![Keep Us Strong](../../../static/gfx/ja-cg.jpg)
![WikiLeaks logo](../../../static/gfx/WL_Hour_Glass_small.png)
Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BEIJING560, PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY,
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING560.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BEIJING560 | 2009-03-04 12:12 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
VZCZCXRO9112
OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0560/01 0631255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041255Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2655
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000560
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY,
OFFERS HELP IN TALKING TO IRAN
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: China is keen to understand the direction of
U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and is
willing to facilitate dialogue between the two sides,
according to an MFA official. China remains committed to the
P5-plus-1 process but values its bilateral engagement with
Iran. Nonetheless, the Iran should not take for granted its
economic relations with the PRC. Despite PRC urging that
Iran respond positively to American overtures, initial rounds
of direct talks with the Iranians on the nuclear issue would
be difficult, the official suggested. The official said that
it is too soon to contemplate what actions should be taken
should Iran develop a nuclear weapon. An academic contact
suggested that there is no "point of no return" on Iran's
development of nuclear technology and that the Iranians
believe they are in a strong bargaining position should some
form of new diplomatic engagement emerge. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations and the
international community's efforts to deal with the Iran
nuclear issue with Deputy Director Xu Wei of MFA's West Asian
Affairs Department Iran Division March 3. PolOff also met
with Li Guofu, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies
at the MFA-affiliated China Institute for International
Studies (CIIS) February 27.
China Seeks Clarity on Policy Review
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) MFA's Xu Wei told PolOff that China was closely
following the ongoing review of our Iran policy. He said
that China believed that the United States maintains a
leadership role in the Middle East and that the results of
the review will have an impact on Chinese engagement with the
region. He said that Beijing hoped for more clarity from the
United States on policy adjustments resulting from this
review, adding that China had been left to guess at how U.S.
policy might change on a very important set of shared
concerns. In the meantime, Xu stressed, China's overall
policy toward Iran had not changed, and China would continue
to emphasize the importance of stability in the Middle East
and its opposition to the development of nuclear weapons in
the region. Xu noted that additional clarity was especially
important because China perceives several voices in the USG
with different viewpoints on Iran speaking publicly on the
issue.
PRC Committed to P5-plus-1, Willing to Facilitate Talks
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶4. (C) Xu stressed the need to resolve the nuclear impasse
through dialogue, and added that China remained committed to
the P5-plus-1 process, as indicated in its support for the
recent P5-plus-1 joint statement on Iran. He said that China
sincerely hoped that the outcome of our Iran policy review
would be direct U.S.-Iran talks, and offered China's
assistance in creating a channel for communication with the
Iranians.
Official: PRC Effective at Communicating with Tehran
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶5. (C) China and Iran continued to enjoy "good" relations in
both the political and economic realms, Xu said, but this did
not indicate that China supports all of Tehran's policies.
He said that China had developed strong communication with
the Iranian regime and used these channels to express to the
Iranian leadership the concerns of the P5-plus-1 and the Gulf
Cooperation Council over nuclear proliferation. Beijing
sought to persuade Iran to play a positive role in the
region, and Chinese communication with Tehran to that end was
effective, Xu said, adding that Iran's cooperation with the
IAEA and the P5-plus-1, though limited, was due in part to
Chinese intervention. China had made clear to Iran that
PRC-Iran economic cooperation should not be interpreted as an
indication that China is not serious about concerns over
nuclear proliferation or about working with the international
community to deal with the nuclear issue.
Talking to Iran Would Require Patience
--------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Xu said that the U.S. policy review had generated
debate within Iran over how to respond, especially over the
possibility of direct dialogue. China was urging the Iranian
regime to respond positively to American overtures, but Xu
said that based on his experience working on Iranian issues,
he believed the leadership will find it difficult to show a
BEIJING 00000560 002 OF 003
positive attitude in public. Xu counseled patience, saying
that he was concerned that expectations in the United States
on how Iran would respond may be too high. Still, he said
that the issues involved were too important for the United
States to fail to press forward with dialogue even if any
such discussions are difficult.
"Too Soon" to Contemplate Weaponization Concerns
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶7. (C) Pressed on how China would respond if Iran developed
nuclear weapons, Xu said that China took proliferation
concerns seriously and opposed such a development. However,
he indicated that China did not yet see Iranian development
of nuclear weapons as an immediate concern, noting that China
was willing to "wait and see how far Iran can go" in
developing nuclear technology before it would change its
position. He added that it was still too soon to contemplate
what actions should be taken should the Iranians develop a
nuclear weapon.
¶8. (C) CIIS's Li Guofu echoed this approach, saying that
while China followed the Iranian nuclear program closely,
China was not 100-percent convinced that Iran is pursuing
nuclear weapons. He indicated that observers who believe
there is a "point of no return" in Iran's technical
development of nuclear weapons were incorrect, because the
problem was fundamentally a political one and not technical.
He said that Iran was moving ahead with its nuclear program
without a clear internal position on whether it would want to
weaponize the technology, but added that Iran hoped to bring
the technology to the point where it could produce a nuclear
weapon in a short period of time. He stressed, however, that
in his view, a complicated series of steps remained between
the current level of technology and the point of
weaponization, including the necessity for a nuclear test.
Such a test, he indicated, would have a profound effect on
the political questions facing the international community.
U.S. Needs to Offer "Something Real"
------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Li said that direct U.S. engagement with Iran would be
complicated by the reality that there is little the United
States can offer at present that would persuade Tehran to
change its behavior. As the regime's confidence in its own
domestic legitimacy has grown, the value to the regime of
normalized relations with the United States has decreased.
Similarly, security guarantees would mean little to an
Iranian Government convinced that it can already ensure its
own security. Li stressed that the U.S. side would need to
be prepared to make concessions in any engagement, and would
need to offer "something real." Li sugested starting with
demonstrating a position of "mutual respect."
Iran Remains Suspicious of U.S. Intentions
------------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Based on his conversations with Iranian
policy-makers, Li said, Iran remained suspicious of U.S.
intentions. He suggested that dialogue with Iran should have
a "symbolic" beginning to avoid a false start. He said that
the two sides should first agree on principles not directly
related to the nuclear issue. He suggested that if the
Iranians show a willingness to suspend uranium enrichment,
the United States should be prepared to follow up immediately
with new cooperation. He stressed that the Iranian
leadership regarded itself an important player on the
regional issues that concern the United States, especially
efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.
IRI Official: Nuclear Weapon Would Be "Disastrous"
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶11. (C) Li reported that he was told by a Deputy Foreign
Minister in Tehran that Iran considers itself a regional
power, but understands that if Iran were to develop a nuclear
weapon, the United States would likely deploy nuclear weapons
to the Persian Gulf region, which would be "strategically
disastrous" for Iran. He said that the official had told him
Iran wants to develop "nuclear capability" as a symbol of its
status as a regional power. The official told Li that Iran
was nevertheless willing to open a dialogue with the United
States.
Other Challenges to Opening a Dialogue
--------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Li said that the atmosphere had improved for
developing new engagement with Iran, but obstacles remained.
BEIJING 00000560 003 OF 003
The regime in Tehran continued to see opportunities for
changing Iran's engagement with the world under the new U.S.
administration, and there was debate in Iran on how best to
respond. Serious debate among the Iranian people on the need
for a nuclear program had yet to take place, Li stressed,
although the notion of weaponizing the results of the nuclear
program continued to generate debate among the Iranian
leadership. Li stressed that the Iranian leadership
continued to dismiss the notion of U.S. military action in
response to its ongoing nuclear development and was convinced
that suspension of uranium enrichment is not necessary for
starting a "new process" with the United States.
Election Politics also a Factor
-------------------------------
¶13. (C) Li said that this year's presidential election in
Iran would be an important factor in the chances for
meaningful talks with the United States. Noting that the
candidacy of former President Khatami posed the first real
challenge of the campaign to incumbent President Ahmadinejad,
Li stressed that Khatami would not have been able to announce
his candidacy without explicit approval from Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. Unlike previous elections, other
reformist candidates had since dropped out of the campaign,
Li said, improving Khatami's chances. Still, the hard-liners
had acted to overcome their internal divisions in light of
the Khatami candidacy, and Ahmadinejad remained "likely" to
be re-elected. Li argued that the top-level blessing of the
Khatami candidacy indicated that the Supreme Leader deems
Khatami reliable enough and would not expect bold reforms
even if Khatami were elected. In the meantime, Li suggested,
Ahmadinejad might feel the need to demonstrate his hard-line
credentials in the run-up to the June election.
PRC to Iran: Don't Take Economic Cooperation for Granted
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶14. (C) Li said that China continued to value development of
its economic ties with Iran in order to maintain economic
growth. He noted that Chinese officials told their Iranian
counterparts that they are frustrated with the lack of
progress on the nuclear issue, progress which would create a
foundation for new investment in the energy sector.
According to Li, to prod the Iranians to show progress on the
nuclear issue, the Chinese had warned them not to take
China's economic interests in Iran for granted. Furthermore,
China's dependence on Iranian energy is decreasing given
recent improvements in Sino-Saudi relations (as evidenced by
President Hu's recent travel there) and their potential to
bring about increased Chinese access to Saudi energy
supplies.
PICCUTA