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Viewing cable 08MEXICO1487, SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT TO MEXICO OF FBI DEPUTY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08MEXICO1487 | 2008-05-16 14:02 | 2011-01-23 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Mexico |
VZCZCXRO6479
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #1487/01 1371454
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 161454Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1886
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 001487
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KCRM SNAR MX
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT TO MEXICO OF FBI DEPUTY
DIRECTOR JOHN S. PISTOLE, MAY 21-23, 2008
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reasons: 1.4 (b),(d).
¶1. (U) Welcome to Mexico City. Mexico is key to USG
success in combating a wide array of transnational security
threats which undermine our ability to confront global
terrorism. A stew of widespread criminality, drug
trafficking, corruption and impunity has created an enabling
environment for a variety of ill-intended elements here.
There is much good news, however: the U.S. - Mexico
relationship on security issues, including counter-terrorism
and counter-narcotics, is excellent and we have no evidence
that foreign terrorist organizations have gained a foothold
here. Equally important, a resolute president is taking
aggressive actions to combat organized crime that will make
Mexico an even more valued partner in years to come. Your
visit here will provide an excellent overview of Mexico's
challenging security environment. While your interlocutors
will have well-defined opinions on the nature of the security
challenges facing Mexico -- that do not always reflect our
own thinking -- engaging them will advance our dialogue
greatly.
Mexico's Security Environment and Commitment
¶2. (U) Mexico remains relatively inhospitable to local and
international terrorist groups intending to operate within
the country. In July and September of 2007, the Popular
Revolutionary Army (EPR), a domestic guerrilla group,
attacked oil and gas pipelines, causing significant economic
damage. Several months ago, this group issue a communiquQ
threatening CISEN, Mexico's civilian intelligence
organization. Attacks, however, are sporadic and it is
doubtful domestic groups have the wherewithal to make an
impact with sustained armed operations. More recently, EPR
and the GOM have been floating possible scenarios under which
they would entertain a dialogue but have yet to reach
agreement.
¶3. (S) Mexican authorities are receptive to concerns raised
by foreign governments regarding potential infiltration by
foreign groups, stepping up security and surveillance when
circumstances warrant, investigating special interest aliens
and taking action against human trafficking and smuggling
operations that might be exploited by terrorists. (A March
2007 procedural change, however, has complicated this
picture. Instead of holding SIAs in one central facility
near the capital, migration authorities now detain and
release such individuals where they are originally found,
complicating our ability to investigate and track them. CBP
has been working with senior migration officials, who are
sympathetic to our concerns. On a positive note, CISEN,
which is our primary interlocutor on counterterrorism, has
allowed USG officers to interview foreign nationals detained
at Mexican immigration detention centers dispersed around the
country for potential CT information of interest.)
¶4. (U) Mexico strengthened its anti-terrorism regime last
year with passage of legislation outlawing terrorist
financing and associated money laundering, significantly
toughening penalties for a variety of terror-related
activities in the process. While the legislation lacked some
important provisions, such as assets forfeiture measures, it
represented a significant step forward in suppressing those
who plan, facilitate, finance or commit terrorist acts. It
is also worth noting, that the judicial reform bill passed in
February includes provisions for asset forfeiture. Money
laundering remains a serious problem and Mexico needs to
dedicate more resources to combat this problem.
¶5. (S) The GOM coordinates well with the USG in a variety of
counter-terror areas. Mexico has begun exploring programs
designed to deter terrorists from using Mexico's seaports as
staging areas for introducing terror-related materials.
Mexico cooperates with USG elements in countering money
laundering activity and its military is actively looking to
gain greater control over its vast maritime zone through
equipment upgrades and counter drug initiatives. CISEN and
DNI's Open Source Center recently negotiated a formal
information sharing arrangement which will permit
subscription to each other's open source products.
¶6. (U) In July 2007, the Mexican Government created the
Specialized High-Level Committee on International
Disarmament, Terrorism, and Security -- otherwise known as
the National Authority -- to "unify, coordinate, design, and
articulate the government of Mexico's public policies to
comply with international obligations on disarmament,
nonproliferation and terrorism." CISEN is the titular head
of the National Authority which is to serve as a coordination
MEXICO 00001487 002 OF 003
entity. The other permanent members include the Foreign
Ministry (SRE), the Finance Ministry, the Defense Ministry
(SEDENA), the Navy (SEMAR), the Attorney General's Office
(PGR), the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP), and the
Transportation and Public Communications Ministry. The
National Authority consists of six permanent working groups
including nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons,
conventional weapons, terrorism, administrative and legal
harmonization and international security. Tasks undertaken
by the working groups include legislative and administrative
harmonization; export controls consultation; development of a
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
(CBRNE) national controls list; the national industry
registrar; industry outreach and awareness; enforcement;
inspection, verification and control; capacity building; and
intelligence sharing.
¶7. (U) Areas of concern remain. Mexico's large territory
and traditionally weak enforcement of the movement of peoples
and goods both at its borders and within Mexico make it a
potential transit point for terrorists intending to launch
attacks against the U.S. Moreover, in recent years,
criminality has taken on a growing presence in Mexico and
engendered concern that the government had lost significant
ground in many locales to narco-cartels. Rampant
lawlessness, widespread corruption and the government's
long-standing inability to confront either had been seen as
troubling threat indicators to those watching our southern
border for signs of potential terrorist infiltration.
Aggressive New Posture on Law Enforcement and Security
¶8. (U) In the past year and a half, however, the GOM has
taken aggressive steps to turn the situation around. Since
taking office, Calderon has launched anti-drug operations in
ten states, raised pay for the military, and replaced
numerous high-ranking federal police officers. He launched
improvements to inter-agency communications and oversaw a
successful effort to pass legislation unifying federal police
forces and reform the judicial system. These enhancements, if
fully implemented, should strengthen the GOM's security
capabilities across the board and make it better able to
confront potential challenges from all manner of ill-intended
non-state actors. For the time being, the government's
aggressive posture has provoked violent struggles within and
among cartels as well as attacks on security personnel
producing record numbers of drug related homicides including
the killing of police and military officials
¶9. (U) Calderon has also placed a high premium on
strengthened law enforcement cooperation with the U.S. which
extends on cases run out of the Attorney General's Office
ranging from child pornography and fugitives to kidnapping
and money laundering. He has significantly expanded the
number of criminal extraditions, instructed key members of
his security team to engage their USG counterparts fully and
worked closely with us to develop a joint approach to
counter-narcotics through such efforts as the Merida
Initiative, a program to provide Mexico with $1.4 billion in
assistance to help it combat organized crime. Post's Office
of the Legal AttachQ has provided Mexico's Public Security
Secretariat (SSP) with training in a variety of fields
including counterterrorism, interview techniques, and
fingerprinting; we also sponsored approximately 60 officials
at FBI Training Academy last year for the LEEDS Course. The
emerging pattern of bilateral cooperation across the board is
highly positive and likely to take on momentum in years to
come.
Old Attitudes Complicate Dialogue on Security Issues
¶10. (U) Despite Mexico's commitment to broaden bilateral
cooperation, there are differences between the U.S. and
Mexican approaches to global affairs to be considered when
seeking dialogue with Mexican interlocutors on security and
foreign policy issues. Mexico is still developing an
"over-the-horizon" view of the world and the potential
security threats it throws up. It does not share our
position on the need for robust, forward-based defense of our
security interests in the Near East or South Asia. It places
less emphasis on the potential threat to the region emanating
from groups such as Al-Qaida. It is less nervous about
Iranian diplomatic, economic and political outreach in the
region than we are.
¶11. (C) Closer to home, Mexico has traditionally sought to
play a regional role that is independent of the U.S. With
the exception of the Fox administration, Mexican governments
-- including Calderon's -- have generally sought to maintain
warm ties with Cuba. Similarly, until recently, the GOM had
MEXICO 00001487 003 OF 003
sought to avoid conflict with the current Venezuelan
government. Mexican officials and citizens alike have viewed
the activities of populist governments, and even certain
armed groups, in the region as relatively benign. One senior
official in Mexico's Foreign Relations Secretariat recently
told us that even the FARC had its "historical context" which
conveyed a certain amount of legitimacy to the organization.
You should remember that Mexicans still view global and
regional security issues through a different prism than we do
when discussing such issues.
¶12. (C) Comment: The Calderon administration has committed
to significantly strengthening the security relationship with
the United States, but remains keen to balance this effort
against its desire to be seen in the region as an influential
-- and independent -- actor. Security cooperation,
particularly in the area of counter terrorism initiatives,
will necessarily be low key for some time to come. That
said, security cooperation in combating organized crime has
never been better. We expect your visit will only reinforce
burgeoning cooperation we are observing across the board when
it comes to law enforcement activities. End Comment.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
and the North AmericanPartnership Blog at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
GARZA