![Keep Us Strong](../../../static/gfx/ja-cg.jpg)
![WikiLeaks logo](../../../static/gfx/WL_Hour_Glass_small.png)
Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07STATE164120, C) EUR DAS KRAMER’S MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07STATE164120.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07STATE164120 | 2007-12-06 15:03 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXRO5450
OO RUEHAG RUEHFL RUEHHT RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #4120/01 3401604
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061545Z DEC 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6507
INFO EUROPE ONLY COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 164120
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: (C) EUR DAS KRAMER’S MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
Classified By: EUR DAS David Kramer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 4, EUR DAS David Kramer met with XXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXX was highly critical of the recent Duma elections, alleging the Kremlin had resorted to all methods to secure an overwhelming victory for United Russia. XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX speculated that Putin would not remain a third term as president, but is nervously trying to secure his future immunity from potential law enforcement investigations into his alleged illicit proceeds. XXXXXXXXXXX argued that the recent anti-western rhetoric that featured in the election campaign did not reflect the views of most Russians and urged the West to continue to assist Russian society in its transformation into something more open, tolerant, and Western. END SUMMARY.
Election Results
----------------
¶2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX expressed pleasant surprise at the sharply critical assessment of the elections leveled by OSCE PA and PACE. XXXXXXXXXXX noted that from everything he had heard prior to the elections, PA and PACE were prepared to offer a positive assessment. XXXXXXXXXXX pointed to tension between OSCE PA and ODIHR, XXXXXXXXXXX He commented that given the many irregularities and fraud that took place during the campaign and on election day, the elections were not legitimate. He acknowledged that the U.S. could not say this, but welcomed any strong public statements the U.S. might make.
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said the reaction across Russia shows that for the educated electorate, the elections left a bad taste and smell. He said the Communist Party was justifiably upset about fraud, as the party,s real results should have been closer to 20 percent in some regions. XXXXXXXXXXX added that the Kremlin had resorted to all methods to secure the vote for Putin and United Russia, mobilizing the homeless, police, falsifying results in regions such as Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the North Caucasus, controlling the media and whipping up hysteria against foreign enemies. However, despite these efforts, Putin, according to XXXXXXXXXXX, suffered poor results, garnering 7 million fewer votes than he did for his presidency four years ago. He argued the regime was undergoing a real crisis as nearly 70 percent of the population, according to Levada polls, did not believe the elections to be free, and the support was one based on loyalty, not genuine support.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX explained the success of LDPR Vladimir Zhirinovskiy by the fact that the Kremlin had forced all other charismatic politicians out of the race (naming Rogozin, Khakamada, and others). He argued that those who didn,t want to vote for United Russia or the Communists voted for Zhirinovskiy as a protest vote. He said that some protest votes also went to Just Russia.
XXXXXXXXXXX
----------------------------------
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX
Succession
----------
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said that popular opinion in Moscow believes that Sergey Ivanov is out of the running for President. He commented that Putin was afraid of Ivanov, deeply distrustful, and that he needed a weaker figure to succeed him instead. He argued that Putin understands that under the system he has created there is no real rule of law and that at any time anyone can be arrested or businesses destroyed. Since Putin reportedly had secret assets tied up abroad (working through proxies like XXXXXXXXXXX) he worried that with a strong successor like Ivanov the tables could be turned on Putin, making him the object of law enforcement investigations and Interpol warnings. XXXXXXXXXXX rejected speculation that Putin would attempt to stay a third term, saying that Putin did not want to be seen as a Central Asian dictator. He asserted instead that Putin would become the head of United Russia and that the party would transform into something akin to the former Communist Party. He noted that the campaign for President had begun and United Russia was, according to Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, prepared to nominate a candidate on December 17. XXXXXXXXXXX dismissed the recent &For Putin8 demonstrations breaking out across the country as long-planned and financed events that were meant to preempt any attempt at a &color revolution8 in Russia.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX noted the effect of a law on the Duma passed two years ago that would allow Putin to decide to take or refuse the Duma mandate not only in the next five days, but also anytime in the next four years. He speculated that this could be done in the interest of gaining immunity as a Duma deputy should Putin want security from his successor. XXXXXXXXXXX argued that this issue, e.g., security, was the driving motivation behind the Kremlin,s heavy-handed approach to electoral manipulation during the Duma elections. XXXXXXXXXXX commented that politically, Putin only trusts his spokesman Aleksey Gromov and Presidential Administration aide Sergey Sobyanin, and possibly the head of the presidential security force, Viktor Zolotov.
Anti-Western Rhetoric
---------------------
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged the large volume of anti-Western rhetoric that has figured prominently in the recent months leading up to the election. However, he said that the Russian public does not necessarily share these sentiments, and is rather more neutral, if not positive, toward the U.S., despite the drumbeat of propaganda. XXXXXXXXXXX argued that Russian society is not aggressive, but instead suffers from passivity and apathy. Nonetheless, XXXXXXXXXXX added, he was optimistic that while the leadership was moving backwards in many senses, society was advancing and transforming into something more open, tolerant, and Western. He encouraged the U.S. to continue to work with society to progress in this direction for the long term. RICE