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Viewing cable 09CAIRO1349, GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09CAIRO1349 | 2009-07-14 11:11 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Cairo |
VZCZCXRO6737
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1349/01 1951144
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141144Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3182
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 001349
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS IR IZ KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
REF: A. CAIRO 1227
¶B. CAIRO 746
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. Key Points:
-- (S/NF) During a June 29 meeting with CENTCOM Commander
General Petraeus, Egyptian General Intelligence Service
(EGIS) Chief Omar Soliman shared his views on Iraq, Iran, and
ongoing efforts on Palestinian reconciliation.
-- (S/NF) On Iraq, Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were
taking a "new position" on supporting Iraqi Prime Minister
Maliki following the Iranian elections and described Egypt's
plans to increase cooperation with the Iraqi government.
-- (S/NF) Soliman believed that the Iranian elections and
Hezbollah's electoral defeat in Lebanon presented a "good
opportunity" to reduce Iranian regional interference,
including by improving Syria's relations with the Arab world.
-- (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman was
pessimistic that an agreement would be reached, but promised
that Egypt would "not give up" and would continue efforts to
undermine Hamas, including by preventing money and guns from
entering Gaza.
----------------------------
Iraq: Extending an Arab Hand
----------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said Arab countries were looking for ways
to support Prime Minister Maliki during this "crucial time"
for Iraq. General Petraeus thanked Egypt for supporting the
Iraqi government, including by nominating a new Ambassador to
Iraq (ref A) and encouraging other Arab countries to "hold
out a hand in friendship." On President Mubarak's
instructions, Soliman explained, Egypt plans to increase
cooperation with Iraq on a wide variety of political,
security, and economic issues.
¶3. (S/NF) Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were taking a
"new position" on Iraq following the Iranian presidential
elections. He believed that Iranian leaders would "change
their attitude" towards neighboring countries and "supporting
terrorism" abroad, and would focus instead on domestic
issues. Iran cannot afford to "challenge the international
community now," Soliman opined. The challenge, Soliman
explained, was to "bring Iraq back to the Arab world" and
foster support for Maliki. According to Soliman, President
Mubarak told King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia "not to search for
another man," but should instead accept Maliki as Iraq's
leader and support him.
---------------------------------------------
Iran: Elections Present Opportunity for Arabs
---------------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Soliman stressed that Egypt suffers from Iranian
interference, through its Hezbollah and Hamas proxies, and
its support for Egyptian groups like Jamaatt al-Islamiyya and
the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt will confront the Iranian
threat, he continued, by closely monitoring Iranian agents in
Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and any Egyptian cells.
Improving relations between Syria and the Arab world would
also undermine Iran's regional influence. Soliman noted "a
little change" in Syria's attitude on engaging with the Arab
world, adding that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia shared this
view and planned to visit Damascus soon "to help change
Syria's attitude."
¶5. (S/NF) Soliman anticipated that Hezbollah's recent defeat
in the Lebanese parliamentary elections would force the group
to "remain quiet for sometime" as they rebuild domestic
support and counter the perception that Hezbollah is a "tool
of outsiders." With Iran itself focusing on domestic issues,
he continued, it was a "good time to make changes" in Lebanon
and reduce Iran's influence. Egypt will support a Saad
Hariri government and the Lebanese army, Soliman emphasized.
¶6. (S/NF) Soliman said that Iran heeded Egypt's warning
against meddling in domestic affairs (ref B) and supporting
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. He received a "very
positive message" from Iran's intelligence chief indicating
that Iran would not interfere in Egypt. Egypt planned to
"remain quiet inside Iran" for the time being, but would
continue to recruit agents who "will do what we ask," if Iran
insists on interfering in Egypt. "We hope Iran will stop
CAIRO 00001349 002 OF 003
supporting Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other cells"
within Egypt Soliman said, "but if not - we are ready."
Soliman said Iranian President Ahmadinejad wanted to attend
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Egypt July
11-16. If he did attend, President Mubarak would meet with
him and clearly explain that Iranian interference in "Arab
issues" was unacceptable. "We are ready for good relations
with Iran," Soliman noted, but only if Iran ceased
interfering and supporting terrorists in the region.
¶7. (S/NF) Because of domestic problems, Soliman believed that
Iran would seek better relations with the Arab world and
suspend its nuclear program for a period of time to avoid a
"war." He also anticipated Iran would try to strike more of
a "balance" between supporting its Hezbollah and Hamas
"tools" and trying to build better relations with the Arabs.
Soliman expressed concern that Iranian influence in Iraq
would spread after the re-deployment of U.S. troops out of
Iraqi cities and the eventual drawdown. General Petraeus
noted that 130,000 U.S. troops remain and that the drawdown
would be gradual. He expressed confidence that Iranian
influence could be contained if Arab countries moved
aggressively to support Iraq.
----------------------------------
Palestinian Reconciliation, Israel
----------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Soliman explained that Egypt's three primary
objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in
Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. On Gaza, Soliman said
Egypt worked closely with Israel to coordinate humanitarian
assistance shipments and was encouraging the Israelis to
allow more assistance into Gaza. Soliman said he was still
seeking a "tahdiya" (calm) agreement between Hamas and
Israel, but noted that Israel's lack of a Gaza strategy and
desire to keep Hamas under pressure made any agreement
difficult. On undermining Hamas, Soliman said Egypt has
"stopped" money and arms from entering Gaza. "Hamas feels
they are losing their capabilities," Soliman said, as they
are unable to re-arm using the tunneling network under the
Egypt-Gaza border. The pressure, especially from Egypt's
success at dismantling Hamas' funding mechanism, may render
Hamas "more flexible" than before.
¶9. (S/NF) Palestinians must believe that Abbas is capable of
securing a Palestinian state, Soliman stressed. He noted
recent positive developments in the West Bank, including
improvements in the Palestinian security forces and the
lifting of some Israeli roadblocks to facilitate commerce and
movement. He expressed concern, however, that continued
settlement activity, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's
recent "radical" speech, and insufficient economic
development in Palestinian areas were undermining the chances
for resuming peace negotiations. Soliman added that
President Mubarak may invite Nentanyahu and Abbas to Cairo if
efforts to re-start negotiations became "blocked."
¶10. (S/NF) Soliman briefed General Petraeus on his efforts to
facilitate Palestinian reconciliation. Reconciliation
remains elusive, he noted, as neither Hamas nor Fatah really
want an agreement. The Palestinian factions were currently
in Cairo, he said, for discussions on releasing detainees.
Talks were at an impasse, however, as Hamas had suspended
reconciliation talks until Abbas released all Hamas detainees
in the West Bank, which Soliman said Abbas would never
accept. Soliman also doubted that a reconciliation agreement
would be reached by July 7 as Egypt previously announced, and
anticipated that talks would be suspended for one-two months.
Despite the challenge and frustrations, Soliman promised
that Egypt would "not give up" on Palestinian reconciliation.
"It is hard," he continued, "but I am always optimistic. I
consider myself a patient man, but I am loosing patience."
-------------------
Syria, Yemen, Afpak
-------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Soliman hoped Syria would improve its
relationship with the Arab world and the U.S. and stop
serving as "Iran's lifeline" in the region. He also stressed
that Syria must cooperate with Iraq to improve border
security and stem the flow of foreign fighters. Soliman also
called on Syria to drop its insistence that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be solved before Syria will
reach an agreement with Israel on the Golan Heights.
¶12. (S/NF) Soliman expressed concern over instability in
CAIRO 00001349 003 OF 003
Yemen and said Egypt was trying to help President Saleh,
including by providing information on Iranian and Qatari
support to the al-Houthi insurgents. General Petraeus noted
U.S. efforts to improve Yemen's capacity to combat
extremists. On Pakistan, General Petraeus said he was
encouraged by the Pakistani military's operations in the Swat
Valley and Northwest Frontier Province, including their focus
on holding and rebuilding effected areas. Soliman credited
the Pakistani government for doing a better job of convincing
people that extremists pose a real threat to Pakistani
national security. On Afghanistan, General Petraeus stressed
the importance of arresting the downward spiral of violence
and improving governance after the September 20 national
elections.
¶13. (U) General Petraeus cleared this cable.
SCOBEY