![Keep Us Strong](../../../static/gfx/ja-cg.jpg)
![WikiLeaks logo](../../../static/gfx/WL_Hour_Glass_small.png)
Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI71, AL-QADHAFI'S FEINT: LIBYAN OIL NATIONALIZATION UNLIKELY REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 474, B) 08 TRIPOLI 498, C) 08 TRIPOLI 563, D) 08 TRIPOLI 597, E) TRIPOLI 40 TRIPOLI 00000071 001.2 OF 003
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TRIPOLI71.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI71 | 2009-01-30 17:05 | 2011-02-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
Appears in these articles: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/ |
VZCZCXRO9531
OO RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0071/01 0301716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 301716Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4387
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0820
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0745
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0877
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4911
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000071
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; DEPT PLEASE PASS COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON;
ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/30/2019
TAGS: ENRG EPET ECON EINV PREL EFIN PGOV LY
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI'S FEINT: LIBYAN OIL NATIONALIZATION UNLIKELY REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 474, B) 08 TRIPOLI 498, C) 08 TRIPOLI 563, D) 08 TRIPOLI 597, E) TRIPOLI 40 TRIPOLI 00000071 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. During a recent video conference with Georgetown University students, Muammar al-Qadhafi suggested that Libya and other oil exporting states could nationalize their oil production in view of sharply plummeting petroleum prices. Several days later, however, a sensior MFA official assured the visiting Spanish King's delegation that Libya does not intend to do so. In typical fashion, al-Qadhafi's call for nationalization was ill-defined and left considerable room for interpretation. Industry experts in Washington and Libya have not entirely dismissed the possibility that the GOL could nationalize its oil and gas sector (Libya did so in 1972); however, they do not currently judge it to be a serious threat and are waiting to see whether legislation proposing such an initiative is introduced in advance of the upcoming session of the General People's Congress. Informed contacts view the call for nationalization as a tactical move to:
1) leverage the expected re-negotiation of existing contracts with international oil companies (IOCs');
2) prompt IOC's operating in Libya to contribute to the U.S.-Libyan claims compensation fund;
3) establish a context for Libya's potential unilateral cuts in production of oil below levels dictated by OPEC, and;
4) prepare the Libyan people for the fact that this year's GOL budget, which will be introduced at the General People's Congress session, will be adversely impacted by falling oil revenues and the global financial crisis. The GOL is in the midst of a painful recalculation of its 2009 national budget to reflect lower oil revenues. Suggesting nationalization - an idea al-Qadhafi attributed to members of the local-level Basic People's Congresses and can therefore disavow easily - clearly signals the extent to which sagging oil prices and the global financial crisis have hurt oil-dependent economies like Libya's, helping pre-empt criticism from abroad if/when Libya makes further unilateral production cuts below OPEC-dictated levels and from regime elements when big ticket development projects are scaled back or cut. Al-Qadhafi's real intent may have been to shift the goalposts of debate so that the steps he ultimately takes seem comparatively palatable. End summary.
AL-QADHAFI THROWS A CURVEBALL
¶2. (C) During a wide-ranging video conference with Georgetown University students on January 21, Muammar al-Qadhafi raised the topic of oil, saying " ... oil-exporting countries might opt for nationalizations due to the sharp fall in oil prices". His speech was foreshadowed by articles in state-run newspapers, later picked up by Reuters, saying that members of the Basic People's Congresses (the lower part of the pyramid scheme of legislative committees and congresses that form the GOL) had called for nationalization. Noting sharply plummeting oil prices, al-Qadhafi suggested that oil production should be temporarily curtailed or stopped altogether to spur higher prices and suggested that a price point of USD 100/barrel was needed to underwrite Libya's ambitious infrastructure development projects. Libya's former senior representative to OPEC, Abdullah al-Badri, told the press on January 23 that nationalization could be "in the offing" and suggested that events in Gaza may have partly prompted the proposal. At a National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce lunch in Houston on January 27, Libya's Ambassador to Washington, Ali Aujali, said the GOL had not ruled out nationalization and characterized a USD 100/barrel price point as "fair". The NOC directed oil companies producing in Libya to cut production by 270,000 barrels per day in compliance to an output-cutting decision adopted by OPEC.
¶3. (C) During the recent visit to Tripoli of Spanish King Juan Carlos I, al-Qadhafi was quoted as saying that " ... if Libya ends up taking this decision, it will be because we don't have any choice". Despite the public threats, MFA Secretary for Arab Affairs (U/S-equivalent) Muhammad Siala told the Spanish delegation that oil production would not be nationalized. In remarks to Spanish daily "El Pais", Spanish energy giant Repsol's President, Antoni Brufau, speculated that al-Qadhafi had been "thinking out loud" (further details septel). A well-connected contact in Tripoli xxxxxxxxxxxx told the Ambassador on January 29 that Ghanem had not taken the press reports or al-Qadhafi's remarks seriously and did not consider nationalization of Libya's oil production as a serious or plausible possibility. Ghanem was "extremely frustrated" that he had not been consulted or informed before al-Qadhafi gave his remarks, and told our contact he was "fed up" and waiting for an opportunity to leave his position at the NOC.
GOL WANTS TO RENEGOTIATE EXISTING PRODUCTION CONTRACTS, INCREASE TRIPOLI 00000071 002.2 OF 003 ITS SHARE
¶4. (C) Part of the issue may be definitional. Although al-Qadhafi has used the phrase "nationalization", he may in fact be signaling more aggressive efforts by the GOl and NOC to secure greater shares of oil produced under existing contracts. During 2008, the NOC renegotiated four existing production contracts with Italy's ENI, Canada's Petro-Canada, a consortium of U.S. Occidental/ Austrian OMV, and a European consortium of Spanish Repsol/French TOTAL/Austrian OMV/ Norwegian Hydro (reftels A, B, C, D). According to a recently-released NOC report, the renegotiated contracts increased the GOL's earnings by USD 5.4 billion last year; the four companies involved also paid USD 3 billion in front-end bonuses, increasing the GOL's take. The renegotiated terms brought those contracts in line with Libya's preferred exploration and production sharing agreement (EPSA) rubric, under which IOC's already producing in Libya have extended their contracts, paid sizeable bonuses and dramatically reduced their production shares to the neighborhood of 10-15 percent. The NOC has repeatedly said it wants to renegotiate its old (i.e., non-EPSA) contracts along EPSA-IV terms, which would allow it to have more than an 80 percentage share.
¶5. (C) The Oasis Group (ConocoPhillips, Marathon, Hess and Occidental), Repsol, Wintershall and Total remain as the foreign producing companies that have not signed the new agreements to align their share percentages with the most recent EPSA-IV configuration. The Oasis Group, whose constituent members' assets and production were nationalized in 1972, agreed in 2005 to pay Libya USD 1.8 billions to return to their previous acreage, which had been held in trust under a "stand fast agreement" for 19 years during the period U.S. sanctions were in effect against Libya. Oasis' contract is for 25 years; the NOC holds a 59.2 percent share, ConocoPhillips and Marathon each have 16.33 percent each, and Hess has an 8.16 percent share. The GOL would like to renegotiate Oasis' contract to increase its share, and has informally signaled that it intends to do so.
¶6. (C) At the same time, industry journals report that the re-negotiated contracts with IOC's will entail investment in exploration and production of some USD 22 billion over the next 5-10 years. Libya would bear up to 50 percent of that financial burden, at a time when it may already have to scale back its infrastructure development projects in light of falling revenues (ref E). The GM of Canada's Verenex (one of the few companies to find new oil under new EPSA's) said nationalization "did not make sense" since the NOC would have to bear bear 100 percent of development and production costs. By way of example, the NOC only bears 50 percent of Verenex's development costs, but gets 87 percent of production revenues.
CLAIMS COMPENSATION FUND CONTRIBUTIONS
¶7. (C) In addition to providing leverage for potential renegotiation of existing contracts, the threat to nationalize may in part be an attempt to prompt IOC's operating in Libya to contribute to the U.S.-Libya claims compensation fund that was implemented in October 2008. Marathon's General Manager (GM) told the Ambassador that the NOC Chairman Shukhri had begun soliciting IOC's again about two weeks ago for contributions to the fund established to compensate U.S. victims of acts of terrorism authored by Libya. The NOC had previously targeted only companies that were producing oil; however, in its most recent approach it also touched IOC's that are in the exploration phase and have not yet begun producing oil. Representatives of Occidental said the company was concerned about press reports, but not overly so. Oxy has received private assurances from Ghanem that nationalization is not the in the offing, and views al-Qadhafi's remarks as posturing to pressure companies to contribute to the fund. GM's of major IOC's here believe that the first-tier producers, who have so far abided by an informal agreement not to accede to demands for contributions, will continue to hold the line; however, there is concern that second-tier producers and perhaps oilfield supply and services companies may buckle under pressure from the NOC and choose to contribute. A second meeting between IOC GM's and Ghanem that was to have occurred on January 28 has been postponed until February 1 or 2, according to Occidental's GM.
PORTENT OF FURTHER UNILATERAL PRODUCTION CUTS BY LIBYA?
¶8. (C) Remarks by al-Qadhafi and other senior GOL officials may also have been intended to establish a context for potential unilateral cuts in Libyan production of oil below levels dictated by OPEC. Three OPEC production cuts since September, TRIPOLI 00000071 003.2 OF 003 most recently a 2.2 million barrel per day cut that went into effect January 1, have failed to slow a slide that has left crude oil prices about 70 percent below the mid-July 2008 price of USD 150 per barrel. Libya directed IOC's in Libya to cut their production by 270,000 barrels per day (Libya's total production is 1.7-1.8 million barrels/day), more than it needed to account for its share of the overall OPEC cut. In his Georgetown remarks, al-Qadhafi flatly said that Libya would not adhere to OPEC's quotas " ... because our livelihood depends on oil". He also suggested that further unilateral production cuts or perhaps even a temporary production freeze could be adopted, although either of those options would result in further declines in revenue at a time when the GOL can ill afford it.
CREATING A DIVERSION IN ADVANCE OF THE UPCOMING GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS?
¶9. (C) Finally, al-Qadhafi's remarks may be part of an effort to prepare regime figures and, to a lesser extent, the Libyan people for the fact that this year's GOL budget, to be introduced at an upcoming session of the General People's Congress (GPC), will be adversely impacted by falling oil revenues and the global financial crisis. As reported ref E, the session planned for January was postponed, in part because the GOL has had to re-calculate the national budget to reflect dramatically reduced oil revenues. A senior MFA official told us that al-Qadhafi, unhappy that widely-publicized infrastructure and development projects designed to demonstrate the Jamahiriya system's benefits, tried to secure funds from Libya's newly-constituted Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to cover budget shortfalls and avoid delaying the projects. The President of the Libyan Investment Authority, which administers the SWF, told the Ambassador that a recently-adopted law prohibits such raids on the fund, and al-Qadhafi appears to have been deterred from doing so (at least for now).
¶10. (C) Comment: Famous for saying the unexpected (a favorite local saying is "from Libya comes the new"), al-Qadhafi did not disappoint with his threat to nationalize Libya's oil production. As with similar dramatic, headline-grabbing statements on various other subjects in the past, though, much of what he says and does represents tactical maneuvering rather than a sincere expression of intent. While it is never wise to rule out the possibility of seemingly irrational decisions by the GOL, we are not inclined to believe that nationalization is being seriously considered. Floating the idea helps leverage the GOL's position with respect to renegotiating existing oil production contracts and (potentially) garnering contributions to the claims compensation fund. More important in the immediate sense, though, is that it clearly signals the extent to which sagging oil prices and the global financial crisis have hurt oil-dependent economies like Libya's, helping pre-empt criticism from abroad if/when Libya makes further unilateral production cuts below OPEC-dictated levels and from regime elements when big ticket development projects are scaled back or cut at the upcoming session of the GPC. In that regard, al-Qadhafi's real intent may have been to shift the goalposts of debate so that the steps he ultimately takes seem palatable by comparison with the specter of what could have been. Well-connected businessman xxxxxxxxxxxx told the Ambassador that he doubted that the GOL would "make the same mistake twice" by nationalizing oil production again, and highlighted the fact that al-Qadhafi attributed authorship of the idea to the BPC's, which would make it easier for him to later disown it. Tellingly, MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Ahmed Fituri told the Ambassador on January 28 that he did not expect nationalization to occur, and had attended a meeting earlier that day in which participants discussed opening a consulate in Houston, in part to better facilitate travel to/from Libya by U.S. oil representatives. End comment.
CRETZ