's stock market is suspect, as
the value of stocks listed on the exchange is predicted to
reach $100 million within two years of opening. Finally, lax
regulation of casinos has raised concern by local radio and
TV commentators about that sector's role in money laundering.
---------------------------
Criminal Ties to South Asia
---------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) A USAID report issued in 2006 notes that commerce
in Maputo depends on the financial acumen of a small number
of Muslims of South Asian-descent who contribute generously
to the FRELIMO party. A major contributor to former
President Chissano and President Guebuza from this community,
who resides less than a hundred meters from the Presidential
Compound, Mohamed Bashir Suleman (MBS), is the owner of the
MAPUTO 00000713 002 OF 003
commercial MBS Group. Contacts at all levels have advised
Emboffs that MBS is a known large-scale narco-trafficker.
They indicate that MBS uses his FRELIMO party connections, as
well as his shopping mall, supermarkets, and hotels to import
narcotics and launder money without official scrutiny. Other
South Asian businessmen with ties to FRELIMO also operate a
vast network of loosely-regulated money changing houses,
which reportedly maintain financial ties with more radical
organizations in
Pakistan and elsewhere.
¶5. (S/NF) A business contact recently shared with P/E chief
a copy of a letter from Mozambique's Chamber of Business
Associations (CTA) to the Prime Minister, expressing concern
about one company selling imported vegetable oils at prices
clearly below cost, noting that this type of price dumping
could result in the withdrawal from the market of other
companies and ultimately a monopoly to form. The contact
said that the letter was in response to efforts by the MBS
Group to consolidate control of this sector--but in reality
the message had nothing to do with vegetable oil--rather, it
was a veiled warning from the
business community to the government that MBS Group's use of
vegetable oil to cover the import of illicit drugs was so
brazen that it was no longer tolerable.
------------------------------------
Narcotrafficking Connections in GRM?
------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) The Frelimo source also told the Charge that MBS
Group regularly uses phantom imports to launder money, and
indicated that MBS and another immigrant, Ahmed Gassan (owner
of the Home Center Furniture store) collude with the GRM's
head of customs (who he called "the King of Corruption")
to reduce scrutiny on imports. The source also indicated
that Gassan's business interests are personally protected by
Minister of Planning and Development Aiuba Cuereneia.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
USG Border Security, OTA, DoD Support, Other Assessments
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶7. (C) Using Department of State INL bureau funds, the
Embassy has a highly-successful joint project with the
Embassy of Portugal to provide training for GRM border
guards. With a very small investment of less than $200,000,
this program has led to the seizure of $2.5 million in cash
and the arrest of two Pakistani smugglers (ref B). While the
program was denied funding in FY09, it may receive support
again in FY10. Mozambique's Tax Authority (AT) has garnered
a reputation for honesty and transparency, and the AT's
director has publicly criticized the head of Customs about
smuggling concerns. Via the Department of Treasury's Office
of Technical Assistance, the USG is providing training and
capacity building to the AT, and is reviewing ways to
specifically support the AT's Financial Intelligence Unit.
DoD provided maritime training, small boats , and coastal
monitoring systems to the FADM and more of this type of
support is programmed for the future. Finally, at the
request of the Embassy, Africa Command, DEA, Treasury and
LegAtt representatives visited Maputo in early June to
conduct a joint assessment of the drug trafficking problem
and the GRM's capabilities. Initial findings validated the
pervasiveness of the problem and identified the institutional
weakness and level of corruption of Mozambican law
enforcement agencies as core problems inhibiting a coherent
government response.
¶8. (SBU) At the most recent mini-Dublin meeting chaired in
late-May by the Portuguese Embassy, representatives from the
Dutch, British and German embassies specifically pointed out
weaknesses in the GRM's enforcement activities, highlighting
that concerns are widespread in the international community.
These concerns were quickly borne out, as in a presentation
at the meeting, a representative of the GRM's Inter-agency
Working Group on Narcotrafficking focused entirely on
domestic consumption and addressing the health needs of local
drug addicts.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
Comment: Not Thoroughly-Corrupted, but Cause for Concern
MAPUTO 00000713 003 OF 003
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶9. (S/NF) Mozambique most certainly is not yet a
thoroughly-corrupted narco-state. However, it is becoming
increasingly clear that the magnitude of the drug shipments
passing through Mozambique may be on a much larger scale than
previously understood, taking advantage of the country's long
and unprotected coast and the facility with which port and
customs officials can be bribed. Money laundering, related
government corruption (possibly even official support), and
ties to South Asia mean that the problem has the potential to
get much worse. While the mission has made initial steps to
bring USG resources to bear, the road ahead will require a
comprehensive and coordinated effort by the international
community to staunch the flow of drugs, not to mention
strengthen the political will of the GRM to take concrete
action.
CHAPMAN