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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS3178, CHIRAC/VILLEPIN/SARKOZY AND THE CLEARSTREAM SCANDAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS3178 | 2006-05-12 16:04 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
VZCZCXRO3046
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #3178/01 1321615
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121615Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7305
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 003178
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV FR EUN PINR
SUBJECT: CHIRAC/VILLEPIN/SARKOZY AND THE CLEARSTREAM SCANDAL
REF: A. PARIS POINTS OF 5/2 - 5/11
¶B. PARIS 3152
Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (C) Summary. As ref A Paris Points document, the
"Clearstream" scandal has become a classic French "affaire
d'etat," a scandal which threatens the life of the government
and the careers of many leading political, judicial, and even
military figures. Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin
continues to occupy the position of chief presumed villain,
as the prime force, if not necessarily the original
instigator, behind false allegations that Interior Minister
Sarkozy had received kickbacks through the Luxembourg
Clearstream bank. The most recent revelations are likely to
result in increased pressure for Villepin's resignation, not
least because President Chirac could decide he has no choice
but to dispose of his Prime Minister and erstwhile political
heir in order to protect himself. The calculations are
complicated for Interior Minister Sarkozy, but his choices
may be narrowing, as it becomes less tenable for him to
succeed Villepin given new allegations that Chirac may have
been complicit in a campaign to persecute him. The
cumulative effect of the revelations of the past week may
push him to leave a much weakened and divided government
considerably earlier than anticipated. This, in turn, raises
the specter of the president of the dominant party of the
center-right running what in effect would be an opposition or
counter-government while members of his own party still
control the Presidency and run the government. The spectacle
of an increasingly divided and scandal-ridden right will of
course redound primarily to the advantage of the opposition
Socialist party. End summary.
Background of a growing political crisis
----------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Rumors that kickbacks from France's 1991 sale of
frigates to Taiwan were being deposited in the Luxembourg
banking house Clearstream have muddied the waters since about
¶2001. But they did not take on political significance until
2004, when then-Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin -- as
he now readily admits -- asked one of France's top
spymasters, then working in the Defense Ministry, to
investigate a list of accounts purportedly held by a number
of France's top political figures. Most prominent among
these was current Interior Minister, center-right UMP party
president and leading presidential contender Nicolas Sarkozy,
who however is also regarded by President Chirac and his
protege Villepin as their primary political adversary.
¶3. (SBU) Although the spymaster quickly determined that the
listings had been falsified, they were subsequently forwarded
anonymously to a judge for further legal inquiries. But most
importantly, no one bothered to tell Sarkozy that he had been
investigated -- and cleared -- until 2005. The slow-fused
time bomb began to tick when Sarkozy took over the Interior
Ministry last summer and grabbed the opportunity to find out
more about what had transpired behind his back. The bomb
finally exploded this month, as questions mounted about who
had done what, and known what, when, and as the leading
center-left daily, Le Monde, and then other media, began to
carry leaked information about the immaculate notebooks kept
by the spymaster, which recorded not only dates of critical
meetings but provided intriguing details about the substance
of the meetings. (Note: Please see ref A Paris Points for a
more detailed discussion of these developments.)
Involving the Prime Minister, perhaps the President
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶4. (SBU) Villepin was subjected to an initial eruption of
public indignation that forced him to acknowledge his role in
ordering the investigations. He, and indirectly Chirac,
appeared to have survived this initial wave when he finally
acknowledged that he had indeed ordered the investigations in
his role as then-foreign minister, insisted that he had only
sought "verification" of the falsified listings, was not
focused on a political witch-hunt, and insisted that Chirac
had had absolutely no role in or knowledge of the
investigations. Shortly thereafter, Chirac took to the
airwaves to express his full confidence in Villepin and his
government. Villepin gave the impression of thinking the
worst was over, and Sarkozy appeared content to remain in the
government at least until justice had been allowed to run its
course.
¶5. (SBU) That uneasy calm ended on May 12 when Le Monde
published further entries from the spymaster's notebooks.
They cite Chirac's desire for direct contact between the
spymaster and Villepin; indicate that Chirac was kept
informed of the spymaster's reports through meetings with his
chief military advisor; document Villepin's insistence on
continuing the investigation of Sarkozy even after the
spymaster had concluded that the Clearstream listings
PARIS 00003178 002 OF 003
implicating Sarkozy were false; chronicle defense minister
Alliot-Marie's anger over the spymaster's ties with Villepin
over her head but also her decision not to get involved (or
inform Sarkozy); and identify a Villepin confidant as the
likely source of the falsifications. While the revelations
do not answer the question of whether Villepin, or eventually
Chirac, instigated the falsifications or simply attempted to
exploit them for maximum political advantage, another entry
notes that Villepin believed that public knowledge of their
roles would be extremely damaging.
Political Stakes Growing
------------------------
¶6. (C) Although Chirac has objected to a "dictatorship of
rumors" and insisted that the facts of the Clearstream affair
be determined through longer, legal evidentiary proceedings
rather than snap judgments about unsubstantiated leaks to the
media, the new revelations have far-reaching repercussions
for the current government, the governing UMP party of which
Sarkozy is president, and the 2007 presidential elections.
In such a high-stakes environment, it is likely that
political judgments will ultimately hold sway over legal
niceties. But the calculations are especially difficult ones
for Sarkozy:
-- The latest revelations will increase the pressure on
Villepin to resign, given his apparently increasingly direct
and obsessive role in seeking to smear Sarkozy.
-- To the extent that circumstantial evidence builds against
Villepin, Chirac will come under increasing pressure to
reverse his support of Villepin and request his resignation.
That still seems unlikely at this stage, given the record of
Chirac's past, tenacious support. If, however, it were the
only way for Chirac to protect himself from further damage
from the scandal, he could drop Villepin.
-- In that regard, it is conventional wisdom that under
almost no circumstances would Chirac dissolve the parliament
and call early elections, a choice he made in 1997 -- under
far more favorable circumstances -- to disastrous effect.
-- The calculations are perhaps the most complicated for
Sarkozy. He had planned to leave the government later in the
year or in early 2007, following his selection as the party's
presidential candidate. In the early stages of the current
crisis, even when it was clear that Villepin was the probable
instigator of the smear campaign against him, Sarkozy was
prepared to let the judicial investigation run its course,
effectively "postponing" a final judgment about whether to
remain in the government. This would have allowed him to
maintain the fiction of working together with other members
of the government while keeping a distance through his
forward-looking policy pronouncements as president of the
UMP, the main party of the right.
-- However, this fiction was largely predicated on Chirac's
non-involvement in Clearstream and a minimum of plausible
deniability for Villepin. If it turns out that both were
plotting against him -- and that's where the latest
revelations are leading public opinion -- Sarkozy can no
longer even consider taking over as prime minister. Instead,
he will likely be forced to leave the government to protect
his own integrity and counter Socialist Party charges that he
is a "false victim" at once associated with and different
from Villepin and Chirac.
-- If Sarkozy does leave the government, this would create a
scenario in which he, and most of the governing party with
him, would effectively be cast in a role of in-house
opposition to the government. Governance would likely be
limited to day-to-day management, and major initiatives would
have to await the outcome of the April 2007 elections and the
new mandate they would provide.
-- It goes almost without saying that a Sarkozy withdrawal
from the government would weaken the center-right and improve
the chances of the Socialist Party (PS) to win the 2007
elections. The PS is going on record by tabling a censure
motion of the government, to be voted May 16, but it has an
interest in Sarkozy's remaining in the government so as
better to tar Sarkozy the Presidential Candidate with the
Chirac/Villepin brush.
Comment
-------
¶7. (C) The farce factor is particularly high in this scandal
given the detailed, personalized nature of the daily leaks to
the media. However, the political stakes are high and the
likely consequences increasingly serious. Sarkozy has a good
record in walking a fine line between defiance of and
cooperation with Villepin and Chirac; confonding the
expectations of many, he emerged from last Fall's unrest in
PARIS 00003178 003 OF 003
the suburbs and this Spring's demonstrations against the
First Employment Contract stronger than before. While we
have no doubt that he will also survive this crisis with his
own integrity intact, the prospects for the center-right in
the 2007 elections have undoubtedly been damaged. Sarkozy's
challenge will be to break from Chirac and Villepin in a way
that does not further damage them, in a situation where not
only the opposition Socialist Party, but perhaps Chirac and
Villepin, would prefer anyone to him.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton