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Viewing cable 09OSLO146, DREAMS IN POLAR FOG: PROPOSED NORDIC EFENSE AND
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09OSLO146 | 2009-03-06 11:11 | 2011-01-13 05:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Oslo |
VZCZCXRO2028
RR RUEHSR
DE RUEHNY #0146/01 0651129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061129Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7402
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 8061
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4038
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3373
RUEHNY/ODC OSLO NO
RUEHNY/USDAO OSLO NO
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0259
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0303
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000146
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019
TAGS: PNR PGOV PREL MARR MCAP MOPS DA IC FI SW
SUBJECT: DREAMS IN POLAR FOG: PROPOSED NORDIC EFENSE AND
SECURITY COOPERATION
REF: 08 OSLO 54
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin . Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d
1.(C) Summay: Challenged to re-invigorate Nordic
cooperation, former Norwegian Foreign Minister (and father of
PM Jens Stoltenberg) Thorvald Stoltenberg presented 13
recommendations proposing greater civil and military
cooperation and a Nordic version of NATO's Article Five.
Stoltenberg delivered his wide-ranging (and non-binding)
recommendations at the February 9 meeting of the Nordic
Foreign Ministers. Norway's current FM, Jonas Gahr Stoere,
hailed the report as historic and modern. Reactions from
other Norwegian policy-makers has been less enthusiastic, but
several of the recommendations have potential to increase
Nordic capabilities and cooperation in international
operations, a plus for the UN and NATO. In addition, the U.S.
could propose specific areas where we see Nordic cooperation
contributing to NATO or U.S. priorities. End Summary.
A Nordic Article Five?
---------------------
2.(C) The most attention-grabbing of Stoltenberg's ideas was
his call for a Nordic declaration of solidarity, including a
mutually binding security policy guarantee. In his
introductory press conference, Stoltenberg stressed that this
proposal was not designed to take the place of existing
treaty commitments, but should be viewed as something
additional. Nonetheless, this idea was seen by some as a
potential challenge to Swedish and Finnish neutrality and to
Norway's traditional transatlantic orientation. Reaction in
Norway has been largely dismissive of the idea but it is easy
to see echoes of a call by the Norwegian Socialist Left
Party's defense spokesman for a division of labor in the
Nordics with Finland responsible for a joint army, Sweden for
the air force and Norway for the navy. Senior Norwegian
officials including the PM's foreign policy advisor and the
MFA's political director have privately indicated to us that
there is little or no interest in a Nordic solidarity
declaration in the GON.
Saving Money and Sharing Responsibilities
-----------------------------------------
3.(U) Declining defense budgets across the Nordic region have
already inspired the Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) of Norway,
Sweden and Finland to conduct a study on areas of possible
cooperation. Stoltenberg expands on the CHODs' study,
proposing joint medical units, transport and lift capability
(both air and sea), cooperation in training and education
(including firing and exercise ranges) and joint equipment
upgrades and purchases. Stoltenberg singled out army
material as particularly promising citing the common use of
all Nordics (with the exception of non-military Iceland) of
Leopard 2 battle tanks, CV-90 combat vehicles and Sisu Pasi
armored personnel carriers. Stoltenberg also proposed
developing a joint amphibious unit, based on current
cooperation between Sweden and Finland, which could be
deployed anywhere in the Nordics and in international
operations.
4.(C) Lest Iceland feel neglected, Stoltenberg proposed that
the Nordics take on part of the responsibility for air
surveillance and patrolling over Iceland. Initially this
would be through participation in the regular Northern Viking
exercises, followed by rotations in the NATO air patrol
rotations and a possible permanent presence at Keflavik air
base. Norway and Denmark already participate in the NATO
program. Swedish and Finnish participation would require
finalization of an agreement between NATO and Sweden and
Finland on data exchange with NATO's air defense system. In
theory this sort of cooperation could be a practical example
of cooperation under the Partnership for Peace program.
Surprisingly, Norwegian officials have been very critical of
this proposal, with the MFA's Political Director and the PM's
International Advisor both expressing strong dislike for this
item.
OSLO 00000146 002 OF 003
Keeping an eye on Polar Bears and Russians
------------------------------------------
5.(U) Maritime monitoring is a central focus of the report
with three separate but interrelated recommendations. These
include establishing a Nordic maritime monitoring system, a
joint maritime response force, and a joint satellite system
for surveillance and communications. The monitoring system
and the satellite proposal all reflect the need for
improvements in the ability to monitor civilian and military
shipping, environmental data and pollution. This need will
increase if shipping volume in the region increases due to
sea ice melting or development of energy projects such as the
Shtockman field. Norway is in the process of developing a
civilian-military Barents Sea monitoring system called
Barents Watch, and Sweden and Finland are currently expanding
their joint defense surveillance system to the entire Baltic
Sea. Stoltenberg calls for a joint Nordic effort to ensure
that national efforts are combatable and do not replicate
functions. A joint satellite would allow for complete and
constant monitoring of the entire Nordic region, as well as
enabling secure communications in the event of a crisis.
Currently the Nordic nations purchase satellite services from
U.S. and European suppliers which do not provide satisfactory
coverage above 71 degrees north. Once a monitoring system is
in place there will be a need for a response capability for
search and rescue and other emergencies. This capability
should include icebreakers fit for Arctic use. Although
Baltic capabilities are strong, there are not currently
enough resources to cover the vast sea areas under Norwegian,
Danish (Greenland) and Icelandic control, particularly if
shipping in the area increases.
Addressing 21st Century Challenges
----------------------------------
6.(U) Stoltenberg also proposed a number of ideas which would
increase civil cooperation including a Nordic stabilization
task force, a joint disaster response unit, a Nordic resource
network to protect against cyber attacks, a war crimes
investigation unit, cooperation between foreign services, and
on Arctic issues. The need for cooperation in war crimes
prosecution, protection of infrastructure from cyber attack
and on Arctic issues is clear and relatively
non-controversial. Cooperation between foreign services is
much more difficult and will likely be limited to countries
where none of the Nordics have representation now.
7.(U) As envisioned, the Nordic stabilization task force
would consist of military, humanitarian, state-building
(police officers, judges, prison officers, election
observers) and development assistance components. This unit
would be intended for use in UN-led operations and for NATO,
EU, AU or OSCE missions with a UN mandate. Stoltenberg
proposes that the military forces allocated to this unit be
drawn from those currently available for the EU Nordic Battle
Group and the NATO Response Force.
Dreams or Reality?
-----------------
8.(C) Comment: High defense costs, a genuine preference to
work with other Nordics and clear regional needs are real
factors which inspired the Stoltenberg study and which may
result in some of his recommendations being followed. The
Nordic Ministers will meet next on June 9 in Iceland and will
announce which recommendations will be pursued. GON
officials have uniformly stressed that where money can be
saved and capabilities increased they are positive. They
were much less positive about the grander ambitions, such as
the Nordic solidarity declaration and taking over
responsibility for Iceland's air patrols. Where this study
could result in something of value is primarily in any
increase in military, international operations and
surveillance capacity. Joint Nordic transport capabilities,
medical teams, amphibious units, a stabilization task force
and maritime awareness could be important contributions to
UN, NATO or U.S. missions.
ΒΆ9. (C) The U.S. should encourage Nordic cooperation to the
OSLO 00000146 003 OF 003
extent that it increases the Nordics' willingness and ability
to improve their internal and international capabilities to
deal with global challenges. It may also be of benefit to
propose specific issues where we see Nordic cooperation
contributing to NATO or U.S. priorities, such as maritime
monitoring of the Barents, the development of stabilization
teams, increases in military capacity, prosecution of war
criminals, etc.
WHITNEY