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Viewing cable 05BRASILIA3116, BRAZILIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON VENEZUELAN ARMS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05BRASILIA3116 | 2005-11-28 20:08 | 2011-01-21 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Brasilia |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T BRASILIA 003116
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PARM BR VE
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON VENEZUELAN ARMS
TRANSFER POLICY
REF: A) BRASILIA 3074 B) STATE 207628
Classified By: Charge Patrick Linehan, 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (S) Foreign Ministry Undersecretary-General for
Cooperation and Brazilian Communities Abroad Ruy Nunes Pinto
Nogueira called the Charge to the Foreign Ministry November
28 to respond to the demarche delivered by then Charge
Chicola on November 22 concerning the new U.S. policy
concerning arms transfers to Venezuela (Ref A). Nogueira
said FM Celso Amorim had read the report of the November 22
meeeting when he returned from abroad, and because of the
importance of the issue to Brazil, asked Nogueira to deliver
the Brazilian response immediately, in place of the
Secretary-General, who was out of town.
SIPDIS
¶2. (S) Nogueira noted that President Lula had raised the
issue of the sale of Super Tucano planes to Venezuela with
President Bush during their November 6 meeting at Granja do
Torto in Brasilia. He said that President Bush had
reportedly been quite positive to the presentation, and had
promised to examine the subject sympathetically. Nogueira,
reading from the Brazilian Government report of the November
6 session, said President Bush had expressed concern about
the possible sale of the planes to Venezuela and said there
could be opposition to the sale in Congress because of the
high percentage of U.S. components in the planes, and in view
of Chavez' actions. However, President Bush had concluded
that "We have to be prudent. We don't need to take a
decision right here at this table." Nogueira said the last
two sentences were a direct quote of President Bush's words.
¶3. (S) Nogueira added that, after the meeting with President
Lula, FM Amorim had personally provided a non-paper to
Secretary Rice. Nogueira told the Charge that Secretary Rice
SIPDIS
had agreed to look into the matter and respond as soon as
possible. Nogueira gave the Charge a copy of the non-paper
in English, the text of which is in paragraph six.
¶4. (S) Nogueira told the Charge that, aside from the
financial concerns Brazil had about the possible cancellation
of the Super Tucano sale, Brazil believes Chavez has the
option to buy the same, or better aircraft from other buyers,
mentioning Russia as an example. Brazil would not like to
see Venezuela procure a plane from outside the hemisphere,
and is worried that the purchase of a more advanced plane
from the Russians or others would cause an imbalance among
the air forces of South America. Finally, he claimed that if
the sale were allowed to go forward, and the U.S. and/or
Brazil later decided it to be no longer convenient to allow
Chavez to deploy the aircraft, the U.S. or Brazil could
ground the fleet by denying support and/or spare parts, just
as the U.S. had done in the case of the Venezuelan F-16s.
¶5. (S) Nogueira concluded by saying that the Foreign
Ministry would be tasking the Brazilian Embassy in Washington
with obtaining a reply to the non-paper that FM Amorim gave
to Secretary Rice on November 6. He said instructions would
be sent to the Embassy on November 29.
¶6. (S) Text of the Non-Paper:
Begin Text:
Sale of Brazilian aircraft to Venezuela
On Octoer 28, 2005, the Brazilian Aerospace Company (EMBRAER)
signed a contract with the Venzuelan Air Force, which
provides for the sale of 20 (twenty) Super Tucano airplanes,
for US$169.7 million.
The deal was conluded only after U.S. parts suppliers (which
account for roughly 50 percent of the aircraft compnents)
provided written assurances that the U.S. Government had
nothing against the sale.
According to unofficial information received by EMBRAER,
Washington would be planning to review such decision. The
cancellation of the deal wuld imply significant loss to
EMBRAER. The Brazilian government would highly appreciate
that the U.S. Government maintained its positiion on the
transaction, since all conditions were met at the time of the
signing of the contract.
It is worth recalling that the Supert-Tucano airplanes are
designed to provide operational support in domestic law
enforcement missions, such as air space surveillance, drug
trafficking and guerrilla combat, objectives that this kind
of aircraft is also expected to accomplished in Colombia.
End Text.
Linehan
...