![Keep Us Strong](../../../static/gfx/ja-cg.jpg)
![WikiLeaks logo](../../../static/gfx/WL_Hour_Glass_small.png)
Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07KABUL3848, AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING: SHIFT TO FOCUSED DISTRICT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KABUL3848.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07KABUL3848 | 2007-11-15 10:10 | 2011-01-23 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO7118
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3848/01 3191054
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151054Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1461
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4279
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3705
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003848
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING: SHIFT TO FOCUSED DISTRICT
DEVELOPMENT
REF: KABUL 3054
Classified By: Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: Since the fall of the Taliban
in 2001, Afghan National Police (ANP) development has lagged
behind that of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Despite the
training of over 70,000 ANP individuals and advances in
equipping and recruiting, the police remain largely
ineffective and corrupt. At the same time, as security
conditions have deteriorated, the proportion of ANP
fatalities has climbed and is now markedly higher than that
of ANA in high threat areas. To enhance ANP effectiveness
both in the counterinsurgency role and in traditional
policing functions, Combined Security Transition Command )
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is working closely with the Ministry of
Interior (MOI), Embassy, ISAF and international community
(IC) donors to launch a new program that will train and
develop whole police units district by district. With MOI
leadership, the Focused District Development (FDD) Program is
a new strategy that seeks to make the district uniformed
police unit the &building block8 for developing the ANP,
emulating to the extent possible the approach that has proven
effective with the ANA.
¶2. (C) District police units will be removed from their
district as a unit for eight weeks training, reequipped, and
paired with a Police Mentoring Team (PMT) for follow-on
training support. Other police units will be put in place to
provide policing during the unit,s training period.
Consultations are also taking place with IRoA officials,
USAID, UNAMA and other IC donors to coordinate the delivery
of governance and development assistance to the districts
selected for FDD. The FDD program is scheduled to begin its
initial training phase in late December, starting with seven
districts in five provinces. There will be challenges to
address as the program goes forward, including shortfalls in
police mentoring teams, accountability, prioritization and
absorptive capacity for assistance while meeting recruiting
goals. But by focusing train-and-equip resources )
including limited numbers of police mentoring teams ) on a
handful of districts at one time, FDD has the potential over
time to provide an effective platform for security,
development and governance advances throughout Afghanistan.
END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
THE FULL FDD CYCLE AND GOALS: RETRAIN, REEQUIP, RENOVATE
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. (C) The FDD program envisions manning, training,
equipping, and providing facilities to an entire district
police unit at one time. Objectives include recruiting to
full authorized levels, replacing ineffective leaders, and
transferring the unit to one of INL,s Regional Training
Centers (RTCs) for training. The full FDD training cycle is
scheduled as follows:
a) assessment and recruiting: approximately 60 days
b) placement of temporary covering security force: 10 days
c) training of district police force ) 8 weeks plus movement
time
d) reinsertion of district police force into district: one
week
e) close PMT overwatch: 2 to 4 months
¶4. (C) CSTC-A's goal under FDD is to train and reform all
police districts in the country in three to four years,
predicated in part on the expectation that the program will
create its own momentum as other districts, seeing enhanced
security and development benefits, will elect to improve
their operations on their own initiative.
KABUL 00003848 002 OF 004
¶5. (C) To allow the staff of an entire police district to be
trained simultaneously, Afghan National Civil Order Police
(ANCOP) companies, supported as necessary in some areas by
ANA units, will temporarily replace the entire district
police force while the latter undergo training.
¶6. (C) Those policemen or new recruits who have not had any
training would receive the basic course; policemen who have
already attended the basic course would attend a newly
developed advanced course; and senior officers (second
lieutenant and above) within the district would go through an
officers, course, also newly developed by INL-contracted
civilian police mentors assigned to CSTC-A and approved by
the INL/NAS office in Kabul. All courses are eight weeks in
length. To enhance unit coherence, all ranks will be brought
together in the final week of instruction to train and work
as a single unit. PMTs will remain with the district police
during their time at the Regional Training Center,
supplementing the INL courses with additional and
reinforcement training as required.
¶7. (C) District police units, equipment and vehicles will be
assessed for usability; after the training period, their
equipment will either be returned, refurbished, or replaced
at the end of the course. Even as their weapons are
evaluated for usability, trainees will continue to receive
training with the same type of weapon. At the same time,
CSTC-A and MOI will work in the trainees, home district to
improve facilities, establish connectivity with other
elements of the security sector, and establish both formal
and informal working relationships with local leaders.
¶8. (C) Once the district police complete the eight-week
training cycle, they will return to their district and
reassume their duties. As police units are returned home,
ANCOP units will also remain for a short transition period.
CSTC-A-sponsored PMTs, composed of professional police and
military experts, will remain full time for at least two to
four months with the newly-trained and equipped district
police units.
¶9. (C) In preparation for the initial training phase, CSTC-A
is sending regional assessment teams in mid-November to all
first-tranche districts. Led by an MOI general officer and
the PMT, and consisting of interagency U.S., Afghan
government (IRoA) and IC experts, the teams will assess the
police force, the status of rule of law and governance in the
districts, to determine the number of new recruits, specific
training, equipment, facilities, and other supporting
requirements needed, and to shape the evolution of rule of
law and governance in the district, as well as the linkage to
the provincial government.
--------------------------------------------- ---
DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS TO FOLLOW ENHANCED SECURITY
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶10. (C) Consultations are also taking place with IRoA
officials, USAID, UNAMA and other IC donors to coordinate the
delivery of development and governance assistance to the
districts selected for FDD. This will ensure that as
regional security is enhanced, districts will benefit
directly from energy, infrastructure, rule of law and other
programs that U.S. and allied Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) will help local and regional officials to coordinate.
Ghulam Jelani Popal, the new Director General of the
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and who
reports directly to President Karzai (reftel), has expressed
keen interest in the FDD program. Post is seeking to
facilitate consultations between IDLG and CSTC-A on how FDD
can strengthen local governance in Afghanistan and how the
KABUL 00003848 003 OF 004
FDD program can be linked to Popal's proposal for
district-based local self-defense forces and other governance
initiatives.
-----------------------
FIRST TRANCHE DISTRICTS
-----------------------
¶11. (C) FDD training of the first selected district police
units is scheduled to start in late December, with each full
cycle taking approximately six to eight months for
completion, including monitoring, reassessment, retraining,
and sustainment training. CSTC-A consulted closely with ISAF
HQ, the ISAF Regional Commands, MOI HQ and senior police
officials in developing recommendations to present to
Interior Minister Zarar for choosing the first tranche of
districts. In addition to MOI input on political and
policing factors, ISAF operational planning considerations
will be a significant concern for the first two FDD cycles,
in order to complement -- and not complicate -- other planned
operations. As FDD planning extends further into the future,
it will instead help shape ISAF operational planning and more
readily synchronize with specific development and governance
projects for identified districts.
¶12. (C) The districts chosen for the first training cycle
include:
(a) Qalat, Shah Joy, and Tarang wa Jaldak districts in Zabul
province;
(b) Zurmat in Paktia province;
(c) Tag Ab in Kapisa Province;
(d) Chahar Dara in Kunduz province;
(e) Bala Buluk in Farah Province.
With the exception of Chahar Dara in the relatively quiet
north, these districts pose varying levels of security
challenges, including key strategic infrastructure (e.g., the
ring road running through the three Zabul districts), known
Taliban transit points (Tag Ab, Zurmat), or significant
political import (Bala Buluk lies adjacent to three districts
recently overrun by Taliban forces in Farah).
----------------
CHALLENGES AHEAD
----------------
¶13. (C) MOI officials, initially slow to warm to the FDD
concept, are becoming more involved and actively welcoming
the program. Interior Minister Zarar is taking an active
lead, and this has translated down the ranks; however,
broadening MOI and government-wide support will depend on
achieving early successes in the first seven trial districts.
¶14. (C) The PMTs will play a key role in the FDD program,
including the assessment and validation of the newly-trained
district police units, as well as subsequent periodic
reassessments and retraining. As critical as PMTs are to the
success of police training, personnel resources have thus far
not been available to meet CSTC-A,s request for 2,500
additional military and civilian police mentors to staff the
PMTs throughout the country. These would augment the police
trainers and mentors already working in Afghanistan. At
present, CSTC-A covers this personnel shortfall by
concentrating on approximately one third of districts,
including having a single PMT conduct area coverage of
several districts in some cases. FDD, however, will require
KABUL 00003848 004 OF 004
concentration on specific districts since PMTs will not have
the option of spreading efforts over multiple districts.
¶15. (C) CSTC-A has been consulting with IC players, in
particular the EU Police mission (EUPOL), to build IC support
for the concept and to tap IC resources. EU-member state
embassy contacts tell us they find FDD a credible approach to
putting police development back on track; however, it is
unclear how much concrete support international partners are
willing to lend to the plan. CSTC-A remains open to
incorporating EU police trainers into CSTC-A-sponsored PMTs,
but EU interlocutors have been hesitant, noting that it would
require a change to the EUPOL mandate to place EU police
mentors at the district level, and may have implications for
broader NATO-EU relations. Some individual nations, such as
Norway and Canada, have offered assistance outside of the
EUPOL mandate, and CSTC-A welcomes such assistance because it
is not constrained by EUPOL limitations.
¶16. (C) Corruption remains a concern. Simultaneously with
FDD, CSTC-A will press ahead on separate timelines to
complete in the next six months the issuance of
identification cards to all ANP, ensure all police districts
are using the electronic payment system, and maximize where
possible the payment of salaries through electronic
transfers. FDD will provide an opportunity to press forward
with rank and pay reform and ANP pay parity with the ANA
which, despite having been approved by the international
community in September, have not yet been fully implemented
-- or have been implemented inconsistently -- in many
districts. Also, the presence of PMTs for 2-4 months
following the group training will not only ensure sustainment
training, but will also provide a crucial reinforcement of
accountability requirements for U.S.-provided equipment.
Following the completion of initial training in the
districts, we will have to assess the priority development
and governance needs, and the absorptive capacity of the
districts.
¶17. (C) A critical issue identified in the CSTC-A concept of
operations will be the removal or neutralization of corrupt,
criminal and/or inept district police chiefs. Afghan legal
constraints bar the outright removal of officers except in
the case of a judicial finding, which is a slow and
unreliable process. CSTC-A,s JAG team has prepared a draft
MOI disciplinary instruction that is currently under review
within the MOI; in it, alternative approaches are explored
that could include suspension without pay, demotion by up to
two ranks, and involuntary retirement. Even if new
disciplinary measures are approved, it will remain a
challenge to empower MOI officials to impose discipline
involving rank or pay in the face of inevitable interference
from outside or senior influences. In addition, district ANP
patrolmen are often loyal to their chiefs on the basis of
tribal and other personal relationships. When their district
commanders are either removed or quit, ANP personnel have
sometimes deserted or abandoned their posts as a consequence.
¶18. (C) CSTC-A is working with the MOI on other personnel
issues. FDD success will depend on the ability of the MOI to
recruit new personnel into the ANP. A September 2007 CSTC-A
survey of about 76 percent of police districts indicated a
shortfall of some 5,500 personnel from authorized billets.
With advice from CSTC-A mentors, MOI recruiters are
redoubling their efforts to hire additional recruits. It
will also be critical to ensure that the pace of ANCOP
recruitment and training is maintained, to ensure sufficient
ANCOP strength to provide the back-fill police presence as
district units undergo their two-month training period out of
their district.
WOOD