

Currently released so far... 3954 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AM
AE
AG
AR
ASEC
AS
AU
AORC
AJ
AMGT
AGMT
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AEMR
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
CH
CE
CA
CASC
CU
CLINTON
CO
CI
CVIS
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CS
CBW
CD
CV
CMGT
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
EUN
EG
EAID
ENRG
ETTC
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EPET
EINV
EMIN
ECIP
ECPS
EINDETRD
EAGR
EU
EN
EZ
ELAB
ER
ET
ES
EUC
EI
EAIR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
ECA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
IR
IS
IZ
INRB
IAEA
IN
IT
ID
IO
IV
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IC
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KDEM
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KPAL
KN
KS
KZ
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KCRM
KJUS
KSEC
KIPR
KGHG
KIFR
KTFN
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KWAC
KAWC
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGIC
KTIP
KOMC
KHLS
KSPR
KGCC
KPIN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KE
KFRD
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
MOPS
MZ
MO
MNUC
MASS
MARR
MY
MEPP
MCAP
MA
MR
ML
MX
MIL
MTCRE
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
PREL
PTER
PGOV
PO
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PK
PINR
PINT
PBTS
PROP
PE
PL
PREF
POGOV
PINL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PGOF
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SNAR
SA
SY
SOCI
STEINBERG
SP
SENV
SCUL
SF
SO
SR
SG
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
UNSC
UP
UK
USEU
UG
UNMIK
UV
UZ
UY
UN
US
UNGA
UNO
USUN
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05MADRID1879, U.S.-SPAIN COUNCIL: MOD BONO EXPRESSES "PERSONAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05MADRID1879.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05MADRID1879 | 2005-05-17 15:03 | 2010-12-07 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001879
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2015
TAGS: PREL SP
SUBJECT: U.S.-SPAIN COUNCIL: MOD BONO EXPRESSES "PERSONAL
OPPOSITION" TO LIFTING EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.4 (B)
¶1. (C) Summary. The U.S.-Spain Council, a private
bi-national NGO dedicated to strengthening U.S.-Spain
relations, held its tenth annual meeting May 13-16 in
Seville. Participants included U.S. Council Chairman Senator
Chris Dodd, EUR DAS Glyn Davies, Charge Manzanares, Spanish
Minister of Defense Jose Bono, Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
Moratinos, Spain Council Chairman Antonio Garrigues, regional
political officials, and business leaders from both
countries. Prince Felipe hosted a dinner for meeting
participants on the second evening of the event. The most
newsworthy development during the Council meetings was
Minister of Defense Bono's strong, but personal, public
support for maintaining the EU China arms embargo (while
making clear that FM Moratinos had the final word on Spain's
position on the arms embargo) and his acknowledgement that he
may have committed "errors" during his tenure as MOD, a
reference to his statements/measures that have upset
U.S.-Spain bilateral relations. Bono informed Charge that he
had made both comments at the request of Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld. Separately, Moratinos urged the creation of a
U.S.-Spain bilateral commission to meet at the ministerial
level on an annual basis to discuss regional issues of mutual
concern, as well as recommending other measures to enhance
bilateral relations. While the comments of both ministers
were largely positive, veiled swipes at opposition support
for U.S. policy in Iraq reflected a continuing temptation to
drag the USG into domestic political debates. End Summary.
//DEFENSE MINISTER ON CHINA ARMS EMBARGO//
¶2. (C) Bono used a speech to participants in the tenth annual
meeting of the U.S.-Spain Council to announce his personal
opposition to the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China.
He said that it did not make sense to lift the arms embargo
now simply because "a particular EU country wants to sell
weapons to China." Bono told Charge privately that he had
made this statement to honor a request made by Secretary
Rumsfeld during their May 3 meeting in Washington that Bono
make public his views on the China arms embargo.
¶3. (C) While Bono was careful to note in his speech that FM
Moratinos had the ultimate word on the China arms issue
within the Spanish government, his comments nonetheless
created a stir during an otherwise routine meeting of the
Council. Charge learned that FM Moratinos and Socialist
Party Director for International Relations Trinidad Jimenez
called Bono after his speech to criticize the way he had
framed the issue. Bono's comments came just hours after
Moratinos' elaboration of a more nuanced position that tracks
with that of its EU allies (see para 9.) Bono's statement
apparently came as a surprise to members of his staff as
well; an MOD contact called Embassy's Spanish-national
political assistant (who was present for the speech) to
verify Bono's declaration.
¶4. (C) Separately, Bono said during his speech that he may
have committed "errors" during his tenure as Defense Minister
and attributed these mistakes to his lack of experience in
the MOD role. Bono told Charge that this admission, like his
comments opposing the lifting of the EU China arms embargo,
came at the urging of Secretary Rumsfeld. Bono made clear
that he wanted Secretary Rumsfeld to be informed that he had
complied with both requests.
¶5. (C) Bono's comments were not uniformly positive. He said
international peace could not be achieved "without the U.S.
or without the legitimacy (conferred by) the United Nations,"
an implicit defense of the Zapatero government's withdrawal
of troops from Iraq on the grounds that the intervention
lacked a UN mandate. Also, Bono made a general comment to
the effect that his Jesuit education had taught him that "the
ends do not always justify the means." (NOTE: Emboffs in
attendance interpreted this as a veiled criticism of the Iraq
conflict and of the opposition Popular Party's decision to
join the U.S.-led coalition. END NOTE.)
//FOREIGN MINISTER CALLS FOR FORMATION OF U.S.-SPAIN
BILATERAL COMMISSION//
¶6. (U) Moratinos made a wide-ranging speech on U.S.-EU
relations and praised President Bush's expression of support
for a strong Europe during his February visit to Brussels.
He said NATO remained Europe's primary security organization
and argued that there was no contradiction between a strong
NATO and the elaboration of a common EU security and defense
policy. Moratinos recommended increased personnel exchanges
between the U.S. and the EU and the formation of an "EU
caucus" in the U.S. Senate as mechanisms for further
strengthening U.S.-EU ties. Moratinos lauded the USG role in
the international community, particularly its part in
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
¶7. (U) The most notable element of Moratinos' speech was his
call for the establishment of a permanent U.S.-Spain
bilateral commission to meet at least once a year at the
ministerial level for discussions on regional issues,
particularly on Latin America, the Middle East, and the
Mediterranean basin. Moratinos suggested other measures for
strengthening U.S.-Spanish relations, including:
-- joint initiatives to promote shared democratic values in
North Africa and the Middle East;
-- the reinforcement of institutional contacts, for example
through events such as the June 6-10 visit to Washington by
members of the Spanish Parliamentary Commission on
International Relations;
-- increased education exchanges to promote mutual
understanding;
-- the establishment of a joint scientific/industrial
research and development institution; and,
-- the formation of a joint business organization by private
sector members of the U.S.-Spain Council.
¶8. (U) Moratinos described current U.S.-Spain relations in
positive terms. He noted Spain's participation in
peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and
Afghanistan and said Spain could be an important partner for
the USG in other areas as well. Moratinos said Spain's
advantages included its place as the world's eight largest
economy ("bigger than that of G-8 member Canada"), its
influence in Latin America, North Africa, and the Middle
East, and Spain's role in the fight against terrorism.
¶9. (U) While focused on positive aspects of the bilateral
relationship, Moratinos' speech also touched briefly on
points of friction. He said Spain had "recovered the
capacity to engage" the Cuban and Venezuelan governments,
overcoming the tensions those relationships suffered during
the Aznar administration. He insisted that Spain was not
pursuing dialogue as an end in itself, but seeking increased
influence in order to advocate for improved human rights
practices on the part of the Cuban government and to preserve
the rights that still exist in Venezuela. On the EU China
arms embargo, Moratinos noted that any arms sales would be
governed by strict EU controls, but said Beijing had to take
steps to improve human rights conditions before this issue
could move forward.
//PP PARTICIPANT TAKES SHOTS AT ZAPATERO//
¶10. (U) Popular Party leader Mariano Rajoy declined an
invitation to participate in the Council meetings, but PP
Parliamentary spokesman on international relations Gustavo
Aristegui did attend and mounted a withering attack on
Zapatero's handling of U.S.-Spain relations. Aristegui said
the GOS was now taking steps to correct its early mistakes,
but without publicly acknowledging that it had committed
grave errors. His Socialist counterpart Rafael Estrella
(considered among the more pro-U.S. Socialist
parliamentarians) fired back, asking how the USG would view
it if a former president visited Europe to militate
unceasingly against the policies of an incumbent
administration. (NOTE: Both Aristegui and Estrella will be
part of the Parliamentary delegation that will visit
Washington June 6-10. They have invited Charge to meet with
them prior to their departure to review their agenda for the
visit.)
//COMMENT//
¶11. (C) MOD Bono is among the most popular Spanish
politicians and his speech before the U.S.-Spain Council
demonstrated his rhetorical skills. He used the presence of
the media and USG officials to comply with assurances he had
reportedly made to Secretary Rumsfeld, while leaving to FM
Moratinos the unpleasant duty of clarifying Spain's official
position on the EU China arms embargo. For now, the GOS has
evidently opted not to clarify the matter publicly in order
to avoid the appearance of internal discord. More broadly,
we note that both Bono and Moratinos continue to fight a
two-front political battle with the opposition PP, on the one
hand claiming that relations with the USG are as strong as
ever, and on the other casting PP support for USG policies in
Iraq as somehow illegitimate and contrary to international
law. GOS officials have clearly tempered their public
statements on Iraq in the last five months, but our efforts
to keep them from dragging the USG into their domestic
political battles remain a work in progress.
NEALON