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Viewing cable 09USNATO30, READOUT NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING JANUARY 28,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09USNATO30 | 2009-01-29 16:04 | 2011-02-01 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Mission USNATO |
VZCZCXRO8298
OO RUEHAG RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV
DE RUEHNO #0030/01 0291635
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291635Z JAN 09 ZDK
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2634
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0430
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0518
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0681
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 1126
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0506
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6242
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0501
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 0303
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0821
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0354
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0885
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000030
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: AF NATO PREL
SUBJECT: READOUT NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING JANUARY 28,
¶2009.
Classified By: Classified by: Charge' de Affaires Walter E. Andrusyszyn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(C/NF) Summary from the NAC Meeting: -- AFGHANISTAN: ISAF Senior Civilian Representative Gentilini said the Afghans were eager for NATO to respond to its proposal for a military technical agreement, sent to NATO in early January. The SCR and several Perm Reps stressed that a MTA with the Afghans could help address the issue of civilian casualties, but many cautioned that the legal difficulties involved in negotiating such an agreement called for the Alliance to proceed with caution. Saying it needed more time to seek instructions, Hungary blocked consensus on a decision that fully filling the Elections Support Force (ESF) should take priority over filling the NATO Response Force (NRF), which would have allowed nations to pull NRF components for use in the ESF. The NAC will revisit the issue next week.
-- BALKANS: SHAPE Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Major General Wright said KFOR assesses that the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is increasingly able to act as second responder for primary security, but the Norwegian PermRep challenged this assessment. The Dutch PermRep, supported by the Czech Republic, said the recent Tadic letter protesting the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) demonstrated that NATO should be reluctant to engage with Serbia on possible changes to the Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement (MTA). MG Wright said SHAPE had revised downward KSF trust fund requirements from 43 to 37.6 million euros, with 20.34 million euros in pledges still needed to meet this target.
-- AFRICA: No discussion
-- IRAQ: The SYG informed the NAC that ASYG Howard (and SHAPE) would travel to Baghdad on Feb. 9 to clarify legal aspects of the NTM-I legal status and would report to the Council upon their return.
-- RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: No discussion
-- POTENTIAL WMD THREATS TO NATO: A joint IS/IMS briefing on the major WMD threats to the Alliance focused on Russian tactical nuclear weapons, Iran's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and attempts by terrorist organizations to procure by other means the WMD that they lack the capabilities to produce.
--AOB: The UK PermRep urged NATO to make a public statement against Russian plans to build a naval facility in Abkhazia. The U.S., Estonia, and Canada supported the proposal, but Germany, Italy, and France urged caution. The SYG noted that there is a clear &fault line8 in the Alliance on how to deal with Russia, and recommend that, if asked, the NATO spokesman would note that NATO had seen the reports, has reason for concern, and will use all channels to communicate with the Russians. END SUMMARY.
----------- Afghanistan -----------
2.(C/ REL ISAF) Afghanistan: SHAPE briefed that 68 percent of all insurgent activity now occurs in Regional Command South (RC-S). ISAF has assisted in the delivery of 19,000 metric tons of World Food Program food since September. The Pakistan Military wants to reopen operations in Swat (settled area) to rout militants, but Pakistan,s counterinsurgency force has refused to deploy until security improves. The ISAF line of communication through Torkham Gate (Khyber tribal agency) remains open. Phase IV of voter registration began in the south January 20. Only seven voter registration centers ) six for security reasons ) of 83 total delayed USNATO 00000030 002 OF 005 2009. opening. During the first four days of Phase IV, nearly 32,000 citizens registered.
3.(S/REL ISAF) SHAPE predicted that with an increase in international forces this year, the numbers of security incidents and the number of civilian casualties is likely to increase. There were 46 percent more civilian casualties in 2008 than in the previous year. SHAPE noted that the large majority of civilian casualty incidents are caused by insurgents, but public reaction is most strident when casualties are caused by international military forces. The Italian PermRep called on the Council to refuse to accept a prediction of more civilian casualties in the coming year, &We must do better, not least because civilian casualties are counterproductive to our strategy.8 Ambassador Volker supported the Italian and Norwegian interventions and highlighted the attention this issue is receiving among U.S. senior officials.
4.(S/REL ISAF) MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT: SCR Gentilini noted that an agreed military technical agreement (MTA) between NATO and Afghanistan, as Afghanistan has proposed, could be effectively tied to the problem of civilian casualties. He hailed GEN McKiernan's recent ISAF Tactical Directive (December 30) as &excellent8 and said it had helped reassure the Afghan government and public about civilian casualties. Gentilini noted, however, that ISAF's directive is perceived as one-sided, and asked PermReps to imagine the power and the public impact of a two-sided (NATO and Afghanistan) joint decision. Gentilini cautioned, however, that there are several &very problematic8 clauses in the Afghans, MTA proposal that would require thorough military and legal review. Ambassador Volker agreed that NATO-ISAF had an opportunity to "put ourselves on the same side" with the Afghan government, but said caution must prevail on choosing the language.
5.(S/REL ISAF) The SCR urged (and said Afghan officials fully expect) that NATO should synchronize its response to Afghanistan,s request for an MTA with NATO with the U.S.,s response to Afghanistan,s request for a U.S.-Afghanistan MTA. He conveyed that Afghan Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs Wardak and Spanta, respectively, are willing to negotiate text and view the Afghan government,s draft as a flexible starting position. Wardak told the SCR he does not expect a final MTA decision by the February 19-20 NATO Defense Ministerial in Krakow (which he will attend), but would like an interim response by then, such as a counter-proposal from the Allies. Gentilini reported that Karzai recently met with families of reported civilian casualties and told them he would give the U.S. and NATO a month to respond to the MTA request. Gentilini thought Wardak and Spanta could manage Karzai and prevent further damaging public comments if they had substantive interim feedback from NATO (and, ideally, the U.S.). NOR, GER, ITA, UK, and POR PermReps voiced support for the SCR's position, that a cautious but sooner-than-later response to the Afghans is warranted and could have political benefit for ISAF. The SYG said he would speak to Karzai on the margins of the Munich Security Conference to reassure him that NATO is taking the request seriously and to urge his patience so NATO can prepare its response.
6.(C) ELECTIONS SUPPORT ) NO CONSENSUS: The SYG called for, but failed to achieve, Council agreement to prioritize filling the Elections Support Force (ESF) over maintaining the NATO Response Force (NRF), thus allowing nations to use units dedicated to the NRF for elections security. HUN blocked consensus, saying it needed time to consult its capital. BEL, POR, and ESP reported they would not hold up consensus but did not see any reason to &rush8 a decision since elections would not be held until the fall and the date remains unknown. Ambassador Volker walked the Council through a timeline and demonstrated that troops must be identified by March in order to allow time for units to prepare for their deployments and be in the field in time for USNATO 00000030 003 OF 005 2009. the elections. Chairman of the Military Committee Admiral di Paola supported Volker,s intervention and stressed the urgency of a decision.
7.(C/REL ISAF) BEL further reserved national decision-making authority on using NRF-designated elements, absent a decision from NATO on common funding or reimbursement. CZE and BUL supported the SYG,s proposal, but suggested a formal tasking to the Senior Resource Board to come up with a financial burden sharing plan. The U.S., UK, CAN, FRA, GER, ITA, LITH, NOR, DEN, and POL supported consensus. The SYG asked nations who had not reported a position to do so within the week and requested that those who had blocked or lodged reservations to tell their capitals &the SYG is insisting8 on guidance to enable a consensus vote on February 4. CAN and UK, endorsed by the U.S., requested that all elections support forces arrive in theater without caveats.
8.(C/REL ISAF) NORTHERN LOCs: The SYG gave an update on NATO,s ongoing negotiations for northern lines of communication through Russia and Central Asia. He said NATO has agreement in principle with Uzbekistan, to be finalized in early February. Kazakhstan has not responded to NATO,s formal proposal of last October, so NATO is beginning its own new draft. Negotiations with Ukraine and Belarus are ongoing.
9.(C/REL ISAF) SUMMIT DELIVERABLES: Ambassador Volker said Defense Ministers must take decisions on what deliverables would be achievable by the Summit &to give our leaders a success in April.8 The UK emphasized that NATO must achieve some deliverables on Afghan army and police development prior to the Defense Ministerial in Krakow (February 19-20), since Afghan Defense Minister Wardak would attend and would expect a sign of support. FRA suggested that ISAF could announce it will provide protection to EUPOL trainers and mentors. The SYG identified the assessment of the Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan as the key deliverable for the Krakow meeting. He said he would issue an updated &roadmap8 for Summit preparations. Several PermReps supported a separate Afghanistan statement at the Summit.
------- Balkans -------
10.(C/NF) Balkans: SHAPE Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Major General Wright said KFOR assesses that the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is demonstrating an increasing ability to act as second responder for primary security in a timely, effective manner. The Norwegian PermRep challenged this assessment, saying he is hearing through national channels that KFOR is having difficulty getting in contact with EULEX in the evening and on weekends, including during disturbances this past weekend. Chairman of the Military Committee Admiral Di Paola counseled patience, saying the EULEX deployment in the north is a work in progress but the situation is improving.
11.(C) The SYG noted he had received an information copy of Serbian President Tadic,s letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon protesting against the formation of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and did not intend to respond. The Dutch PermRep, supported by the Czech Republic, said that as long as Serbia continues to use the sort of inflammatory language found in the Tadic letter, NATO should be reluctant to consider changes to the Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement (MTA). Deputy Chief of Mission Andrusyszyn added that now was not the time to consider revising the MTA, and Bulgaria cautioned that it had indications Serbia wanted not just revision but termination of the MTA. Norway said now was not the time to consider revising the MTA but to get a clearer picture on dialogue with the Serbs, while Italy, backed by Spain, said NATO should be open to discussing MTA changes with Belgrade. USNATO 00000030 004 OF 005 2009.
12.(C) The SYG said Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations Rossin had found encouraging signs of progress on KFOR,s new tasks of building up the KSF and demobilizing the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) during his visit to Kosovo on January 22. MG Wright said KFOR aims to recruit and train 315 civilians*ten percent of whom should be minorities*to join KSF ranks in 2009. KFOR intends to conduct six basic training cycles for KPC transferees to the KSF between February and September and three new recruit training cycles beginning in April, August, and November. Priority will go to filling the KSF Training and Doctrine Brigade, Operations Support Brigade, and Rapid Reaction Brigade in that order.
13.(C) MG Wright briefed that SHAPE had reviewed KSF stand-up requirements and revised downward trust fund requirements from 43 to 37.6 million euros after accounting for intended spending on the KSF by Kosovo authorities. MG Wright said there was a need for an additional 20.34 million euros in contributions beyond already donated and pledged funds and equipment.
14.(C) Spain protested against the language used in a Secretary General,s report issued on January 26 on the status of efforts to establish the Ministry for the KSF, saying the wording implies that all NATO Allies recognize Kosovo (Note: The cover page and document refers to &Minister8 or &Ministry8 25 times, language to which non-recognizing Allies such as Spain and Romania have objected in previous NATO documents). The SYG responded that NATO is not in the recognition business but that there is no denying that a Ministry for the KSF exists. He said he would look again at the document,s wording and perhaps return to the issue at a later time.
------ Africa ------
15.(C/NF) Africa: no discussion
---- Iraq ----
16.(C/NF) Iraq: The SYG informed the NAC that ASYG Howard (and SHAPE) would travel to Baghdad on Feb. 9 to clarify legal aspects of the NTM-I legal status and would report to the Council upon their return.
--------------------- Response to Terrorism ---------------------
¶17. (C/NF) Response to Terrorism: no discussion
----------------------------- Potential WMD Threats to NATO -----------------------------
¶18. (C/NF) Potential WMD Threats to NATO: The Council received a joint IS/IMS briefing on the major WMD threats to the Alliance from Ambassador Jacek Bylica, head of NATO's WMD Center, and Brigadier General Norbert Stier, Deputy Assistant Director of the IMS Intelligence Division. Given time limitations, the briefing summarized particular programs of concern rather than covering the gamut of threats.
¶19. (C/NF) Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal, estimated at 2,000 - 4,000 warheads, was cited as a particular threat, and Moscow's lack of willingness to engage in discussions on the issue was cited as troubling. In addition, Russia continued to develop chemical weapons which could both defeat NATO counter-measures and evade detection by the OPCW. Several Allies queried the confidence which the WMD Center and IMS Intel Center placed in the latter assessment. The Netherlands PermRep, on the other hand, noted that the USNATO 00000030 005 OF 005 2009. tactical nuclear threat to NATO Allies was real and major, yet the issue was not covered by any existing non-proliferation regime. He urged future discussions on Europe's security architecture to include the issue.
¶20. (C/NF) The briefing on Iran focused on an assessed willingness by the Iranians to pursue both nuclear weapons and ever-more capable delivery vehicles for them. Efforts in 2008 to test space-launch vehicles were cited as a particularly troublesome indicator.
¶21. (C/NF) Terrorist acquisition of WMD was the next topic of major concern. Although there was a limited assessed capability for al-Qaeda and other groups to acquire WMD, the intent was clearly present, and there were ongoing credible reports of attempts to recruit the needed expertise. A "dirty" radiological IED program was assessed to be under active consideration by al-Qaeda.
¶22. (C/NF) The British PermRep noted the absence of emphasis on intent in an almost-total focus on capabilities in the briefing, which he called useful but incomplete. In conjunction with the expressed concerns on terrorist recruitment of CBRN experts, the Latvian representative noted recent reports of infiltration into Pakistani CBRN-related laboratories. The Spanish PermRep stated that non-proliferation treaties are "the first line of defense" against WMD incidents, and that Allies should focus on the NPT at the scheduled February 25 reinforced NAC which will discuss arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues.
------------------ Any Other Business ------------------
¶23. (C/NF) Any Other Business: The UK PermRep, on instructions, urged NATO to issue a public statement expressing concern about the recent Russian announcements of plans for building military bases in Abkhazia. He said the UK was pushing for a similar response from the EU. Germany said it was reluctance and NATO should be cautious on the timing of a statement, if there was one at all. Italy wanted to think about timing and other ways to send Russia a message. France echoed the German and Italian cautions. The US supported the UK proposal and noted that this highlighted the unclear picture of what Russia was doing in the area. The Greek PermRep said Russia,s intentions were unclear and that a Russian official had issued a disclaimer about the naval base and said that the only decision made was about the military base at Gudauta. The Estonian PermRep said it would help for the Russians to hear a &polite and decent8 statement that NATO is concerned, and that by standing on principles NATO could stop a bad situation from developing. The Dutch Ambassador said the Alliance needed more information on Russia,s intent, and suggested that there were formats to raise the issue with the Russians, such as the SYG,s meeting with Deputy PM Ivanov next week at the Munich Security Conference.
¶24. (C/NF) In the absence of consensus on a statement, the SYG recommended that, if asked, the NATO spokesman would note that NATO had seen the reports, had reason for concern, and would use its channels to communicate its views to the Russians. The SYG also said that there is a clear &fault line8 in the Alliance on how to deal with Russia and recommended against wasting time trying to get a consensus position on a statement. Finally, the UK Ambassador suggested the Political Committee should discuss the issue after getting instructions from capitals. ANDRUSYSZYN