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Viewing cable 06REYKJAVIK118, ICELAND: 3/30-3/31 TALKS SET STAGE FOR NEW
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06REYKJAVIK118 | 2006-03-31 18:06 | 2011-01-13 05:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Reykjavik |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRK #0118/01 0901822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311822Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2676
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0198
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000118
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
OSLO FOR DATT AND ODC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS IC
SUBJECT: ICELAND: 3/30-3/31 TALKS SET STAGE FOR NEW
DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
REF: REYKJAVIK 107
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CAROL VAN VOORST, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: A U.S. interagency delegation met in
Reykjavik 3/30-31 with senior Icelandic officials to describe
the operational framework for the defense of Iceland
following the upcoming realignment of Naval Air Station
Keflavik (NASKEF). The Icelandic delegation expressed keen
interest in U.S. proposals for enhanced security cooperation
and pressed for additional details in the interest of
generating a defense plan that could shortly be explained to
the Icelandic people. The U.S. promised a EUCOM briefing in
April on a new plan for the defense of Iceland, and assured
the Icelanders that the departure of fighter jets would not
create a gap in coverage. Although the Icelanders reiterated
their disappointment at the U.S. pullout, the tone was
essentially cordial and cooperative, with no indication that
the Icelanders would seriously consider abrogation of the
1951 Defense Agreement. That said, the Icelandic trust that
the U.S. team sought to shore up is fragile, and maintaining
a collaborative atmosphere will depend on our ability to come
through with a reassuring and detailed EUCOM plan. As the
Icelanders pointed out, we have yet to delve into the murky
depths of base closure issues - another challenge State and
DOD must come to grips with shortly. End summary.
--------------
U.S. proposals
--------------
¶2. (C) The Ambassador led a team from the Departments of
State and Defense that briefed senior Icelandic foreign
affairs and public safety officials in meetings held in
Reykjavik March 30-31, two weeks after the U.S. announcement
that NASKEF would close at the end of the fiscal year.
Assuring the Icelanders that the U.S. commitment to Icelandic
defense under the 55-year-old bilateral Defense Agreement
remained solid, the U.S. briefers discussed concrete ways in
which the U.S. would counter 21st century threats minus a
permanent on-island presence:
-- Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James
Townsend provided the historical context for the shift in
force posture as the U.S. in Iceland
seeks to replace "a one-dimensional response to a threat that
no longer exists."
-- Defense Intelligence Agency Senior Intelligence Officer
James Danoy enumerated mechanisms available for bilateral
intelligence sharing and offered to help Reykjavik "plug in"
to the NATO intelligence structure.
-- Brigadier General Richard Mills, EUCOM Deputy Director for
Plans and Operations, described European Command's
contemporary mission and
capabilities, laying out the ability of an expeditionary
EUCOM to respond rapidly and decisively to threats to
Iceland.
-- Brigadier General Thomas Coon, Mobilizations Assistant to
the Director, Operational Plans and Joint Matters, HQ USAF,
discussed how the Air
Force can support EUCOM and NATO in providing warfighting
capabilities for Iceland appropriate to the changing
strategic environment.
-- Responding to Iceland,s request for information, Lt.
Colonel Troy Edgell, Country Program Director, Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, explained search and rescue
(SAR) procurement options via direct commercial sale and
Foreign Military Sale as well as estimated Icelandic
requirements and costs.
-- State Department Iceland Desk Officer John Maher reviewed
the recent history and potential growth of U.S.-Iceland
non-defense security
cooperation.
¶3. (C) At the conclusion of the 3/31 session, EUR DAS Mark
Pekala presented a 32-point distillation of concrete offers
of strengthened cooperation made by the briefers, including:
-- strategic intelligence partnership (including through
Icelandic access to NATO intel networks; bilateral expert
talks; joint intelligence assessments; intelligence officer
training; and a formal bilateral intelligence exchange
agreement);
-- exercises, ship visits, short-term deployments, and combat
air patrols from bases outside Iceland;
-- Icelandic orientation visits to U.S. and NATO defense
headquarters and installations;
-- Icelandic participation in the Foreign Military Sales
program to enable cost-effective procurement of SAR assets;
-- non-military security training, e.g. on contraband
enforcement, Internet forensic investigations, transnational
money laundering, natural disaster
response, and emerging and pandemic disease response;
-- enhanced Coast Guard exchanges and training, and
partnering the U.S. Coast Guard's New England region with
Iceland. (Note: This point amplified a presentation by U.S.
Coast Guard Commandant ADM Thomas Collins, who had met with
Iceland Coast Guard Director Georg Larusson and Ministry of
Justice Deputy Permanent Secretary Stefan Eiriksson at
Keflavik March 28. End note.)
------------------
Icelandic concerns
------------------
¶4. (C) The Icelandic side was noncommittal on specific U.S.
suggestions and made none of its own. It did affirm its
willingness to review an umbrella defense plan for Iceland
that European Command expects to have ready by the end of
April. Ambassador Albert Jonsson, Advisor to Iceland's
Minister for Foreign Affairs and chair of the Icelandic
delegation, urged the U.S. side to provide substantive and
readily understandable proposals that the GOI could put
forward to the Icelandic public as evidence that Washington
continues to guarantee Iceland's security. He also requested
that the U.S. provide, in the course of upcoming follow-up
meetings:
-- a clear picture of the size and shape of the U.S. military
footprint that will remain on the Agreed Area at the end of
September (adding that some U.S. presence would be important
both practically and politically);
-- a timetable for bilateral discussions between now and the
base closure;
-- information on how the U.S. intends to maintain and
monitor its military infrastructure on the Agreed Area after
September 30;
-- information on how the U.S. intends to carry out its
responsibilities as host nation for the NATO infrastructure
on the base;
-- an answer as to whether the Navy special communications
facility at Grindavik will remain. (The U.S. side responded
that the tentative plan is to
convert to a contractor-run facility.)
¶5. (C) Icelandic MFA Defense Department Director Jon Egill
Egilsson asked the U.S. to establish a mechanism for
resolving base transition issues, including the timing of the
handover of facilities on the Agreed Area. The U.S.
delegation promised responses to these Icelandic concerns at
the next round of consultations.
¶6. (C) Comment: Over the course of two days of discussion,
Jonsson went from complaints of Iceland,s abandonment by the
U.S. to a more constructive acknowledgement that the U.S.
takes its responsibilities for Iceland,s defense seriously
and is deliberately working through the issues of responding
decisively and quickly to potential threats. This counts as
a significant step forward insofar as it clears the air for
discussion of specific ways in which the U.S. and Iceland can
work together as modern strategic partners. That said, the
Icelandic trust has been bruised, and maintaining a
collaborative atmosphere will depend on our ability to come
through with a reassuring and detailed EUCOM plan. We will
also have to keep the pressure on the Icelanders to become
active partners in the areas of cooperation that the team
outlined for them. Moreover, as Jonsson,s questions
underscore, we have yet to delve into the murky depths of
base closure issues - another challenge State and DOD must
come to grips with shortly. End comment.
van Voorst