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Viewing cable 06PARIS1031, SEGOLENE ROYAL DISCUSSES STRATEGY FOR 2007, TRIP
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS1031 | 2006-02-17 16:04 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001031
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: SEGOLENE ROYAL DISCUSSES STRATEGY FOR 2007, TRIP
TO U.S. WITH AMBASSADOR
REF: A. (A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 17
¶B. 2006
¶C. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 10
¶D. (C) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 6
¶E. (D) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR JANUARY 20
¶F. (E) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR DECEMBER 19
¶G. 2005
¶H. (F) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 23
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 8 meeting with Ambassador,
Socialist Party (PS) presidential hopeful, current media
darling and president of the Poitou-Charentes region Segolene
Royal left no doubt as to her determination to win election
as president of France in 2007. She matter-of-factly
assessed her high poll numbers, expressing the conviction
that her focus on family, school, and social services issues,
along with her popularity among ordinary people, make her a
potent political force. (Current polls show that Royal could
make a formidable candidate in France's presidential
election, now 14 months away. These polls show she is one of
only two or three contenders that over half of voters now say
they could be willing to vote for as president.) Conceding
that "polls are not elections (ref D)" but adding that "they
stop being in error about six months before the elections,"
Royal expressed optimism that her popularity would hold until
then -- and for six months thereafter, notwithstanding the
predictions of pundits to the contrary. Royal went to
considerable lengths to express her openness and friendliness
towards the U.S. and mentioned the possibility of visiting
Washington during an upcoming trip to New York to speak at
Columbia University. End summary.
A DISARMINGLY DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) In her discussion with Ambassador Stapleton and
Embassy officers on February 8, Segolene Royal lived up to
her image as an uncommonly charismatic, subtle and determined
politician. She very matter-of-factly reviewed her
sustained, high poll numbers (ref C) and made no bones about
her intention to pursue the presidency so long as "other
people think it's possible for me." Unaffectedly applying to
herself the term "willful" often used about her by
detractors, Royal said she was determined to stay in the
presidential race until eliminated or victorious. (Comment:
According to a recent biography of Royal, she wanted to test
the waters by running in 2002, and rues having allowed
herself to be discouraged from doing so by fellow PS
heavyweights. In this biographer's account, she is
determined to stay in there to the end this time around. End
comment.)
"I'M THE ONE TO BEAT" FOR THE PS NOMINATION
-------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Royal betrayed no qualms about her ability to shape
to her benefit the process that is leading to the PS's
selection of a candidate for 2007 by primary vote among party
members next November. In contrast to her public remarks
about securing the PS nomination, where she often quotes
former president Mitterrand in saying that, in politics "you
have to give time to time," Royal was much more direct with
the Ambassador, shrugging off the chances of her more senior
rivals in the PS by pointing out that, "I'm the one to beat."
(Note: Among PS party members, who will be the only voters
in next November's party primary, Royal's current popularity
ratings nearly double those of her nearest rival, former
prime minister Lionel Jospin. The popularity of Royal, as a
potential presidential standard bearer has risen steadily
among party members since last summer (ref F). Among the
public at large, she also far outpaces Jospin and other PS
heavyweights in current polls as the most preferred PS
presidential candidate. End Note.)
¶4. (C) Royal said that the attraction of winning -- with her
as the standard-bearer most clearly able to deliver victory
-- was a powerful galvanizer of opinion among party members.
She judged that her relatively junior standing as a party
leader and alleged lack of qualifications need not stand in
the way of her garnering enough support to win from among the
party's 130,000 card-carrying members. Briefly reviewing her
electoral and governmental record, she believed her
experience was more than adequate to overcome any qualms
party members (and thereafter, voters) might have about it.
(Note and comment: Royal has been elected to the National
Assembly four times; has served junior minister for the
environment, junior minister for elementary education and
junior minister for families, children and the handicapped.
Most recently (in 2004) she won the presidency of the
Poitou-Charentes region, beating the hand-picked candidate of
then Prime Minister Raffarin. Royal's is a distinguished
record of achievement and experience. What issue there may
be over her qualifications within the PS has to be seen in
light of, for example, former prime minister Laurent Fabius'
experience as prime minister, president of the National
Assembly, head of the PS party group in the National
Assembly, minister of economy and finance and regular
re-election to parliament since 1978. Since the February 8
meeting, it has become obvious that former prime minister
Jospin, in many ways the party's most senior figure, is
actively seeking the nomination (ref A). End Note and
comment.)
GOLD-PLATED IMAGE PLUS FAMILIES-SCHOOLS-NEIGHBORHOODS
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶5. (C) Royal outlined a carefully crafted strategy designed
to cast her as the candidate of safe change -- i.e., the
candidate who answers best French voters' simultaneous
eagerness for change and fear of it. Royal said that she
believed "people want a new kind of political discourse."
This conviction, she continued, was prompting her to skip the
political talk shows and deliberately focus instead on the
family, school and environmental issues that are her strength
and "are what matter most to ordinary people." She argued
that her focus on "soft" social services issues, coupled with
her very positive public image, her sterling center-left
credentials and proven effectiveness as a grass-roots
politician, make her a potent political force. Royal said
that the core of her candidacy is "having the courage to have
confidence in the voters."
NOT A LOT OF POLICY SPECIFICITY
-------------------------------
¶6. (C) Royal spoke in very general, indeed, rather vague,
terms about what she stands for as a presidential candidate.
(Comment: Given her popularity, it is probably not in her
interest to furnish policy prescriptions at this time lest
she alienate potential supporters. End comment.) She
described a crisis of confidence among ordinary French people
who, she said, "are prey to a feeling of decline." She
evoked how prospects for those in the middle class are
shrinking, for their children even more so. She pointed to
narrowing the quality gap between France's elite schools and
its regular schools and universities as key to
re-invigorating upward mobility in French society. She also
criticized the Villepin government's emphasis on employment
as the engine of upward mobility, lamenting the
"destabilizing effects" for family life of the increased job
insecurity implicit in many of the government's employment
initiatives. Royal said that she would like "to lead a
national project" that would succeed by renewing "hope in the
people." Implicitly addressing criticism directed against
the absence of a program, Royal noted that the successful
record of the Jospin government didn't prevent him from
losing in his bid for the presidency in 2002, concluding that
"you don't win elections on your record or your program" but
rather on the expectations generated by a candidacy.
OPENNESS TO THE U.S.
--------------------
¶7. (C) Though she did not dwell on foreign policy issues,
Royal did make an effort to convey openness towards the U.S.
Echoing the remarks of other political interlocutors across
the board, she duly noted her opposition to the U.S. invasion
of Iraq but went to considerable length in assuring the
Ambassador that a socialist government would "never have
actively campaigned against the U.S. in Africa," for example,
and would have handled differences in a more understanding
and less confrontational manner than President Chirac and
then-FM de Villepin. Royal recalled, with evident fondness,
her work organizing the 1981 Versailles Summit between
Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand. This was her first
experience with presidential-level diplomacy and apparently
involved liaising with the U.S. Secret Service; Royal
expressed her surprise, at the time, discovering the massive
logistical underpinnings required by such events. Royal also
made clear, through a reference to watching "Desperate
Housewives," that she did not reject American popular
culture. Royal did not augment her friendly sentiments
toward the U.S. with any vision for U.S.-France relations.
She did suggest a need "to find France's place in the world,"
with the GoF showing less arrogance in how it speaks to the
world. The latter factor, she suggested, had played a role
in the defeat of France's 2012 Olympics candidacy.
¶8. (U) Royal said she would be visiting the U.S. soon,
probably in the context of accepting an invitation to speak
at Columbia University in New York this spring. She
mentioned the possibility of also visiting Washington at that
time. The Ambassador said he would be pleased to work with
her and her staff to design an appropriate program.
COMMENT
-------
¶9. Royal clearly believes her determination, concern for
ordinary people and uncommon mix of strengths as a candidate
make her a real contender, notwithstanding the predictions of
pundits and her political rivals that the "Segolene
phenomenon" will not last. Opponents, whether from
center-right (with the exception of Interior Minister
Sarkozy) or her own center-left, either insist on her
"unfitness" for the job (ref D) or suggest she is a stalking
horse for a "draft" of former PM Jospin. Although it is not
unfair to be skeptical about Royal's staying power or even
her qualifications, it is also true that much of the
disparagement of her stems from envy of the popularity of a
female upstart, who is also challenging the unwritten rules
of the political establishment. It is also undeniable that
Royal has managed to tap into the feelings of an electorate
looking for change.
¶10. Royal appeared to be well disposed towards the U.S.
That said, as is the case for many on the left of the French
political spectrum, it would be a mistake to translate a high
comfort level with American culture into approval for a wide
range of U.S. polices, foreign and domestic. Royal has only
made brief trips to the U.S. as a tourist. End comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton