![Keep Us Strong](../../../static/gfx/ja-cg.jpg)
![WikiLeaks logo](../../../static/gfx/WL_Hour_Glass_small.png)
Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08LONDON1837, FOREIGN OFFICE SEES BROWN-MEDVEDEV TALKS LEADING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08LONDON1837.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08LONDON1837 | 2008-07-10 16:04 | 2011-02-04 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy London |
VZCZCXRO3971
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLO #1837/01 1921638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101638Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9171
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001837
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS PGOV, ECON, ENRG, PREL, UK, RS
SUBJECT: FOREIGN OFFICE SEES BROWN-MEDVEDEV TALKS LEADING
TO WARMER UK-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard M. Mills Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev used their first one-on-one meeting at the G8 summit to build a friendly rapport rather than “score points” on smaller contentious issues, said the Foreign Office (FCO) to members of the diplomatic community. According to the FCO, Brown and Medvedev both expressed frustration at the stalled dialogue between the two governments, and pledged to reopen top-level lines of communication. They agreed on several issues, including support of a post-Kyoto framework, reformation of international institutions, and increased dialogue on climate change. At the same time, the pair did not dwell on more controversial issues, such as Kosovo’s independence and the Litvinenko murder. The FCO,s overall assessment of the meeting was positive, and the FCO’s Russian Office sees in Medvedev a leader more open to domestic liberalization and cooperation with Britain and the West than was his predecessor.
¶2. (SBU) Summary continued. Though the Brown-Medvedev meeting touched on important international issues, the FCO said the most important outcome were signs of a thaw in top-level UK-Russian relations. As an example, they pointed to conversations with the Russian government regarding Zimbabwe and progress in gaining Moscow’s support for some G8 action. Encouraged by the prospects of improving relations under Medvedev, the FCO believes that now may not be the time to renegotiate items such as the Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), and that better agreements with Moscow may be reached later, if Medvedev can successfully liberalize parts of Russian society. End Summary.
Litvinenko
----------
¶3. (C/NF) PM Brown briefly brought up the Litvinenko murder case and the extradition request, and Medvedev apparently sought to bury the matter by referring to it as a “legal issue.” Medvedev said that it was a “sad affair,” but that it should be a matter left to the courts. FCO reported that no transformative dialogue occurred, and that no progress was made on the issue.
¶4. (C/NF) In a separate meeting on the day of the briefing, Cabinet Office Director General Margaret Aldred confirmed to the DCM that the Brown meeting had been “fairly relaxed” and not strained. Aldred said the cost of the fall-out to HMG from the Litvinenko issue was an end to close cooperation with Russian intelligence (FSB) on counterterrorism and other global issues.
Visas and Diplomatic Relations
------------------------------
¶5. (C/NF) Brown and Medvedev made little progress on the issue of diplomatic visas, which are still being restricted by both countries as part of the fall-out from the Litvinenko case. The FCO reported that Medvedev was apparently upset over reports in the British media, appearing the same week as the G8 meeting, on Russian espionage activities in the UK.
¶6. (C/NF) According to the FCO, HMG has had good reasons to refuse many Russian visa requests. HMG officials see a real “intelligence threat from” Russia (in addition to China), and regret a “missed opportunity” in the late 1990s and early 2000s to assess these intelligence threats. FCO officials explained that the Russian government is still restricting visas to UK diplomats, that HMG is not be able to fully staff its embassy in Russia, and that local Russian hires have been harassed by the FSB. Accordingly, HMG is restricting the number of visas issued to Russian officials. The FCO reports that HMG had proposed a deal on easing visa restrictions, but that Russia is requiring that HMG consult with the FSB on any mutual visa agreement. HMG continues to refuse to engage directly with the FSB, pending resolution of the Litvinenko murder case.
British Petroleum
-----------------
¶7. (SBU) Medvedev confirmed to Brown that he had met with Russian shareholders of TNK-BP, and indicated to them that they could seek legal recourse through Russian courts, if they had concerns with how the joint venture was operating.
International Institutions
LONDON 00001837 002 OF 002
--------------------------
¶8. (SBU) Medvedev brought up the need for major reform of international institutions, one of the PM’s main international initiatives. Medvedev told Brown that international financial institutions need to be more engaged in managing the global credit crunch.
British Council
---------------
¶9. (SBU) Medvedev told Brown that while Russia no longer views the British Council in Russia as a “den of spies,” there still exist legal issues regarding the British Council,s activities in Russia. Medvedev implied that politicians are not in a position to discuss what is or is not legal, and that Russian courts will make the final decisions regarding the British Council,s Russian operations.
Kyoto Protocol
--------------
¶10. (SBU) Medvedev indicated to Brown that Russia might be willing to support a 2012 post-Kyoto framework, but expressed concerns about the rapid industrialization of China and India and its potential to undermine any international agreement on carbon emissions.
FCO,s Analysis: Medvedev is not Putin
-------------------------------------
¶11. (C/NF) FCO officials expressed optimism that Medvedev will bring a partial liberalization to Russian political life. They see signs of a slow break with Putin, including the former President,s failure to attend the G8 summit, the retirement of several high-ranking Putin-appointed generals, and the appointment of Antoly Chubais, a liberal and close Medvedev ally, to the presidency of Rosnanotech, which FCO views as a huge “Kremlin slush fund.” On the other hand, several of Putin,s men are still in the upper echelons of the Kremlin, though the FCO believes that they will be removed over the next few years.
¶12. (C/NF) FCO officials said that the EU should hold off on signing a new PCA, which expires at the end of 2008, and wait to see if Medvedev liberalizes parts of Russian society before agreeing to long-term commitments. The FCO stressed that the next few years should be geared towards improving upper-level UK-Russian relations, and that high-level visits are the way forward. HMG is planning several visits to Russia in the fall, and will receive high-level Russian officials early next year.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LeBaron