![Keep Us Strong](../../../static/gfx/ja-cg.jpg)
![WikiLeaks logo](../../../static/gfx/WL_Hour_Glass_small.png)
Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA634, BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE: ENDGAME STRATEGY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRASILIA634.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRASILIA634 | 2009-05-19 16:04 | 2010-12-05 05:05 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO8264
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0634/01 1391639
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 191639Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4328
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0490
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0075
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9551
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7753
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4071
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000634
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA AND PM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS ETTC BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE: ENDGAME STRATEGY
REF: A. BRASILIA 216
¶B. BRASILIA 41
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. With two months
remaining before the Government of Brazil decides on a next
generation fighter aircraft, the U.S. competitor, Boeing's
F18 Super Hornet is still perceived by many Brazilians in and
outside the GOB as a likely second or even third-place
finisher, despite having the best aircraft and best offset
package. Most Brazilian contacts tell us that they do not
believe the USG is supporting the sale strongly, raising
doubts in their minds about our long term reliability as a
partner. Between now and July, there will be several
opportunities to assure the Brazilians at senior levels that
the USG will be behind the sale. Paragraphs 3-7 below
contain proposed steps to address key Brazilian concerns and
maximize chances for selection of the U.S. competitor. Among
these steps, high level contacts, especially by the President
and Secretary will be critical to overcome the perception of
a lack of U.S. support. We also need to underscore our
assurances that technology transfer has been approved and
highlight the superiority of Boeing's proposal to that of its
French competitor. As noted reftels, Embassy believes State
will play a critical role in roviding assurances that will be
essential to a winning bid. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S/NF) As the FX2 competition moves into its final
stages, the U.S. has a strong offer from Boeing for the F18
Super Hornet that comes with a huge package of industrial
cooperation and a competitive overall cost. While we can be
confident that the Super Hornet would be Brazil,s choice
based on its superior capabilities and attractive offset
package, it still has no better than a fifty/fifty chance of
success because of political support for the French
competitor and a lingering belief among some Brazilian
leaders that a close relationship with the U.S. may not be to
Brazil,s advantage. Winning the FX2 endgame, therefore,
will depend on an effective strategy to overcome our
political disadvantages and allow the Super Hornet,s
superiority be the deciding factor. Such a strategy must
address several key issues:
Perception of a lack of USG support
-----------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) With the French sale effort being managed directly
from President Sarkozy,s cabinet and ongoing Swedish
engagement on the Ministerial level, the USG is perceived by
most Brazilians as lukewarm at best in its support for the
FX2 sale. This is a critical disadvantage in a Brazilian
society that depends on personal relationships as a
foundation for business. The difficulty is exacerbated by
the separation between government and industry in the United
States. We cannot, for example, offer government financing
to support a state owned company as can our competitors. To
address this problem, high level contacts will be essential,
particularly from the Department of State which is assumed by
the Brazilian Air Force to be restrictive of mil-mil
ooperation. In such contacts, U.S. officials will need to
highlight expanding U.S.-Brazil partnership and how
cooperation with the United States as Brazil modernizes its
obsolescent military will not only provide the best
operational capabilities, but will enhance our overall
cooperation. This is why we have been forward leaning in
approving transfers of technology in support of this sale.
In addition to taking advantage of the near-term
opportunities for high level contacts presented by MOD
Jobim,s May 20 visit to Washington And Secretary Clinton,s
possible visit to Brazil in late May, Embassy believes that
phone calls between Presidents Obama and Lula, between NSA
Jones and Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marco Aurelio
Garcia, and between SecDef Gates and MOD Jobim, would boost
our case significantly.
Tech Transfer
-------------
¶4. (S/NF) Although the major decisions to approve the
BRASILIA 00000634 002 OF 003
transfer of technology for the FX2 sale have been made,
Brazilian leaders continue to doubt U.S. ability to follow
through. While the problem has been mitigated by an
effective public affairs strategy, we still hear that, absent
specific high level State Department assurances, the
Brazilians cannot be sure. It may well be that the
Brazilians want to keep tech transfer doubts alive in order
to have a ready-made excuse for buying an inferior plane,
should political leaders decide to do so. Repeated concerns
about unreleasable source code could have a similar basis.
Finally, we have heard that there are concerns on Capitol
Hill about the possibility of a South American arms race.
Should these reach Brazilian ears, there will be additional
worries that Congress will intervene to block the sale.
Embassy recommends the following as next steps to strengthen
our case on tech transfer:
-- An advocacy letter from President Obama to President Lula
-- A letter from Secretary Clinton to MOD Jobim stating that
the USG has approved the transfer of all appropriate
technology.
-- Interagency guidance on source code (cleared for April
Revista Forca Area article) should be disseminated for use.
-- All high-level contacts, including by Secretaries of
State and Defense and POTUS should include reassurance that
tech transfer has been approved.
-- Washington agencies should begin consultations with
appropriate Hill staff as early as possible to overcome
misperceptions that arms sales to Brazil could be
destabilizing.
Financing
---------
¶5. (S/NF) U.S. inability to offer government financing or
guarantees puts the Super Hornet at a significant
disadvantage to its competitors. EXIM is prohibited from
engaging in sales of defense articles, leaving Brazil to
depend on commercial financing at higher rates. According to
Washington agencies, it would be possible to seek
Congressional relief for EXIM to support the sale. This has
been done in the past on rare occasions. The Brazilian Air
Force finance office has told us that even a statement that
we are willing to seek such legislative action would be
considered a positive sign. Embassy recommends that
Washington explore the possibility of legislative action to
allow EXIM Financing and respond by the May 29 deadline to
the GOB request to provide information on government
financing options.
Making the Case
---------------
¶6. (S/NF) We have been successful in getting across the
points that the Super Hornet is a highly capable aircraft,
and now need to focus on the broader picture -- how
partnership on the fighter sale will yield benefits for both
sides both in military terms and in economic benefits. As
the world,s largest aerospace company, Boeing is able to
offer a much greater scope of opportunities for Brazilian
industry, including some outside of the FX2 offset program.
The early June visit of Brazilian legislators to Washington
will be an opportunity to get the message to political
leaders. By focusing on key Senators, we have the
opportunity to bring on board individuals who can influence
the decision makers and ensure that the people who will have
to approve spending Brazilian government money understand
that the F18 offers them the best value. Embassy will
continue to highlight tech transfer and Expand our message
to include economic benefits to Brazil of the Boeing
proposal. We also recommend the following:
-- Make an expert on the aerospace industry available for
interview to highlight economic health of Boeing compared to
its competitors.
-- Use visit of Brazilian Congress to drive home message
that partnership with the U.S. entails benefits to both sides
that go well beyond offset program. Ensure that Brazilian
Senators understand significantly lower life
cycle costs of the Super Hornet.
BRASILIA 00000634 003 OF 003
-- Arrange for an interview of the SecDef, or other senior
Administration representative, with a prominent Brazilian
journalist to underline importance of U.S.-Brazilian
partnership and how the FX2 sale will help.
Attack the French Bid
---------------------
¶7. (S/NF) Although the French offer a less capable fighter
at a higher cost, the Rafale has been the presumptive winner
since the inception of the FX2 competition. While the
technical evaluations of the aircraft should result in a
significant advantage for the Super Hornet, we need to take
steps to erode the French political edge. While a major
element of this will be highlighting Boeing,s lower cost,
there are several other measures that can make a case against
the French. The first step will be to remind the Brazilians
that their interest in the Rafale was driven by an assumption
that the United States would not release technology. Since
we have approved release of the relevant technology, we
should ask if Brazil still needs the French as a safety.
Over the last few months, the French sales effort has been
based on a misleading, if not fraudulent, claim that their
plane involves only French content (rendering it free of
meddlesome U.S. export controls). This is not the case. A
DTSA analysis found a high level of U.S. content, including
targeting systems, radar components and safety systems that
will require U.S. licenses. Next steps:
-- Although it does not appear that the tech data provided
with the French bid violated ITAR regs, PM/DDTC and DTSA
should continue to monitor French marketing to ensure
Dassault does not skirt ITAR restrictions.
-- Investigate India,s decision to drop the Rafale from its
fighter competition to see if there is a reason that would
make the aircraft less attractive to Brazil.
-- Ensure the Brazilians are aware that we expect to be
issuing retransfer licenses for U.S.-origin components on the
French plane and have already approved transfer of some
technical data.
KUBISKE