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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09MALABO31, EQUATORIAL GUINEA RAW 5: HOW IT WORKS -- WHY IT SOMETIMES
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MALABO31 | 2009-03-30 12:12 | 2011-02-10 21:09 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Malabo |
VZCZCXRO3778
OO RUEHMA
DE RUEHMA #0031/01 0891241
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301241Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MALABO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0482
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0041
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0278
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0016
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0027
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0108
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0074
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MALABO 0546
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MALABO 000031
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
KHARTOUM FOR FERNANDEZ; HARARE FOR CHISHOLM; YAOUNDE FOR DATT
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL ECON PGOV EPET KCOR PINR SOCI EK
SUBJECT: EQUATORIAL GUINEA RAW 5: HOW IT WORKS -- WHY IT SOMETIMES
DOESN'T
REF: A)MALABO 27 B)MALABO 18
¶1. (U) Triggered by changes underway in Washington D.C.,
upcoming personnel rotations in Embassy Malabo and animated by
the recent attack on the capital, this is the fifth in a series
of cables intended to update our perspective on Equatorial
Guinea, and to provide a ground-level view of one of the world's
most-isolated and least-understood countries to interested
readers.
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Equatorial Guinea (EG) is a place that is
trying to do everything at once, and doing some of it poorly.
The parts it does best it hires out to others, whether
construction of roads and bridges, new ministry buildings, or
professionalization of security forces. When left to its own
devices, it rarely succeeds, despite reasonably good intentions
and mellowing, benign leadership, and because of huge capacity
gaps. EG is a country emerging from a dark past of extreme
isolation and poverty, now flush with cash and oil reserves but
little else. Nonetheless, it is moving quickly, forging ahead
without always completing the work of institutional development
and legal reform (and shedding some resources to corruption and
mismanagement), but also outstripping its retrospective critics.
However, in leaving its Franco ghost behind, EG is unlikely to
stumble upon the right path on its own. Steering the country in
the right direction will require hands-on engagement. End
SUMMARY.
¶3. (SBU) Punished by History: Equato-Guineans are, by nature
and of experience, suspicious people. The long-isolated
population developed the conservative affect of most such
nations. Their early interactions with the outside, when they
came, were almost always painful. Whether suffering as the prey
of slavers, under the whip of colonialist coffee and cocoa
farmers, or more recently from the privations of foreign
"Tropical Gangsters" opportunistically looking to cheat, steal
or otherwise benefit from the once-impoverished country,
visitors were believed to bring problems. While the arrival of
oil riches has only increased the flow of predators, it has also
generated local sharks -- not to mention enhancing the country's
profile as an attractive "takeover target." The challenges
confronting a country that has moved from being one of the
world's poorest to one of its richest (in per capita income
terms) in less than a single generation are myriad.
¶4. (SBU) Of course, after starting with virtually nothing at
independence and then going backwards for at least a decade,
institutions that might help meet these recent challenges remain
a work in progress. With billions in oil revenue at stake, EG
resorts to peculiar tactics to manage its assets. The president
proudly notes he is the paymaster general for even routine
expenditures (Ref A). This mechanism probably helps constrain
corruption, but it also creates suspicion and an obvious
bottleneck. Nonetheless, a review of almost any state structure
-- from the courts system, to the system of accounting and
internal controls, to oversight mechanisms, to organization and
constitution of the far-too-numerous ministries -- reveals
project after project, all at early stages of establishment.
Though institutional development is underway and new talent and
better-trained staff beginning to surface, the country is still
a long way from being prepared to efficiently serve the public
interest.
¶5. (SBU) The Strange Choices Made by Poor People with Money:
EG's first 10-year economic development plan, generated in a
1998 conference open to interested national and international
groups, has just been completed. The idea was to make good use
of EG's then-newly found oil wealth before it ran out. With
EG's petroleum reserves growing and its revenue stream more
durable than initially expected, the old plan has recently been
replaced by a new one, "Horizon 2020," that seeks to deliver
"developing country status" for EG by 2020. Upon review, the
infrastructure-intense first plan was remarkably well executed.
Early indicators for "Horizon 2020" are likewise promising.
While the first plan focused on the "hardware" of modern society
-- i.e., roads, bridges, public buildings, ports and airports --
the second recognizes the necessity of complementing structures
with "software," focusing on the need to build institutional and
human capacity to run and maintain the system. In short, the
strategy has been to put a poorly-prepared generation to work in
low-skilled jobs building the infrastructure while the next
MALABO 00000031 002 OF 004
generation prepares to run a modern society.
¶6. (SBU) Nonetheless, some of the expenditures are peculiar.
For example, there seems to be a fixation -- perhaps issuing
from a population long in the dark -- for street lights.
Tens-of-thousands have been erected in anticipation of an
electric grid that is not yet capable of delivering power to
light them. Construction of impressive soccer stadiums in the
major cities of Malabo and Bata (towns really -- neither exceeds
150,000 inhabitants) raced the building of the two model schools
that lie in direct line of sight. In Malabo, the stadium came
first; in Bata, completion of the school edged out the sports
complex. There is also a focus on palaces, representational
space to wine-and-dine frequently visiting dignitaries. This
phenomenon of "keeping up with the African Joneses" is partially
explained by EG's intention to prove itself to
once-condescending neighbors, all heading this way in 2011 for
the African Union Summit. The 53 delegations of the member
states will be housed in a brand new "presidential village"
housing complex currently being constructed in once-pristine
jungle on the outskirts of Malabo. The stadiums are similarly
explained -- EG will co-host the Africa Cup soccer tournament
the next year (along with neighboring Gabon). Long looked down
upon by its African brothers, EG is preparing to show out. The
Potemkin village has purpose -- and will eventually even work.
¶7. (SBU) Internal Crooks: The headlong pace of development has
its problems. Apart from being preyed upon by outsiders,
Equatoguineans are experiencing a new phenomenon -- a growing
crowd of local predators. In the rush to put oil money back
into the ground and develop the country, but without the
constraints and controls of functioning institutions, the system
clearly leaks. On the downstream end (i.e., acquisitions and
construction project implementation) the lack of transparency
exacerbates concerns that rules are being broken. Grey areas in
the legal environment and a residue of regulatory gates and
gatekeepers create ample opportunity for graft and corruption.
Add to that an array of international contractors willing to
start to work with only the sketchiest of plans and supporting
documents, along with a nod from "el Jefe" the paymaster, and
the boom economy fairly ripples with rumor of who's at the
trough and who's on the take.
¶8. (SBU) While the general population complains about trends
and even bristles as the worst abuses, it remains relatively
complacent in light of the stunning advances being made
throughout the country. The quality of life for the average
citizen in EG has seen a great leap forward in the past decade
and, though surpassed by the gains of a greedy few, appears to
promise enough to inspire continued patience. Also, as is
demonstrated to the delight of the average citizen, heads
occasionally roll when the president catches (or perhaps finds
reason to catch) someone red-handed. For example, "el Jefe" has
just changed a number of Justice system leaders while
complaining that not enough is being done to constrain greed and
corruption among officials (SEPTEL).
¶9. (SBU) Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: Many international
agencies and institutions rate EG as among the worst of the
worst in terms of almost any indicator selected. Yet, from
ground level the story appears much better than reported One
problem is noise. The bias against EG is animated by a loud
chorus of hostile critics from among the diaspora (many of whom
left when things were much worse) and the once-colonial,
now-disenfranchised Spanish. A dedicated and vicious segment of
the Spanish media now effectively filters out most of the good
news about EG, and provides a distorted frame of reference for
anyone casually seeking information about the only
former-Spanish colonial holding in Africa. Unfortunately, this
creates a bias within the NGO community for those organizations
that fail to undertake due diligence to confirm claims. The
problems of EG, already exaggerated by an active and efficient
internal rumor mill, are thus often blown all out of proportion
by the country's opponents. The country's own extremely limited
information culture is another of its problems. The cultural
instinct is to clamp down on news. While the information
environment is slowly improving, there are still essentially no
reliable statistics upon which to base sophisticated
assessments. No one even really knows the actual size of the
MALABO 00000031 003 OF 004
country's population.
¶10. (SBU) Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests things are
better than generally believed. Numerous daily flights to and
from international destinations, and the continent, are full --
and not cheap. Local representatives of the Coca Cola Company
tell us EG has the highest level of consumption of its
refreshments in Africa. And this "luxury" competes with an
extraordinary local thirst for beer -- little wonder authorities
are moving quickly to construct municipal sewer plants. The
streets of Malabo and Bata, until recently mostly unpaved and
all but devoid of traffic, now suffer daily traffic jambs and
gridlock. Today, taxis, charging minimum of the equivalent of
one dollar, are ubiquitous -- ten years ago it was necessary to
schedule an appointment to use one of the handful that existed.
The local fuel supplier (Total) tells us that gasoline and
diesel consumption is growing exponentially, forcing his company
to repeatedly invest in new tanks and supply facilities --
meanwhile EG's parastatal fuel company (GEPetrol) is gearing up
to compete. The ruling elite are clearly not the only ones
driving cars or drinking Cokes. Things are clearly looking up,
and the idea that over half the population of EG lives on less
than a dollar a day is implausible. The obvious advances must
be particularly galling for those who left when times were
tough, and who now see things roaring ahead. A good rule of
thumb? Beware of what you are told about EG -- ground truth is
likely to differ.
¶11. (SBU) Martial Law: Since at least Forsythe's "The Dogs of
War," EG has been a favorite takeover target for both outside
and inside plotters. Its newfound wealth increased both its
target profile and internal concern over such threats. The
smoking gun of the 2004 Simon Mann-planned coup attempt
stiffened the country's already-intimidating security
structures. The February 17 raid (Ref B) more recently
increased the ops tempo. President Obiang came to power himself
in a coup likely assisted from the outside. He and his team
know how it works. Though without official declaration, the
country persistently operates under martial law-like conditions.
This posture generates human rights concerns as documents are
checked, guns are displayed and foreigners get the fish eye.
The fact that EG employs poorly-educated, front-line cops and
soldiers -- who in many other parts of Africa might be common
street thugs (perhaps readily available for a pickup game of
coup d'etat) -- contributes to the challenge of
professionalization. As a result, the responsible international
community remains aloof to EG's security needs. So, despite the
reputation for toughness, the fact EG is widely denigrated (if
not reviled) seems to attract regular attention of buccaneers
and adventurers who seem to think they have cover of
international opprobrium. With no security allies and only
nascent internal capacities, it is difficult for the country to
relax or even improve the very mechanisms that get it into
trouble on the human rights front. It's hard to retool when
you're in the middle of a fight. This negative feedback loop
needs to be broken.
¶12. (SBU) Politics as Unusual: EG is less a rogue state than
it is a rudimentary one. Its institutions, those stem cells of
democracy, have been stunted by its short, troubled history.
Upon assuming leadership Obiang forcefully consolidated power
within his party, the "Partido Democratico de Guinea Ecuatorial"
(PDGE). As oil wealth arrived, and the party (cloaked as the
government) made good on political promises, began to fulfill
development plans and brought progress to much of the country's
doorstep. The need to maintain power by force has now largely
dissipated -- the PDGE is a formidable, but no longer ruthless,
political machine. Between itself and a handful of pet
coalition partners, it can now count on overwhelming popular
support as far as the eye can see. The remaining opposition is
pitiful -- fractured, incompetent and disorganized -- and seems
to think it can complain itself into office. Elections here
will continue to reflect lopsided results in favor of the ruling
party.
¶13. (SBU) Yet behind the curtain the party fairly seethes with
intrigue. There are left-right, North-South, East-West,
young-old, ethnic-clan, male-female, and regional splits that
are bridged only by an old-fashioned African devotion to the
chief, and the self restraint of a recently traumatized
MALABO 00000031 004 OF 004
population. Despite his reputation of omnipresence, much goes
on under the nose of "el Jefe," and the players energetically
vie for influence and position. The art of governance is being
practiced. Nevertheless, democracy, as we know it, will only
arrive in EG once the patriarch is gone and the party comes
apart along its various fault lines. In the meantime, practice
at elections, improving processes and maturing institutions will
help set the stage for real, public political discourse. The
generational shift currently underway is clearly contributing to
this positive evolution -- and the system is adjusting. To
ensure the right outcome, that system will need time, direction
and assistance. President Obiang is both well positioned and
intentioned to provide the space, and appears, despite his age,
to have the stamina to see it through. For the near term, it
will be up to outsiders to span the capacity gaps that might
help the country reach any goal of real democracy, governing a
free market economy. We are clearly best positioned to provide
such help -- should we choose to accept that mission. If we
don't, others may take the country in a different direction.
¶14. (SBU) Conclusion: EG is a country poorly prepared for the
future thrust upon it by oil riches. While outsiders can be
contracted to take care of some of the nuts and bolts issues of
development, when it comes to the arch of governance, money
alone is not enough to span the yawning capacity gaps. Though
much needs to be done to improve EG society, sometimes the
country is simply not ready to undertake the necessary work on
its own. In the meantime, Obiang's "benevolent
authoritarianism" provides an ample incubator for positive
changes to occur, though there is competition for his attention
among the international players. In any case, at the moment he
is unchallenged by any other political figure. If we want to
steer EG toward our own goals, we must gain trust of GREG power
players and help them move our way. Having proven fickle in the
past, we will need to stay engaged to ensure we keep that trust.
We have determined in small scale that engagement works --
primarily via the MPRI security professionalization training
project and the USAID-supported Social Development Fund, both of
which are turning earth and having positive effects. Our
support of EITI is also showing results. The door remains open.
We have pending requests for help with reform of justice
system, regional security cooperation, development of democracy
programs and an upcoming request for assistance with improving
public finance. The view from here is that these opportunities
should be seized.
SMITH